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This thesis examines the effect of automation in the rail signalling environment. The 
level of automation in a system can be described as ranging along a continuum from 
manual control to fully autonomous automation and development of appropriate 
automation for a system is likely to enhance overall system performance. Network 
Rail, the company which owns, operates, and maintains the rail infrastructure in the 
UK, envisions increasing levels of automation in future rail systems, but prior to this 
research, little structured evaluation of current automation had been undertaken. 
 
The research performed for this thesis set out to examine the impact of automation 
on rail signalling.  A rail automation model was developed to illustrate the levels of 
automation present in different generations of signalling system. The research 
focussed on one system in particular, the Automatic Routing System (ARS). The ARS 
has been present in modern signalling centres since the late 1980s. It uses timetable 
information to set routes for trains arriving on its area of control and incorporates 
complex algorithms to resolve conflicts between trains.  
 
Multiple methods were used to investigate current signalling automation. An 
understanding of the signalling domain underpinned the research, and a model was 
developed to illustrate the type and level of automation present in different 
generations of current signalling systems. Structured observations were employed to 
investigate differences in activity between individual signallers. As a part of this study, 
a relationship was found between observed intervention levels and some of the trust 
dimensions identified from the literature. A video archive analysis gave initial insight 
into some of the issues signallers had with automation, and semi-structured 
interviews carried out with signallers at their workstations built on these themes. The 
interviews investigated four areas; signallers’ opinions of ARS, system performance 
issues, knowledge of ARS, and interaction with ARS. Data were gathered on a wide 
variety of individual issues, for example on different monitoring strategies employed, 
interaction preferences, signallers’ understanding of the system and their ability to 
predict it. Data on specific issues with ARS also emerged from the interviews, for 
example the impact of poor programming and planning data, and the poor 
competence of the system, particularly during disruption. An experiment was 
performed to investigate the differences between different levels of automation under 
 ii
both normal and disrupted running. The experiment gathered quantitative data on the 
effect of different levels of automation on workload and performance in addition to 
eye tracking data which were used to gain insight into signaller monitoring strategies. 
The results indicate that ARS does reduce workload and increase performance, and 
it does so in spite of deficiencies in terms of feedback to the signaller. This lack of 
feedback makes it difficult for the signaller to understand and predict the automation 
and, hence, creates difficulties for the operator. In addition, the methods for 
controlling ARS are limited and it can be difficult for the signallers to work 
cooperatively with the system. 
 
Principles of good automation were identified from the literature and 
recommendations based on these and the findings of the research were developed 
for future signalling automation systems. These highlighted the importance of 
improving feedback from ARS and the ability of the signaller to direct the system. It is 
anticipated that these improvements would allow the signaller and the automation to 
work more closely together in order to maximise overall system performance. The 
principles of automation are intended as a generic guidance tool and their application 
is not confined to rail signalling. There may also be wider implications from the 
research such as the influence of operators’ ability to understand and predict 
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 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter introduces the research completed for this thesis and the context in 
which it was conducted; that is, rail signalling. The background to the work is 
described, the aims and objectives and the overall research approach are all outlined, 
and an overview of the thesis structure is given. In addition, the domain of rail 
signalling is briefly introduced and the specific system under investigation, the 
Automatic Routing System (ARS), is described.  
1.2 Background 
This research examined automation in rail signalling systems. The most frequently 
cited definition of automation is when a machine (usually a computer) assumes a task 
that is otherwise usually performed by a human operator (Parasuraman & Riley, 
1997). It may be introduced into a system for a variety of reasons, but frequently cited 
reasons for use of automation include achieving tasks more efficiently and reliably 
than human operators. Cited benefits include reduction of operator workload and 
error coupled with a reduction in labour costs. These benefits make automation very 
attractive to businesses wishing to increase efficiency while reducing costs. However, 
automation can lack the flexibility of human operators in the face of novel situations 
and thus difficulties can be encountered when the designers attempt to replace 
human problem solving abilities with automation. Thus, humans are likely to remain 
vital to system performance for many years (Parasuraman & Wickens, 2008).  
 
Automation has been present in rail signalling systems for many years. At a basic 
level the interlocking systems which ensure that signallers do not set conflicting 
routes for trains can be regarded as an early form of automated decision support. 
These have been in place since the 1800s. However, this work primarily concerns the 
most advanced form of automation currently in use on the UK network, namely, 
Automatic Route Setting, or ARS.  
 
Automatic Route Setting was first introduced circa 1989 and is now used in 11 
signalling centres across the UK. Fundamentally, it works by using the programmed 
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timetable for the train service to set the appropriate routes for trains arriving in its 
area of control. This successfully eliminates the mundane work of route setting for the 
signaller. However, ARS also attempts to deal with conflicts between trains; that is, 
when two trains arrive at a section of railway at the same time; the most common 
reason for this would be late running of one or more of the trains. To make effective 
decisions on which train to route first requires expert knowledge of both static and 
dynamic properties of a given situation. Static properties would include the train 
service pattern and the infrastructure layout. Dynamic properties could include the 
relative delay and speeds of the trains involved and the state of the infrastructure at 
that time. Although ARS attempts to account for these variables it is not always 
successful and the signallers then step in to take over. Despite the presence of ARS 
for almost 20 years, little formal research has been conducted on the effectiveness of 
the system and the interactions between the human operator and the automated 
system. Without human factors research it is difficult to improve upon the current 
system. The investigation of how signallers go about working with ARS under these 
kinds of circumstances forms the basis of this research. 
 
Network Rail is currently involved in a major programme of work to upgrade the UK 
rail network and in the future the company has plans to centralise its control facilities. 
At present the intention is to go from approximately 800 signal boxes to 15, with a 
consequent reduction in the workforce. Automation is expected to play an integral 
part in these plans. In order to facilitate the design of the new automated systems 
which will support the centralised control it is important to understand the use of and 
issues with the current system. This future use of automation has been an important 
driver for this work and an outcome of the research will be recommendations for new 
systems drawn from the research conducted on the present system. 
1.3 Aims and Objectives 
The aim of this research is to study a real world automated system (ARS) in order to 
understand the impact of automation on the human operators who work alongside it 
and identify how automation can be implemented to best support overall system 
performance.  
 
Three objectives have been defined to support this aim: 
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1. To develop a theoretical framework within which to research and implement 
human centred automation in rail signalling. 
2. To study current use of automation within rail signalling and understand the 
effect automation has on the signalling task, including: 
a. How signallers monitor the system; 
b. How signallers interact with the system; 
c. Signallers’ understanding of how the system works; 
d. Overall system performance. 
3. To develop recommendations for development and implementation of 
automation in future rail signalling systems. 
 
These objectives were addressed through the development of a conceptual 
framework and a research framework.  The conceptual framework describes how the 
concepts investigated in this research relate and how they contributed to the 
development of recommendations, while the research framework illustrates the 
methods used throughout the research.  
1.4 Research Approach 
Figure 1-1 illustrates the conceptual approach taken to address the objectives. 
Theory and knowledge were identified in the literature and provided a basis to 
support the investigation of the design and use of automation. The review of the 
literature also identified best practice which supported the development of guidance. 
The research undertaken examined the impact of the design of automation on the 
operator, in terms of trust and workload and the performance and behaviour of 
operators using automation, with key themes of monitoring and situation awareness.  
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Figure 1-1: Conceptual Framework 
 
This research was jointly funded by Network Rail and the Engineering and Physical 
Sciences Research Council (EPSRC). As such, the researcher was given the 
opportunity to work within Network Rail for the duration of the research and spent 
three years working full time in the company’s headquarters in London. During this 
time she was fully integrated within Network Rail’s Ergonomics National Specialist 
Team. This immersion provided many opportunities in terms of participation in 
meetings and projects aligned with the research area as well as facilitating direct 
access to people and environments for this research. Working from within Network 
Rail facilitated access to personnel and work sites which otherwise would have been 
very difficult to arrange. This allowed the development of a comprehensive 
understanding of the work tasks and environment associated with rail signalling.  
 
Three research approaches underpinned the work; real world research, mixed 
method research and grounded theory. Figure 1-2 illustrates the research approach 
taken. Real world research is that in which the problem being investigated is set in 
the real world in contrast to a more controlled laboratory setting (Robson, 2002). This 
research was undertaken in the rail environment examining a real world automated 
system and the people who operate it. The complexity, messiness, and inability to 
control the environment associated with the real world approach were apparent 
throughout the research. Hence, the flexible design associated with the real world 
approach was also utilised, and this incorporated a mixed method approach allowing 
the use of multiple methods to investigate problems (Hignett & Wilson, 2004). 
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Hypotheses were not generated at the beginning of the research, but were formed by 
an iterative process throughout the course of research in the manner of Grounded 
Theory (Pidgeon, 1996). 
 
 
Figure 1-2: Research Framework 
 
The starting point was to understand the context of the research, specifically to 
develop a firm appreciation of the nature of the signalling task. This is known as 
‘boot-strapping’ in the cognitive task analysis domain (Chipman, Schraagen, & 
Shalin, 2000). Without this it would have proved impossible to plan studies to 
investigate aspects of the signalling task potentially affected by automation and to 
analyse the data gathered in these studies. Knowledge of signalling was achieved 
initially through participant observation, including direct field observations of 
signallers in a variety of signal boxes. “Field observations support a discovery 
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process, they serve to draw attention to significant phenomena and suggest new 
ideas, the validity and generality of which can then be evaluated through additional 
studies” (Vicente et al., 2001. p. 835). In total, 89 signal box visits were undertaken 
throughout the course of the research (Appendix A) and these facilitated a general 
understanding of the whole system and where and how automation fits within it to 
develop over time in the mind of the researcher. Placement within Network Rail also 
made possible the use of the participant observation approach (Hammersley & 
Atkinson, 1995). All members of the team and other colleagues encountered in the 
organisation were aware of the researcher’s role. Although not classic and fully 
structured participant observation much of the direction of the research and 
interpretation of findings has been influenced by situations and conversations 
encountered on a daily basis, whether within the Ergonomics team, engineering 
teams, operations teams, or front line signalling sites. However, much of this was 
informal and is presented within the thesis as a supporting method which allowed 
greater confidence in the validity of the data gathered using more formal methods 
and to better interpret the findings. Attendance at signalling school also provided 
some specific task training which consolidated knowledge. The work undertaken to 
understand the context of the research was drawn together in the development of a 
rail automation model which describes the automation present in three generations of 
signalling systems. 
 
Once a preliminary understanding of the research context was established a three 
prong approach was taken to the research. The qualitative investigations into ARS 
included semi-structured interviews, questionnaire data, a video archive analysis and 
the overall participant observation approach which provided insight and allowed 
deeper interpretation of the findings from the other methods used.  Structured 
observations, questionnaire data and an experiment were the methods which 
contributed quantitative data to the research. All the research methods used are 
summarised in Appendix B. The taxonomic investigation into good automation was 
achieved through reviews of the literature the principles of automation were 
generated from this and validated using the paired comparisons technique (Sinclair, 
2005). Each of the individual methods used in these investigations will be discussed 
in detail in the relevant chapter. The final goal was to develop recommendations for 
appropriate automation and this was achieved by drawing together the findings from 
all the research undertaken. 
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1.5 Signalling Environment 
The research was conducted entirely within the domain of rail signalling and it is 
important to understand this context. This section gives a brief overview of signalling 
and ARS. Railways require signalling systems to operate safety and efficiently. The 
primary aim of signalling is to ensure separation between trains but signalling 
systems also control the points movements required to set routes for trains (i.e. they 
are also responsible for ensuring trains get to their destination). Separation between 
trains is most often ensured by allowing only one train into a section at a time. 
Entrance to a section is controlled by signals and the presence of a train in that 
section is detected either manually or through sensors such as track circuits or axle 
counters. There are three main forms of signalling system in operation on the UK 
railway today (Figure 1-3); lever frames are the oldest, dating from the 1800s, and 
use levers attached to signals and points to set routes for trains. Entry Exit (NX) 
panels were introduced in the 1950s and allowed the signaller to operate the points 
and signals through button presses, with the physical labour of moving them being 
undertaken automatically. The most recent form of signalling system is the Integrated 
Electronic Control Centre (IECC), developed in the 1980s. This operates like an NX 
panel, but uses Visual Display Units (VDU) and incorporates an automated route 
setting system (ARS). The main focus of this research is ARS, but comparisons will 
be drawn with these other generations of signalling system. 
 
The signaller’s job becomes more complex when he/she is faced with competing 
demands for track occupancy, for example, two trains want to travel over the same 
piece of infrastructure at the same time. This situation is known as a conflict, and the 
signaller must ‘regulate’ the train service to resolve it. Discussions with rail operations 
subject matter experts (SME) determined that regulation may be defined as: 
  
The planning and implementation of train paths over the available 
infrastructure in order to optimise the train service, mitigate the effects of 
disruption, and support recovery from disruption. 
 
Signallers working on lever frames or NX panels are responsible for making these 
decisions, but in IECC signal boxes ARS is capable of making decisions between 
trains.  
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Figure 1-3: Examples of Signalling Systems 
 
Automatic Route Setting (ARS) has been in place since the late 1980s, and was first 
introduced in Liverpool Street IECC. DeltaRail, who now develop ARS, stated that 
(DeltaRail, 2008): 
  
“ARS optimally routes trains using timetable data, current train position and an 
internal representation of the rail network. It can handle severely disrupted 
service patterns and assist the signaller in the event of train or infrastructure 
failures.” 
 
ARS has access to the central timetable services database (TSDB) and each day 
downloads the timetable for all the trains in the area it controls. It then uses codes 
from the timetable to determine the route and timings for each train. As each train 
enters the control area ARS automatically sets the route ahead of the train. 
Algorithms are also incorporated in ARS to compare trains on the workstation to 
decide which to route first. Less advanced forms of route setting automation could 
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either route strictly according to the timetable or operate on a first come first serve 
basis, but ARS attempts to regulate the train service to attain optimal performance. 
 
It does this by holding a list of trains currently in the area and the routes they require. 
All these trains are compared to identify which trains potentially conflict. There are 
three ways a train may conflict; they may travel over the same section of track in the 
same direction, travel over the same section of track in opposite directions, or travel 
over lines which cross. If two conflicting trains require the same route at the same 
time, ARS uses a set of parameters such as train priority, current train delay, and 
predictive forward movements from the timetable to determine the weighted delay for 
each train in this situation. It then sets a route for the train which it calculates causes 
the least delay. 
 
The signaller has no insight into this process. The signalling screens only display 
when routes have been set by ARS and although there is an ability to query ARS 
through the general purpose (GP) screen, this information is not always informative to 
the signaller, particularly if they do not fully understand the processes ARS uses to 
make its decisions. It is impossible for ARS to give information on what it is planning 
to do as it does not make decisions in advance but immediately implements decisions 
made.  
 
Signallers can use reminder devices to constrain ARS. Reminder devices were 
traditionally used in mechanical systems to physically prevent signallers pulling a 
lever to set a route, usually because of some form of blockage on that route. In IECC 
systems, reminder devices placed over signals prevent ARS setting a route to or from 
that signal. The reminder also serves the traditional function of reminding the 
signaller not to set that route. Although intended as a safety device, reminders are 
frequently used by IECC signallers to control ARS as it is a direct and easy way to 
inhibit route setting. 
 
Not all trains are in ARS; this is most likely to be because there is no timetable or an 
incomplete timetable for them in the database. Trains which are not in ARS are 
shown in pink and must be controlled manually. Signallers may also choose to take 
trains out of ARS. This allows signallers to maintain control over that train as it must 
be routed manually, although it can be put back in to ARS if the signaller wishes. 
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Further information on rail signalling, including descriptions of roles and systems and 
more detail on ARS processes, can be found in Appendix C. The reader may find it 
useful to refer to this section for background information. 
1.6 Thesis Structure 
The remainder of this thesis is presented in seven chapters: 
x Chapter 2 – review of the human factors literature with respect to automation. 
This chapter covers the benefits and issues typically encountered with 
automation. Key human factors themes are discussed and principles of 
automation are drawn from the literature.  
x Chapter 3: Rail Automation Model – This chapter describes the development 
of a rail automation model which illustrates the variation in levels of 
automation in different generations of UK signalling systems. 
x Chapter 4: Structured Observations of IECC Signallers. This chapter presents 
the method, results and discussion of observation studies carried out in four 
IECC signal boxes. 
x Chapter 5: Signaller Interviews. This chapter presents the method, results and 
discussion of semi-structured interviews with signallers. The results from 
analysis of pre-existing videos of interviews with signallers in IECCs are also 
presented and discussed in this chapter. 
x Chapter 6: Level of Automation Experiment. This chapter presents the 
method, results and discussion of a simulator experiment designed to 
examine the differences in workload, performance, monitoring, and signaller 
activity between three different levels of automation. 
x Chapter 7: General Discussion. The ARS system is discussed in the light of 
the findings and the methods employed are evaluated. Recommendations for 
future automated signalling systems are given.  
x Chapter 8: Conclusions. The work is concluded in Chapter 8. The 
recommendations are summarised and the impact of this research is stated. 
Recommendations for future research are also outlined. 
1.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has introduced the domain of rail signalling and described the system 
under investigation (ARS). The aims and objectives of the research were outlined and 
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the approach to the research described. Finally, the structure of the thesis was 
outlined. The next chapter will introduce automation and present the taxonomic 
investigations, discussing the relevant human factors literature and producing 12 
principles of automation. 
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CHAPTER 2: AUTOMATION AND HUMAN FACTORS 
2.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter introduces automation of control systems and gives some background 
on the benefits and issues that have been associated with the introduction of 
automation. The existing research on key human factors themes with regard to 
automation is discussed, including trust, situation awareness (SA), workload, 
monitoring, and mental models. The different approaches to the design of automated 
systems are discussed and, finally, 12 principles of automation are drawn from the 
literature. 
2.2 Introduction 
The first stage in this research was a taxonomic investigation of automation. This was 
achieved through a review of the relevant literature and the definition of 12 principles 
of automation from that review. These principles were validated subsequently through 
presentation at conferences and a paired comparisons exercise with human factors 
professionals (Appendix D). The position of this research in the research framework 
is illustrated in Figure 2-1.  
 
The research in the field of human factors of automated systems is presented in this 
chapter. An overview of automation is first provided, with discussion of the benefits 
and issues with introducing automation into a system. Frameworks are then 
presented to describe how the level of automation may vary within a system. Such 
frameworks are often used to investigate the impact of automation on human factors 
concerns such as trust, SA, and workload (e.g. Endsley & Kiris, 1995; Kaber, Perry, 
Segall, McClernon, & Prinzel, 2006). These concerns are discussed in the third 
section of this chapter in addition to the impact of automation on operator monitoring. 
Approaches to the design of automated systems are presented before the existing 
research is drawn together in the form of the 12 principles of automation.  
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Figure 2-1: Position of the Literature Review in the Research Framework 
2.3 Overview of Automation 
Automation is developed and introduced to replace tasks previously performed by 
human operators (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). However, even highly automated 
systems need humans for supervision, adjustment, maintenance, expansion and 
improvement and Parasuraman and Wickens (2008) suggest that humans are likely 
to remain vital to system performance for some time. Automation has many 
strengths, including precision, speed, lack of emotion and distraction but it also has 
weaknesses, not least that it lacks the flexibility which humans possess that allows us 
to adapt to novel or unexpected situations. 
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Technology is the driving force behind automation, and as technology continues to 
increase in power and reduce in size and cost, it is likely to drive automation even 
further (Wiener & Curry, 1980). The potential for automation to operate systems more 
economically has also added to the lure of automation. This push of technology 
coupled with the pull of potential efficiency gains has made automation of complex 
systems increasingly common. However, wholly automated systems (i.e. systems 
with no human operator) in complex industries are rare and are generally confined to 
closed systems, such as industrial manufacturing. Most automated systems have at 
least one human operator to monitor their performance. The interaction between the 
human and automation creates a number of human factors issues. This chapter 
discusses the concept of automation, the benefits and issues, and the associated 
human factors issues.  
 
There are a number of perceived benefits of automation; these include a reduction in 
human error, a saving on labour costs and a reduction in human workload 
(Bainbridge, 1983; Dekker, 2004; Hollnagel, 2001). Automation certainly contains the 
potential to bring about a reduction in human error, labour costs and workload but 
these benefits are not always realised when an automated system is introduced. 
Human error may be reduced in the task performance; however, machines are 
manufactured, programmed and maintained by humans and an error may occur at 
any one of these stages which does not become manifest until the operational stage 
(Wiener & Curry, 1980). Thus, human error may still occur in highly automated 
systems. In addition, these errors may be hidden and lie unknown within the system 
and so they have the potential for severe consequences (Wickens, 1992). It may be 
more accurate to say that automation can reduce the human variability associated 
with task performance, rather than human error.  
 
In respect of labour costs, it must be noted that automation does not usually replace 
the human operator in totality; usually a new role is created for a human supervisor or 
operator. In addition, there are new job roles associated with the design, 
manufacture, programming and maintenance of the automated machine and these 
roles may be more skilled, higher paid jobs than those the automation is designed to 
replace. Hence, the saving in labour costs may not be as high as is sometimes 
perceived. Well designed automation may lead to a reduced workload; however, it is 
often the case that while a reduction in physical workload is achieved, there is a 
potential increase in mental workload for the operator. Automation may also lead to 
peaks and troughs in workload (Woods, 1996) if it reduces workload during periods 
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when workload was already low but becomes a burden during higher workload 
phases.  
 
Introduction of automation is often based more on these perceived benefits rather 
than whether it is appropriate. Wickens (1992) listed three circumstances where it is 
appropriate to introduce automation; automation which is employed to perform a 
function that is beyond the capabilities of a human operator, for example performing 
complex calculations at high speed or highly precise measurement; automation which 
performs functions at which human operators are poor, for example monitoring a 
system for a single failure event; and automation which provides assistance to human 
performance, for example augmenting information on display systems.  
 
Aside from the benefits there are also many problems in which automation of a 
system may result; Bainbridge (1983) highlighted a number of such problems in an 
important discussion on the ironies of automation. She suggested that the 
introduction of automation is often ironic as it replaces tasks humans perform 
reasonably well or easily and leaves the operator to perform tasks which were too 
difficult to automate. For example, operators may be required to take over from the 
automation under unusual or failure conditions. This is the time when the tasks are 
most difficult, but when automated support is often lowest. Other examples of issues 
with automated systems include low reliability automated systems or those with a 
tendency to err as this may induce low operator trust which results in low usage of 
the automation (Sheridan, 1999). Operators who are not actively involved in the 
control may suffer from out of loop unfamiliarity (Wickens, 1992) or loss of SA 
(Endsley, 1996), and this can become a major problem if they are required to take 
over from the automation, especially during emergency circumstances. Another 
problem may be the loss of skills on the part of the operator as they are no longer 
required to use them regularly (Bainbridge, 1983); again, this may be an issue during 
system failures when the operator is required to take over from the automation 
quickly and effectively.  
 
Automation therefore may be implemented with varying degrees of success, and 
introducing it into a system requires careful analysis, planning, and testing to ensure 
maximum benefit is achieved. The level of automation in a system is a key factor in 
determining the benefits and issues which may arise from the introduction of that 
automation.  
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2.4 Levels of Automation 
The level of automation employed in an automated system may vary along a 
continuum from no automation at all through to fully autonomous operation. The 
literature contains a number of models describing the level of automation (Billings, 
1991; Endsley & Kiris, 1995; Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000). These 
models all range from complete manual control through to autonomous automation 
but use different scales to describe the intermediate levels of automation. Manual 
operation is usually included in such models as a base level. Figure 2-2 shows a 













Figure 2-2: Levels of Automation (Billings, 1991). 
 
During the lower three levels in this model the operator still has a degree of manual 
control (i.e. he/she is still responsible for physically completing tasks). As automation 
moves into the next three levels the operator takes a more managerial role, either 
instructing the automation to perform specific tasks (management by delegation), 
giving consent for automatically identified options to be executed (management by 
consent) or vetoing options chosen by the automation (management by exception). 
Autonomous operation has no operator involvement in normal operations. The 
highest levels, management by exception and autonomous operation, exclude the 
operator from the decision making process and are therefore undesirable as the 
operator cannot work cooperatively with the automation and is ill prepared to assume 
control if it fails (Hollnagel, 2001). Therefore, in the higher levels of automation, 
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management by delegation or consent may be preferable because they keep the 
operator in the loop and this view is supported by research which found higher levels 
of performance for management by consent levels of automation as compared to 
higher and lower levels (Ruff, Narayanan, & Draper, 2002).  
 
Endsley and Kiris (1995) developed a similar scale with only five points (Figure 2-3), 
although other 10 point scales have been developed by Endsley and Kaber (1999). 
This is very similar to the model developed by Billings (1991) with the lower levels of 
automation having the human operator make decisions and the higher levels moving 
the decision making increasingly towards the system.  
 
 
Figure 2-3: Levels of Automation (Endsley & Kiris, 1995) 
 
Although different levels of automation have been developed by different 
researchers, they all use the same approach of creating a scale on which to rank the 
level of automation (Moray, Inagaki, & Itoh, 2000). The scales vary in wording and 
graduation but most are complementary and employ one scale to describe the 
automation, often focussing on where the responsibility for decision making lies. The 
exception to this is a model for types and levels of automation developed by 
Parasuraman et al. (2000) and based on original work by Sheridan and Verplank 
(1978). 
 
This model used a four stage model of human information processing to describe 
different levels of automation (Parasuraman et al., 2000). Human information 
processing describes the human perception and analysis of information to reach and 
implement decisions. Wickens and Carswell (1997) presented the model shown in 
Figure 2-4 as a typical representation of human information processing. Information is 
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received through the senses and cognitively acted upon. A response is selected and 
executed and the effect is perceived and fed back through the model (Wickens, 
Gordon, & Liu, 1998).  
 
 
Figure 2-4: Human Information Processing (Wickens & Carswell, 1997, p. 91) 
 
Parasuraman et al. (2000) simplified this model for their work on automation into the 
four stage model shown in Figure 2-5. Interestingly, human information processing 
models were developed using the metaphor of the digital computer (Wickens & 
Carswell, 1997), so by applying it to automation, Parasuraman et al. are reapplying 
this metaphor to its origins.  
 
 
Figure 2-5: Human Information Processing (Parasuraman et al., 2000) 
 
The four stages of the model are information acquisition (sensory processing), 
information analysis (perception/working memory), decision and action selection 
(decision making), and action implementation (response selection). Information 
acquisition refers to the sensing of data and includes positioning and orienting of 
sensory receptors, sensory processing, initial pre-processing of data prior to full 
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perception and manipulation of processed and retrieved information in working 
memory. Decision and action selection involves choosing from the decision 
alternatives. The final stage, action implementation, refers to the execution of the 
action choice and typically replaces the human hand or voice.  Each of these 
functional dimensions is assigned a level of automation, for example on a scale of 1-
8. A potential scale is shown in Figure 2-6 (Sheridan, 1998).  
 
 
Figure 2-6: Levels of Automation (Sheridan, 1998) 
 
Once levels have been assigned a graph can then be produced for an automated 
system, showing how the automation varies through each stage (Sheridan, 1998). In 
Figure 2-7, three examples of different systems are illustrated. The circles represent 
a potential voting system for an organisation; the acquisition of information is manual, 
although email could be used and so this is assigned to Level 2. The results are 
analysed by the computer and the winner decided automatically. Power is transferred 
to the winner with the aid of the computer for passing on information. The black 
squares represent advice on a new air traffic control system; information acquisition 
and analysis are recommended to be highly automated (e.g. radar, weather 
information, etc.). Decision making is recommended to be manual and since 
implementation is in the hands of the pilots, autopilots are likely to be involved. The 
open squares represent a typical robotic manufacturing task. A computer system 
acquires all the data and performs the analysis, and the results are available for a 
human supervisor to check. The analysis results are passed on to a decision 
algorithm and the results of this are displayed to the operator. The decision is 
implemented by a robot in a fully automatic fashion (Sheridan). 
1. The computer offers no assistance; the human must do it all 
2. The computer suggests alternative ways to do the task 
3. The computer selects one way to do the task, and 
4. …executes that suggestion if the human approves, or 
5. …allows the human a restricted time to veto before automatic 
execution, or 
6. …executes automatically, then necessarily informs the human, or 
7. …executes automatically, then informs the human only if asked 
8. The computer selects, executes, and ignores the human. HIGH 
LOW 
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Figure 2-7: Graphical Representation of Levels of Automation (Sheridan, 1998) 
 
The advantage of this model, as described in these examples, is the ability to 
differentiate between types of automation within a system. This means that individual 
automation systems can be modelled more accurately. For example, an automated 
system may have high levels of information acquisition and action implementation 
automation but leave the operator to analyse the information and make decisions. It 
is not possible to represent this situation on any of the other models found in the 
literature.  
 
Classifying levels of automation using models such as those described provides a 
framework to support the design of automation (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 
2008) but it also usefully provides a structure within which to research optimal levels 
of automation, and this approach is commonly found in empirical research on 
automation (Endsley & Kaber, 1999; Kaber et al., 2006). Some of the issues which 
have received specific attention in the research are discussed in the following 
sections. 
2.5 Human Factors Concerns 
The introduction of automation, and the level/design of that automation, creates new 
issues for the human operator. The impact of automation on four such issues is 
















ACQUIRE ANALYSE DECIDE IMPLEMENT 
Task of holding an election of officers for an organisation 
Advice on new air traffic control systems 
Typical manufacturing robotics task 
LOW 
HIGH 
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2.5.1 Trust in Automation 
Trust has been identified as a potentially important construct by researchers who 
theorise that low levels of trust in automation may influence operators’ usage (Muir, 
1987; Sheridan, 1999). Muir (1994) stated that if it was not possible to build 
automated systems which are trustworthy, then we could not build automated 
systems at all. Several studies have found a correlation between trust levels and use 
of automated systems (de-Vries, Midden, & Bouwhuis, 2003; Lewandowsky, Mundy, 
& Tan, 2000; Moray et al., 2000; Muir & Moray, 1989). Operators only use automation 
to the extent that they trust it; if operators distrust automation they will reject it, 
preferring to perform the task manually. 
 
There is much discussion in the literature regarding a definition of trust, but the work 
of both Barber (1983) and Rempel, Holmes, and Zanna (1985) form the most 
common basis for a definition. These were developed to represent interpersonal trust 
but have been commonly used to define human-automation trust (Madhavan & 
Wiegmann, 2007). Both are three stage definitions, and can be regarded as 
overlapping somewhat. The first stage involves the creation of an accurate mental 
model which allows the operator to understand and predict the behaviour of the 
system (Muir, 1987). This implies that trust is dependent upon understanding of the 
system (Lee, 1991). The second stage concerns the ability of the system to correctly 
perform its tasks and can be regarded as the most important for human-automation 
trust (Muir). This might also be called reliability or competence and refers to the 
performance of the system (Lee). Barber identified three types of technical 
competence that one human might expect from another: expert knowledge, technical 
facility, and everyday routine performance. These three factors roughly correspond to 
Rasmussen’s (1983) taxonomy of knowledge, rule, and skill based behaviour. 
Automation may be capable of carrying out only one of these three factors but still be 
able to perform its individual task satisfactorily. The final dimension can be labelled 
faith, and becomes important when the automation is more competent than the 
human operator. The operator is therefore unable to evaluate the automation and 
must rely on an assessment of the automation’s responsibility. These three stages 
may be sequential. Operators initially trust a system if they find it to be predictable; 
once predictability has been established, they find the system to be dependable. 
Faith requires belief in the referent beyond that for which there is direct evidence. 
Faith in automation may be based upon the evidence gathered during the 
predictability and dependability stages but also upon belief that the machine can cope 
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with certain events, even though those exact events may not have been encountered 
before (Rempel et al.). 
 
Both the above definitions suggest that trust is a multi-dimensional concept and there 
are many factors which can influence an operator’s trust in an automated system. 
Research, much of it using a pasteurisation plant simulation, has consistently shown 
that automation reliability is closely related to operator trust (Lee & Moray, 1994; Muir 
& Moray, 1989; Wiegmann, Rich, & Zhang, 2001). In fact there are two facets to 
reliability, an automated system may be reliable in the sense that it does not suffer 
mechanical failure, but it must also be reliable in the sense of making correct 
decisions consistently or performing its function well. This second facet can be 
labelled ‘competence’ for clarity (Madsen & Gregor, 2000; Muir & Moray, 1996; 
Parasuraman et al., 2000). System competence has been found to be the greatest 
predictor of the operator’s overall trust (Muir & Moray, 1989) and operator trust may 
be affected differently by different levels of system incompetence. Small errors, even 
those which do not affect performance, may greatly reduce trust while operators have 
been found to become increasingly less sensitive to larger errors (Lee & Moray, 
1992; Muir & Moray). Automation must therefore be extremely reliable if high levels of 
trust and usage are to be achieved.  
 
Such research highlights the importance of highly reliable and competent automation; 
however, operators may perceive even unreliable automation to be better than 
manual operation. Riley (1996) suggested that operators’ trust in, or decision to rely 
on, automation is strongly influenced by the operators’ self confidence. If an operator 
has more confidence in his/her own abilities than in the automation then they are 
more likely to perform the task manually, and research using the pasteurisation plant 
simulation has confirmed this relationship (Lee & Moray, 1992, 1994). Operators 
used the automated system when conditions became such that they could not 
manage the system manually (e.g. during faults). Despite the low reliability, the 
automation became useful to the operator (Sheridan, 1999). The type of automation 
error and the consequences of that error also influence usage (Jiang et al., 2004); for 
example, if the automation makes an incorrect decision which causes further 
problems for an already overloaded operator they are more likely to discontinue using 
the automation. The interplay between competence, usefulness and self confidence 
may be quite complex, but to ensure automation is useful and utilised it is clear that 
the first requirement is reliability, both in the sense of repeated consistent functioning 
and competent decision making. 
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Safety critical systems are likely to be highly reliable and competent, and operators 
highly trained and confident in their abilities, and in these cases other factors may 
influence trust. Feedback from the automation becomes particularly important as 
automation becomes more complex and possibly even exceeds operator 
competence. Operators require explicit and appropriate feedback on its intentions in 
order to develop appropriate expectations (Sarter, Woods, & Billings, 1997; Sheridan, 
1999). Good feedback may even counter the loss of trust in automation with low 
reliability and increase automation use. Research has shown that if operators are 
given an explanation as to why the automation might err then trust and usage levels 
can be maintained (Beck, Dzindolet, & Pierce, 2007; Dzindolet, Peterson, Pomranky, 
Pierce, & Beck, 2003). Simpler automation systems may not require advanced levels 
of feedback as the operator may be capable of understanding and predicting the 
automation without such prompts. It is the ability to develop an accurate mental 
model which the operator can use to understand and accurately predict future 
behaviour of the system which facilitates trust (Madsen & Gregor, 2000; Muir & 
Moray, 1996; Sheridan, 1999).  
 
The investigation of mental models would be a study in itself (Bristol, 2005); a short 
overview of mental models is given here due to their relevance to trust in automation. 
“A mental model is an individual’s cognitive representation of how a system operates. 
Mental models enable an individual to describe, explain, and make predictions about 
system operations” (Scerbo, 1996, p. 54). The purpose of mental models is illustrated 
in Figure 2-8.  
 
 








WHY A SYSTEM EXISTS 
HOW A SYSTEM OPERATES 
WHAT A SYSTEM IS 
WHAT A SYSTEM LOOKS LIKE
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Wickens (1992) stated that successful performance in control rooms depends on a 
good mental model of the system allowing operators to anticipate future system 
states, formulate plans, and troubleshoot effectively and poor or inaccurate mental 
models have been associated with incidents and accidents (Sheridan & 
Parasuraman, 2006). Operators who possess an accurate mental model can make 
correct judgements on when an automated system can be relied on and when it 
should not be relied on. This is referred to as ‘trust calibration’.  
 
Calibration of trust refers to the correspondence between a person’s trust in the 
automation and the automation capabilities (Lee & See, 2004; Madhavan & 
Wiegmann, 2007). If trust is miscalibrated the result is inappropriate reliance on the 
automation, either overtrust or undertrust. For a system to work optimally, the 
operator’s level of trust in the automation must be correctly calibrated (i.e. it should 
match the actual capabilities of the automation). These capabilities may vary in 
different circumstances; for example, automation may be competent in one set of 
circumstances but not in another. Operators should be able to recognise when 
automation can be relied upon and when it cannot. However, trust is not always 
uniform between different operators. Pre-existing factors such as experience with 
technology and familiarity may influence operator trust (Sheridan, 1999) meaning that 
individuals may have different trust levels for the same automated system. Merritt and 
Ilgen (2008) found that individual differences did affect perceptions of automation 
competence and hence influenced trust. Interestingly, they also found that individuals 
who had higher expectations of and a propensity to trust automation had the largest 
negative impact on trust when the automation failed. This suggests that correct 
calibration, and optimal automation usage, for less than perfectly reliable automation 
may more likely be achieved by individuals who are not predisposed to trust the 
automation. 
 
As trust is a multi-dimensional concept and is dependent on circumstances, features 
of the automation, and individual differences it is difficult to measure. There is no 
direct objective measurement of trust and so measurement tends to depend on 
subjective ratings on the dimensions believed to influence trust, including reliability, 
competence, understandability, faith, personal attachment, and deception (Atoyan, 
Duquet, & Robert, 2006; Bisantz & Seong, 2001; Jian, Bisantz, & Drury, 2000; 
Madsen & Gregor, 2000). 
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The key findings on trust are summarised in Table 2-1. Experimental studies have 
provided evidence of the tendency for operators not to use automation if they distrust 
it, although this result is tempered by an operator’s level of self confidence in 
handling the system without the aid of the automation. The effect of reliability or error 
rates on trust and subsequent usage of trust has been conclusively proven. Evidence 
also exists to support the notion of competence as a key dimension in trust and there 
is some support for the idea that understanding automation can improve the rating of 
trust. However, it is important to note that some aspects of trust are not influenced by 
the system itself but are related to the individual and outside the control of system 
designers.  
 
Key Finding Author 
There is a correlation between trust in and usage of 
automation. 
Muir & Moray, 1989; 
de-Vries, Midden, & 
Bowhuis, 2003 
High reliability and competence are fundamental 
requirements for trust in automation. 
Muir & Moray, 1989; 
Wiegmann, Rich & 
Zhang, 2001 
Operator self-confidence and the usefulness of the 
automation also influence usage. 
Lee & Moray, 1992; 1994
For complex systems, explicit feedback is required to 
develop trust. 
Sarter et al., 1997; 
Sheridan, 1999; 
Dzindolet et al., 2003 
Trust must be well calibrated to ensure optimal use of 
automation. 
Lee & See, 2004; 
Madhavan & Wiegmann, 
2007 
Accurate mental models are important to ensure correct 
calibration of trust. 
Sheridan & 
Parasuraman, 2006 
Individual differences influence trust. Merritt & Ilgen, 2008 
Table 2-1: Summary of Key Research on Trust 
2.5.2 Situation Awareness and Automation 
Situation awareness can be thought of as a person’s real time mental model of the 
world around them and is central to effective decision making and control in dynamic 
systems. The most common definition of SA is “the perception of the elements in the 
environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning 
and the projection of their status in the near future” (Endsley, 1996, p. 164). These 
three elements of SA are typically referred to as levels with each level building on the 
previous and representing a more advanced state of SA. The three levels are: the 
perception of critical factors in the environment (SA level 1), understanding what 
these factors mean, particularly in relation to the achievement of goals (SA level 2), 
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and being able to predict what will happen to the system in the near future (SA level 
3).  
 
Automation holds the potential to affect an operator’s SA by reducing their direct 
involvement in the system and hence their perception of the environment may be 
reduced, either through complacency or through reduced quality in the feedback from 
the automation. Complacency may be a particular risk for highly reliable systems in 
which the operator rarely, if ever, is required to intervene (Endsley, 1996). Over 
longer periods, use of automation may also degrade the operators’ capability to 
understand what changes in the environment mean, affecting the higher levels of SA.  
The complexity of some automated systems can also make the higher levels of SA 
harder to achieve as the systems become less understandable and have a resulting 
impact on the operator’s ability to predict future system state. Although operators may 
not require a high level of SA if the automation is performing well, it may prove critical 
following a failure. In automated systems, this potential loss of SA is often referred to 
as out-of-the-loop unfamiliarity. In contrast, automation may also hold the potential to 
improve operator SA if it is designed and implemented in a manner which optimises 
operator workload, gives good feedback, and keeps the operator involved in the 
system (Billings, 1991). 
 
In order to understand the impact of automation on SA it is necessary to measure 
operator SA. There are three principal methods of measuring SA: freeze probe 
measures, real-time probe techniques, and self-rating scales. Situation Awareness 
Global Assessment Technique (SAGAT; Endsley, 2000) is the most common freeze 
probe technique (Salmon, Stanton, Walker, & Green, 2006) and has the advantage of 
being an objective technique. However, generally it can only be used in conjunction 
with a simulator as it involves freezing the simulation at random intervals, blanking 
the display, and questioning the operator on their current perceptions of the situation. 
These answers are then compared to the actual situation to determine the 
participants’ accuracy (Endsley, 1996). The requirement to use a simulator means 
that the use of SAGAT is limited to experimental settings and cannot be used in real 
world settings. Realism is further reduced by the requirement to freeze the simulation 
to administer the tool. Real-time probe measures such as Situation Present 
Assessment Measure (SPAM; Durso & Dattel, 2004) alleviate the necessity to freeze 
the simulation by incorporating the probes into the simulation. The measurement of 
SA is based on the time taken for the operator to respond to the probes. Another 
advantage of this method is that measurement of SA using this tool is not affected by 
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memory decay, as could be the case with SAGAT (Wickens, 2008). It is also possible 
that, with care, this measure could be applied in a real world setting and so is not 
confined to simulators. 
 
Both probe techniques represent an intrusion for the operator which the researcher 
may wish to avoid. In these cases, self-rating scales are commonly used and 
Situation Awareness Rating Technique (SART) is the most common of these. This 
tool was originally developed to assess aircrew SA (Taylor, 1990, in Salmon et al., 
2006) and asks the participant to rate themselves on 10 dimensions post trial. Three 
key dimensions from SART of attentional demand, attentional supply, and 
understanding have since been identified and form the 3D-SART tool (Jones, 2000). 
Although SART is easier and less intrusive to administer than probe measures, it can 
only collect data on the whole trial so SA cannot be measured for specific 
circumstances. Less commonly, SA may also be measured using observer rating 
scales. Observer rating scales typically involve an SME observing an operator and 
rating their SA (Salmon et al., 2006). However, for this method to be effective there 
must be visible cues for the SME to observe. This is likely to be a particular issue with 
automated systems as operators’ physical interactions, and hence visible cues, are 
reduced. The final point to make on measurement of SA is common to all measures, 
and that is the requirement to first understand what SA consists of. Different systems 
and tasks have different SA requirements and so the first step in measuring SA in a 
new context must be a thorough understanding of the elements necessary to build 
and maintain SA in that context (Endsley & Rodgers, 1994). 
 
Research on SA and automation aims to answer the question of whether operators 
are less aware of changes in the environment when those changes are under the 
control of another agent and so experimental studies in the area have typically 
focussed on how SA varies with level of automation (Durso & Sethumadhavan, 
2008). The levels of automation investigated range from full manual control, through 
intermediate levels where the operator is responsible for decision making, to fully 
autonomous automation. Few effects of high levels of automation have been found 
on Level 1 SA, although one experiment found that Level 1 SA improved when 
information acquisition was automated but decision making was manual (Kaber et al., 
2006). This suggests that the use of information is more important for SA than the 
gathering of that information.  
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Two studies in two different domains have shown Level 2 SA to be significantly 
increased in intermediate levels of automation as compared to full automation 
(Endsley & Kiris, 1995; Kaber & Endsley, 2004). These results suggest that keeping 
the operator involved in the decision making process produces increased SA and 
although this increase in SA was not always accompanied by a corresponding 
increase in system performance, it did allow participants to perform better following 
automation failures, a result also found by Kaber, Onal, and Endsley (2000). 
However, SA is not always highest at intermediate levels of automation, as illustrated 
by Endsley and Kaber (1999). Their experiment found SA was increased during the 
highest levels of automation. This experiment differed in that participants were 
novices who had only a very short training time on the system. It seems likely that 
these participants struggled to control the system manually and so when their 
resources were freed during the higher levels of automation they were able to pay 
more attention to the system and hence improve SA. This study highlights an 
important point; SA does not only suffer when operators are taken out of the loop by 
automation, but also when operators are overloaded.  
 
All the empirical research found in the literature was based in artificial simulated 
environments with no empirical data coming from real world research. However, 
accident data from the aviation domain may give some insight into the effect of 
automation on SA. There are a number of accident investigations which have 
identified lack of SA, or out-of-the-loop unfamiliarity, as a causal factor, for example, 
an accident in New York in 1984 in which the pilot was unaware of the airspeed as 
this was under automatic control at the time of the accident (Wickens, 1992). Such 
accidents suggest that lack of SA due to automation does have a real effect; 
however, it is also possible that such accidents were due to other more critical factors 
such as pilot distraction or overload which resulted in low SA (Dekker, 2004). 
Nevertheless, it can be concluded that automation systems must be designed to 
support operator SA under a variety of conditions to ensure safe performance.  
 
Table 2-2 summarises the key findings of the literature review on SA. It is clear that 
SA can be affected by the level of automation in a system. That effect may be 
positive or negative, depending on the tasks that must be achieved, which are 
automated, and how they are automated. Automation which is designed to keep the 
operator in the loop while eliminating menial tasks to reduce workload is likely to 
create optimal SA.  
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Key Finding Author 
Level 1 SA is higher during automated operation of 
information acquisition, suggesting that the use of 
information is more important for SA than gathering the 
information. 
Kaber et al., 2006 
Level 2 SA is higher during intermediate levels of 
automation. 
Endsley & Kiris 1995; 
Endsley & Kaber, 1999 
Level 2 SA may be improved by automation during high 
workload conditions. 
Endsley & Kaber, 1999 
Performance during automation failures is better with 
higher SA. 
Kaber et al., 2000 
Well designed automation has the potential to improve 
operator SA. 
Billings, 1991 
SA is also affected by high workload conditions. Endsley & Kaber, 1999 
Table 2-2: Summary of Key Research on Situation Awareness 
2.5.3 Workload and Automation 
Automation is commonly introduced into systems on the basis that it will reduce 
operator workload and hence facilitate more efficient operation. Workload is a difficult 
concept to define but refers to the load or demand imposed on the human operator 
(Wickens & Dixon, 2007). These demands may be physical or cognitive in nature. 
The simple four stage human information processing model (Parasuraman et al., 
2000) can be used to separate physical demands from cognitive demands, with 
information acquisition and action implementation generating predominantly physical 
demands for the operator, and information analysis and decision and action selection 
generating predominantly cognitive demands. In many ways, mechanisation and 
automation have reduced or eliminating much of the physical demand on humans, 
but the introduction of technology into society may have increased daily cognitive 
demands, for example by driving a car or interacting with a computer (Megaw, 2005). 
Similarly with automation of control systems, the information acquisition and action 
implementation phases of systems are typically easier to automate so operators have 
a reduced physical workload but their cognitive load may not be reduced. However, 
the physical demands can sometimes be more obvious and system designers may 
seize this reduction as an opportunity to increase the control area, increasing the 
cognitive workload for the operator as he is required to assimilate greater amounts of 
information to maintain SA (Macdonald, 1999). It is important to note that automation 
does hold the potential to assist the operator during high workload conditions, and 
automated systems are most successful when they achieve this (Dixon & Wickens, 
2006). 
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Workload also varies between normal and disrupted, or failure, conditions. It may be 
acceptable during normal operations, but if the automation fails, or conditions occur 
which are outside its capabilities, workload may rise to levels at which operators 
cannot maintain satisfactory performance. The capacity for automation to reduce 
workload during normal conditions, when workload may already have been 
acceptable, but to fail to assist during high workload conditions is known as ‘clumsy 
automation’ (Wiener, 1989; Woods, 1996). With highly reliable systems it may be the 
case that failures are so rare that any performance decrement during a failure is an 
acceptable risk and so workload during failures is not a design consideration. 
However, workload which is too high is only one side of the issue, performance may 
also be affected if operators are underloaded and highly reliable automation which 
leaves the operator with too little to do may risk this (Young & Stanton, 2002). 
Operators who are underloaded may become bored and suffer lower SA as they 
become distracted. In order to understand the overall effect of automation on 
workload it is necessary to choose appropriate techniques with which to measure it. 
 
There are four main categories of workload measurement; performance based 
measurement, physiological, analytical, and subjective measures (Megaw, 2005). 
Performance based measures may assess the performance of the participant at the 
task under review (primary measure) or their performance on a secondary task 
(secondary task measure). A secondary task may be useful if it is difficult to measure 
the success of a primary task. It aims to establish the spare capacity of the participant 
after completing the primary task and uses the amount of spare capacity as a 
measure of primary workload.  Physiological measures such as cardiac activity, brain 
activity, galvanic skin response, eye function, and hormonal analysis have the 
advantage of being objective, but they may only apply to one dimension of workload 
and can be difficult and expensive to administer, particularly in a real world setting 
(Megaw). There is also variability in the results and no physiological measure has yet 
been accepted as standard (Sheridan, 2002). Analytical measures use system 
models based on information processing and resource theories to estimate workload 
but they require significant time and effort to develop and use (Pickup, 2006). 
Subjective measures are the most frequently used method of assessing workload. 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration Task Load Index (NASA-TLX; 
Hart & Staveland, 1988) is a common subjective measure of workload and provides a 
reliable measure of overall workload on a scale of 0 to 100. Operators are asked to 
rate their workload on a number of pre-determined scales including mental demand, 
temporal demand, physical demand, performance, effort, and frustration (Harris, 
Chapter 2: Automation and Human Factors 
31 
Hancock, Arthur, & Caird, 1995). Alternatives include the Cooper-Harper and Bedford 
scales developed to assess the controllability of new aircraft, and the Subjective 
Workload Assessment Technique (SWAT) which uses three three-point scales to rate 
subjective workload (Megaw).  
 
Using these measurement techniques, experimental studies have shown that 
automation has the potential to reduce workload in domains such as telerobotics and 
aviation (Endsley & Kaber, 1999; Harris et al., 1995; Kaber et al., 2000; Kantowitz, 
1994). A study by Kaber et al. (2006) determined that there is a larger workload 
reduction when information acquisition and action implementation are automated as 
compared to information analysis and decision making. Although workload is 
generally reduced by automation, some studies have suggested that a requirement to 
continuously monitor automation actually increases workload (Kaber & Endsley, 
2004; Warm, Dember, & Hancock, 1996). The effort associated with remaining 
vigilant is high (Warm et al.) and workload may also be increased by the necessity to 
extract data regarding analysis and decisions made by the automation. This would 
explain why automation is more successful at reducing workload in the information 
acquisition and analysis functional dimensions. Operators’ cognitive workload may be 
just as high, or even higher, during automated decision making as they make their 
own decisions as a basis for comparison with the automation. Data on the effect of 
automation on workload in the real world come from analyses of the Aviation Safety 
Reporting System (Renyard, Billings, Cheaney, & Hardy, 1986) in which incidents 
involving automation and workload were found to be more common on advanced 
automation glass cockpit flight decks than less advanced aircraft (Kantowitz, 1994). 
The incidents also tended to be more severe. This suggests that automated systems 
hold the potential for workload to spiral upward to the point where operators can no 
longer cope. In contrast, manual systems are more easily paced by the operator. For 
real world automated systems, it may be more important to ensure operators can 
perform safety and efficiently under all circumstances than at low workload under 
some. 
 
These findings suggest that careful consideration of cognitive workload needs to be 
taken when automation is introduced, particularly with regard to abnormal operations 
or situations. Maintaining balanced and manageable level of operator workload 
during different phases of control is likely to result in an optimal level of performance. 
Table 2-3 summarises the key findings on workload and automation.  
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Key Finding Author 
Automation can reduce workload during normal 
operations. 
Kantowitz, 1994; 
Endsley & Kaber, 1999; 
Harris et al., 1995; 
Kaber et al., 2000  
Automation of information acquisition and action 
implementation have a greater effect on workload. 
Kaber et al., 2006 
Monitoring of automation may increase workload. Kaber & Endsley, 2004; 
Warm et al., 1996 
Automation may increase workload during incidents. Kantowitz, 1994 
Table 2-3: Summary of Key Research on Workload 
2.5.4 Monitoring of Automation 
A major effect of automation is the transition of the operators’ role from one of 
monitoring which is integrated with control to one of monitoring for automation 
failures. This difference is often referred to in terms of ‘active control’ and ‘passive 
monitoring’ (Endsley & Kiris, 1995; Liu, Fuld, & Wickens, 1993; Metzger & 
Parasuraman, 2001). The suggestion is that manual control is an active process 
whereas monitoring of an automated system is a more passive role for the human 
operator. This may not be a positive change as humans are not well equipped for the 
monitoring task due to working memory limitations (Shorrock & Straeter, 2006; 
Wiener, 1985). Ironically, automation is often applied because the system designers 
believe it can do the job better than the operator, but the operator is still required to 
monitor that it is working effectively (Bainbridge, 1983). This monitoring work may be 
more mentally demanding than manual control (Parasuraman, Mouloua, & Molloy, 
1996), especially considering the number of different components it may be 
necessary to monitor, many of which may operate faster and in a more complex 
manner than humans are capable of (Shorrock & Straeter). Furthermore, automation 
may remove the operator from the ‘loop’ potentially hindering effective monitoring and 
in the event of a problem requiring intervention, operators who are only involved in 
monitoring may have slower reactions as they gather the information necessary to 
understand the situation (Endsley, 1996).  
 
Endsley and Kiris (1995) implied that ‘passive monitoring’ is associated with lower 
cognitive processing, suggesting that when operators are monitoring they are 
passively rather than actively processing information. There is evidence to suggest 
that passive processing of information is inferior to active processing (Cowan, 1988) 
and Metzger and Parasuraman found that expert air traffic controllers in a laboratory 
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experiment took longer to find conflicts when they only had to detect them, as 
compared to detect and resolve conflicts. However, it may be the case that in real 
world operations operators do actively process system information while monitoring. 
If the information the operator is receiving is meaningful and they make judgements, 
including predicting future system states and deciding whether to intervene, based on 
it then some level of active processing would be required. In support of this, the 
subjective workload associated with monitoring has been shown to be quite high 
(Warm et al., 1996).  
 
Despite the concerns regarding monitoring, there is relatively little empirical research 
dealing with the subject of monitoring, and in particular human monitoring behaviour 
in relation to automation (Liu et al., 1993). The majority of the literature relating to 
monitoring is in the fields of vigilance and complacency, and assumes that the 
desired level of monitoring is a constant but the operators’ ability to maintain this 
varies over time. 
 
Vigilance refers to the ability of an individual to remain alert over a period of time and 
is typically measured by the number of missed signals. Operators are required to 
maintain vigilance when working with control systems to ensure they can control 
them effectively, but this may be harder to achieve when the operator’s main role is 
monitoring as there is little to keep him/her actively involved. Vigilance decrement is a 
phenomenon first simulated by Mackworth in 1950 (Parasuraman, 1987), and 
describes the situation where an operator begins to miss vital cues after a sustained 
period of attention. It has been repeatedly demonstrated in laboratory settings 
(Parasuraman; Warm et al., 1996) but most of these studies used simple sensory 
tasks that were not representative of the complexity of monitoring dynamic real 
systems (Moray, 2003). In addition, the tasks required the participants to monitor for 
infrequent signals that carried little significance or meaning to the individual further 
increasing the difficulty of remaining vigilant, and hence these findings may not be 
applicable to the real world where operators would be more likely to attach both 
meaning and importance to signals (Parasuraman, Molloy, Mouloua, & Hilburn, 1996; 
Wiener, 1987). One experiment addressed these concerns by using the 
pasteurisation plant microworld, previously used to examine the role of trust in 
automation use, to examine the vigilance decrement in a complex realistic task 
(Moray & Haudegond, 1998). No vigilance decrement was found suggesting that the 
vigilance decrement does not exist for some kinds of dynamic tasks. Therefore, 
although the vigilance decrement has been clearly demonstrated in laboratory 
Chapter 2: Automation and Human Factors 
34 
experiments, it is less clear whether this effect carries over into the real world. 
Complex, dynamic, real world systems may keep operators sufficiently involved and 
engaged for a significant reduction in vigilance to be avoided. It seems likely that only 
highly autonomous automated systems pose a vigilance problem to operators. 
 
Complacency also concerns unnoticed cues by operators, but in this case it is due to 
the operator having come to rely upon the automation and failing to monitor it, 
possibly due to a false sense of security or because they prioritise other tasks 
(Endsley & Kiris, 1995; Parasuraman, 2000; Sarter et al., 1997). Although the 
outcomes of vigilance decrement and complacency are the same, they differ in that 
complacency is a failure to sample correctly when monitoring whereas vigilance 
decrement is a difficulty in remaining focussed on the monitoring task (Moray, 2003). 
Research demonstrated that the time taken to detect failures rises when automation 
of one system in a multi task system is constantly reliable as compared to variable 
reliability automation of that system (Parasuraman, Molloy, & Singh, 1993). The effect 
was eliminated when participants had only to monitor one system. However, Moray 
(2003) argued that complacency is not concerned with the detection of signals but 
rather with attention and so a more appropriate measure would be to calculate the 
optimal sampling frame for a given system and assess operator monitoring against 
this. Operators who monitor a system more frequently than required are likely to 
distrust that system, while sampling less frequently than required would indicate 
complacency. For highly reliable systems the optimal sampling rate would be low, but 
this means that if a signal was to occur immediately after the operator has sampled it 
may not be noticed for a considerable period even though the operator is displaying 
optimal sampling behaviour (Moray & Inagaki, 2000). In this way, experimental 
studies can suggest a complacency effect where it is not actually present. Further 
research using the same experimental set-up as Parasuraman et al. demonstrated 
that participants’ mean time between fixations rose significantly for constant reliability 
automation (Bagheri & Jamieson, 2004) suggesting that the operators did adjust their 
sampling in response to the increased reliability of the automation. Muir (1987) also 
found a relationship between trust levels and how often operators monitor 
automation. This would seem to be a reasonable response to automation which 
appears reliable and operators adjust their trust and sampling frequency accordingly. 
If all signals were to be responded to immediately, even those which occur very 
infrequently, it would require huge monitoring resources and in the normal course of 
events, operators would likely be accused of mistrust in the automation. As the 
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reliability and competence of automated systems increases, the requirement to 
monitor should decrease as a result of the operator’s well calibrated trust.  
 
Despite the research focus on vigilance and complacency, studies have also been 
undertaken to examine how operators’ go about monitoring complex real world 
systems (Sarter, Mumaw, & Wickens, 2007; Vicente, Mumaw, & Roth, 1998; Vicente, 
Roth, & Mumaw, 2001, 2004). Vicente et al. (2004) developed a model to describe 
operator monitoring in the nuclear domain. A simplified version of this model is shown 
in Figure 2-9.  
 
 
Figure 2-9: Operator Monitoring Model (Vicente et al., 2004) 
 
The model suggested that monitoring is triggered, or initiated, by scheduled tasks or 
activities, policies, or alarms. The operator then engages in cognitive activities, for 
example evaluating the input, identifying the relevant data, finding the data, and 
developing a monitoring plan. Facilitating activities may be undertaken by the 
operator, for example configuring an interface, but these may not always be 
necessary. Monitoring activities in the nuclear domain included monitoring 
indications, conducting a field tour, monitoring alarm screens, communicating with 
other operators, or reviewing logs. As this model was developed exclusively within 
the nuclear domain it is not certain whether it can be generalised to other domains. 
However, it seems likely that monitoring of control systems in other domains would 
follow a similar model, although the specific tasks and activities undertaken in each 
stage may vary. Within the model, operators develop strategies to facilitate effective 
monitoring (Vicente et al., 1998). These strategies involve using knowledge gained 
through experience to anticipate events and to schedule work around monitoring 
activity. Such strategies are dependent on the feedback from automation systems 
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may be ineffective (Sarter et al., 2007). In these cases, operators may rely more on 
raw information and neglect monitoring of automated systems, with a resultant loss in 
the benefit of automation.  
 
Eye tracking equipment may be used to gather information on the specifics of how 
operators monitor their systems. Methods for precise tracking of eye fixations have 
been around for over 100 years (Jacob & Karn, 2003) and although the technology 
continues to improve becoming more accurate, easy to use, and reliable, eye tracking 
systems continue to be invasive and/or uncomfortable to use. Remote eye tracking 
systems are more comfortable for the participant but they must be careful not be 
move out of the range of the equipment. Head mounted eye trackers allow more 
movement, but are physically uncomfortable and become less precise the more the 
participant moves. The extraction and analysis of eye tracking data can also be 
difficult and labour intensive (Jacob & Karn). Such limitations have meant that the 
volume of research is not as large as might be expected given how long eye tracking 
has existed. However, eye tracking has been used to study operators’ use of systems 
in control environments (e.g. Anders, 2001; Ottati, Hickox, & Richter, 1999) results of 
these studies may be used to help design better interfaces or to improve training 
programmes (Dishart & Land, 1998; Ottati et al.). Such studies provide important and 
useful data, but are very domain specific. Unfortunately, it is impossible to generalise 
results on the importance of a particular display in one domain to a domain which 
incorporates a completely different set of displays. Within the rail domain, research 
has been undertaken to study train driver visual strategies (Luke, Brook-Carter, 
Parkes, Grimes, & Mills, 2006) but no research was found on rail signalling.  
 
The key findings from the research on monitoring are summarised in Table 2-4. 
Overall, the concerns regarding monitoring of automation appear to have little 
empirical basis, particularly with regard to vigilance and complacency. The reduction 
of monitoring of reliable automated systems which is sometimes labelled 
complacency seems more likely to be a reasonable prioritisation on the part of the 
operator, and part of an overall strategy which operators develop to help them 
manage tasks and activities effectively. Although eye tracking may be used to 
investigate the mechanics of monitoring, no published research was found in the rail 
signalling domain.  
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Key Finding Author 
The subjective workload associated with monitoring may 
be high. 
Warm et al., 1996 
‘Passive monitoring’ may reduce awareness as compared 
with ‘active control’. 
Endsley & Kiris, 1995; 
Metzger & Parasuraman, 
2001 
Although a reliable laboratory result, no evidence of a 
vigilance decrement has been found in real world 
systems. 
Moray & Haudegond, 
1998 
Alleged complacency may be due to the calibration levels 
of trust. 
Moray & Inagaki, 2000; 
Bagheri & Jamieson, 
2004 
Operators develop strategies to monitor automation 
effectively. 
Vicente et al., 2004 
Table 2-4: Summary of Findings on Monitoring 
2.6 Design of Automated Systems 
Whether the concerns discussed in the previous section become real issues in new 
automated systems is typically decided at the system design stage and may depend 
on the design strategy employed (Waterson, Older Gray, & Clegg, 2002). Automation 
design strategies determine where the line of control is between the human operator 
and the automation. Initial automation strategies were to automate everything 
technically possible to achieve widely anticipated benefits (Dekker, 2004), and this 
led to the “left-over” principle. Under the ‘left-over’ principle, the operators tasks are 
determined by whatever proved too difficult to automate (Hollnagel, 2001). This 
system therefore can place a heavy burden upon the operator, particularly if the left 
over elements are diverse and complex. Unfortunately, given the limitations of current 
technology and the flexibility of humans, this can often be the case. 
 
Another approach, the substitution or compensatory principle (Hollnagel, 2001), uses 
MABA-MABA lists (Men-Are-Better-At, Machines-Are-Better-At) to allocate functions 
between the operator and the automation. This approach was first developed in the 
1950s by Fitts (Fitts, 1951), and is still referred to as Fitts’ List. It only takes into 
account isolated capabilities, and so does not consider the full complexity and 
demands of a given situation and how this would best be controlled. Added to this is 
the fact that introducing automation into a system creates new functions and tends to 
transform a task often in unanticipated ways (Dekker & Woods, 2004). So while 
function allocation may have some uses in guiding allocation of functions 
(Parasuraman et al., 2008), it is also important to consider the role of automation and 
the human in the context of the task as a whole.  
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More recently, a strategy has emerged called the complementary principle. The 
purpose of this strategy is to sustain and strengthen human ability to perform 
efficiently and involves cooperation and coordination between the automation and the 
operator (Dekker & Woods, 2004). The main concern is not the momentary level of 
efficiency, “but rather the ability of the system to sustain acceptable performance 
under a variety of conditions” (Hollnagel, 2001). This situation is also described as 
the ‘cyborg metaphor’ in which the operator and the automation act together and the 
removal of one would render the system useless (Lee, 2008). 
 
Within rail signalling, research has been undertaken to guide the development of new 
automated signalling systems in Sweden (Hellstrom, Frej, Gideon, & Sandblad, 
1997). Analysis of the requirements for an autonomous automation system 
suggested that it is potentially impossible to fully automate Swedish train control 
(Kvist, Hellstrom, Sandblad, & Bystrom, 2002). A description of the Swedish rail 
network (Kauppi, 2006) suggests that it is considerably less complex than the UK 
network, with a large proportion (more than 80%) of the network consisting of single 
lines rather than the more complex double or multiple track layout commonly found in 
the UK. If rail signalling cannot be fully automated it suggests that a cooperative 
human-machine system is required to control railways (Kauppi). Automated systems 
developed to support this requirement will need to address the concerns outlined in 
this chapter. The final section of this chapter describes 12 principles of automation 
drawn from the literature which may be used to help guide the design of automated 
systems. 
2.7 Principles of Automation 
In order to address the concerns outlined in the previous section and to assist in the 
design of cooperative automated systems, principles of ‘good automation’ were 
drawn from the human factors literature. Key pieces of literature were reviewed and 
any recommendations or guidance on the development of automated systems were 
noted; 12 key principles were then defined from these data. Application of these 
principles to the design of automated systems should help ensure optimal levels of 
trust, SA, monitoring, and workload.  
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2.7.1 Reliable 
The automation should function consistently. 
 
The adverse effects of reliability on operator’s trust in and use of automation have 
been repeatedly demonstrated (Dzindolet et al., 2003; Wiegmann et al., 2001). 
Different failure rates have different effects on the operator. A difference has been 
drawn here between reliability and competence but this does not always seem to be 
the case in the literature. Reliability here has been taken to mean the repeated 
consistent functioning of an automated device (Sheridan, 1999), but its ability to do 
the job correctly is understood to be competence.  
2.7.2 Competent 
The automation should perform tasks correctly given the information that is input. 
 
Muir and Moray (1996) identified competence as a key dimension in development of 
trust in automation and suggested that designers of automated systems should 
consider whether automation will be able to carry out a function effectively as any 
weaknesses will reduce the likelihood that operators will use the automation. Control 
failures that are as a result of programming (i.e. where the automation acted as 
designed but the result was not desirable) would be classified as incompetent 
automation rather than unreliable. This in contrast to much of the literature in the area 
where automation competence is frequently referred to as reliability (e.g. Moray et al., 
2000; Riley, 1994).  
2.7.3 Visible 
All decision relevant information for a given situation should be available to the operator. 
 
This may be taken as supporting the first stage of SA. It differs from the next principle 
(observability) in that it refers to the provision of information regarding the system 
being controlled, while observability relates to the provision of information concerning 
the automation’s decisions and actions. Dekker (2004) warned of automation making 
information ‘invisible’, hiding events which may be of interest to the operator and 
Billings (1991) and Endsley (1996) both recommended that operators always have 
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basic information on system parameters being monitored available in a clear and 
easily interpretable format as this allows them to remain involved and aware of the 
system.  
2.7.4 Observable 
Automation should provide effective and immediate feedback to the operator allowing 
him/her to maintain awareness of system state. 
 
Observable automation can be achieved through good quality feedback from the 
automation. Parasuraman and Riley (1997) stated the importance of providing 
feedback regarding automation state, actions, and intentions to enable the operator 
to monitor and intervene effectively. Woods (1997) identified that systems that 
provide only weak feedback on their activities are more likely to surprise the operator 
and recommended that observability of automation activities be improved. Sarter and 
Woods (1997, p. 554) defined observability as “the ability of available feedback to 
actively support operators in monitoring and staying ahead of system activities and 
transitions”. They stated that it involves more than just availability of the data but also 
the cognitive work involved in extracting it. The method of feeding back information 
also affects observability. Sheridan and Parasuraman (2006) suggested that 
automation which follows good etiquette (e.g. patient and non-interruptive) in feeding 
back information supports better system observability. Limited observability is likely to 
impact on the operators’ ability to understand the automation and develop a correct 
mental model, and may restrict the use of automation (Norman, 1990).  
2.7.5 Understandable 
Decisions made by the automation should be understandable to the operator given the 
current state of the system and environment. 
 
Automation which can be easily understood by the operator enables them to predict 
and work cooperatively with the automation. Parasuraman and Riley (1997, p. 248) 
argued that “better operator knowledge of how the automation works results in more 
appropriate use of automation”. This understanding forms the basis of the 
development of a mental model. Development of an accurate mental model allows 
the operator to predict future actions of the automation (Sheridan, 1999). Woods 
(1997) stated that automation surprises are more likely in situations where operators 
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have gaps in their mental models of how the automation works in different situations. 
Hopkin and Wise (1996) argued that successful human-machine relationships require 
the operator to understand the criteria taken into account by the computer, but it is 
not necessary for understanding to extend as far as how the individual algorithms 
work (Lenior, Janssen, Neerincx, & Schreibers, 2006). Comprehensible and 
predictable automation should be developed, even at the cost of reduced flexibility or 
power of the automation (Billings & Woods, 1994).  
2.7.6 Directable 
The operator should be able to direct the automation easily and efficiently. 
 
Woods (1997) recommended that users be given the ability to direct the automation 
as a tool in achieving goals, and Dekker (2004) that the human operator be allowed 
to assume a strategic role in directing the automation. This ability to direct the 
automation helps achieve a more cooperative system, with the resulting benefits 
including improved SA, mental workload, and overall system performance (Miller et 
al., 2005). Without the ability to influence and direct the automation the 
recommendations on observable and understandable automation are useless as the 
operator is essentially powerless (Christoffersen & Woods, 2001).  
2.7.7 Robust 
The automation should be able to perform under a variety of conditions, not just normal 
operating conditions. 
 
Sheridan (1999) termed the ability of automation to cope with a variety of conditions 
‘robustness’. This should be both in terms of the operating envelope within which the 
automation is capable and avoiding ‘clumsiness’; that is, automation which is of most 
assistance during normal operations but becomes less helpful, or even a burden, 
during abnormal operations (Billings, 1997). Billings (1991) suggested that 
automation should be of most help during times of highest workload and somewhat 
less help during times of lowest workload. In practice this may be hard to achieve, but 
it is desirable that automation is designed to be helpful, and not a burden, during 
times of high workload. 
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2.7.8 Accountable 
The operator should be responsible for overall performance and therefore in charge of the 
automation 
 
Billings (1991) suggested that responsibility is an important concept in human-
automation relationships. Sarter et al. (1997) stated that computers cannot be 
expected to be responsible beings and so it follows that the operator must be 
provided with the means to control the system. Automation which is autonomous and 
lacking in accountability is more likely to surprise the human operator, making it 
difficult for him/her to maintain effective control of the system (Woods, 1997). Aircraft 
pilots have expressed a strong preference for management by consent automation, 
but when workload demands were high they preferred a management by exception 
system (Olsen & Sarter, 1999). Research has indicated that operators who are not 
fully conscious of their role in ensuring high performance are less likely to intervene 
(Mosier, Skitka, & Korte, 1994). Ensuring that the automation is accountable to the 
operator enables the operator to take responsibility for the overall system 
performance. Of course there are some circumstances where it may be possible to 
completely remove the human from the control loop, usually in areas which have very 
definite data and characteristics. Train driving may be an example of this, however, 
even in these cases a human override is deemed necessary (Sheridan, 1999).  
2.7.9 Error Resistant 
The automation should make it difficult for the operator to make an error. 
 
Billings (1991, p. 78) suggested that error resistance may be achieved by “clear, 
uncomplicated displays and simple, intuitive procedures”. He also suggested that 
error resistance could be achieved through confining the operator’s potential actions 
to an envelope protected by the automation, although to ensure accountability a 
human override should be incorporated. Rasmussen and Vicente (1989) argued that 
reliable human-machine systems can be developed by designing interfaces which 
minimise the potential for error and support recovery from errors. They describe a 
number of principles for reducing operator error which fall under the category of 
making systems error resistant. These include consistent mapping of cues for action 
and symbols of process function; tools provided to the operator to experiment and 
test hypotheses for use in unanticipated situations; provision of appropriate 
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information for monitoring purposes; and development and maintenance of mental 
models. Norman (1983) suggested that error resistance can be maximised through 
improved feedback, functional organisation of screen displays, command languages 
or menu headings which are distinct from one another, minimising the ease with 
which actions that have serious implications or are not reversible can be performed, 
and consistency of the system structure and commands. 
2.7.10 Error Tolerant 
The automation should have the ability to mitigate the effects of an operator error. 
 
Error tolerance in a system can be increased by the monitoring of other stakeholders 
in the system (Billings, 1991); automation can provide this support by giving clear 
warnings when unsafe actions are attempted. Rasmussen and Vicente (1989) also 
described a number of guidelines for systems to cope with operator error that could 
be classified as methods to enhance error tolerance in a system. These include 
making the limits of acceptable performance clear to the operator before the effects 
disappear or become irreversible and providing feedback on the effects of actions to 
counter any delay between operator action and observable effect. Norman (1983) 
suggested that actions should be reversible whenever possible. 
2.7.11 Proactive Control 
The system should support the operator in predicting and controlling ahead rather than 
controlling reactively. 
 
Dekker (2004) suggested that automation should support the operator in reasoning in 
advance and knowing what to expect, allowing them to develop a plan in advance. 
Endsley (1996) stated that supporting SA by allowing operators to keep up with 
changing system parameters and understanding the effect of these allows operators 
to proactively optimise system performance and prevent future problems. Proactive 
control can be enabled by ensuring that the automation is predictable. Sandblad, 
Andersson, Bystrom, and Kauppi (2002) recommended a proactively controlled 
system for railway control which allows the operators to monitor the development of 
the system over time and prevent disturbances. 
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2.7.12 Skill Degradation 
The automation should incorporate a method to guard against operator skill degradation. 
 
Bainbridge (1983) suggested that skill degradation is a likely but undesirable trait of 
automation. As the reliability of the automation increases the opportunity for the 
operator to practice manual control is reduced and the effect may be to reduce the 
operator’s skill in understanding and controlling the underlying system (Dekker, 
2004). The result may be an operator who is required to take over when the 
automation reaches its limits, but who is no longer skilled enough to do so adequately 
(Endsley & Kiris, 1995; Hoc, 2000). It may be difficult to guard against skill 
degradation in some highly automated systems but in these cases high fidelity 
simulators may be provided to help operators maintain their skills. 
2.7.13 Summary 
The 12 principles presented in this section were drawn from the literature and 
validated with human factors professionals (Appendix D). They are intended as a 
guide for the design of automated systems, but may also be used to structure an 
evaluation of existing systems.  
2.8 Conclusions 
Automation has the potential to add benefit to control systems through the reduction 
of workload and increase in performance (Sheridan, 1999). However, the introduction 
of automation faces many challenges, including ensuring the correct level of 
automation, to ensure that the benefits are achieved and system performance is 
optimised. Table 2-5 describes findings for each of the key themes with respect to 
automation. The table illustrates that automation has an effect on SA, workload, and 
monitoring of automation and these are influenced by the operators’ trust and mental 
models of the automation.  
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Theme Key Finding 
Trust x There is a correlation between trust in and usage of automation.  
x High reliability and competence are fundamental requirements for 
trust in automation.  
x Operator self confidence and the usefulness of the automation also 
influence usage.  
x For complex systems, explicit feedback is required to develop trust. 
x Trust must be well calibrated to ensure optimal use of automation.  
x Accurate mental models are important to ensure correct calibration 
of trust. 




x Level 1 SA is higher during automated operation of information 
acquisition, suggesting that the use of information is more 
important for SA than gathering the information.  
x Level 2 SA is higher during intermediate levels of automation. 
x Level 2 SA may be improved by automation during high workload 
conditions. 
x Performance during automation failures is better with higher SA. 
x Well designed automation has the potential to improve operator SA 
x SA is also affected by high workload conditions. 
 
Workload x Automation can reduce workload during normal operations. 
x Automation of information acquisition and action implementation 
have a greater effect on workload. 
x Monitoring of automation may increase workload. 
x Automation may increase workload during incidents. 
 
Monitoring x The subjective workload associated with monitoring may be high 
x ‘Passive monitoring’ may reduce awareness as compared with 
‘active control’.  
x Although a reliable laboratory result, no evidence of a vigilance 
decrement has been found in real world systems. 
x Alleged complacency may be due to the calibration levels of trust. 
x Operators develop strategies to monitor automation effectively. 
 
Table 2-5: Summary of Key Findings  
 
To tackle these concerns, 12 principles of automation were drawn from the literature 
and validated with human factors professionals. These principles are summarised in 
Table 2-6.  
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Principle Description 
Reliable The automation should function consistently. 
Competent The automation should perform tasks correctly given the 
information that is input. 
Visible All decision relevant information for a given situation should be 
available to the operator. 
Observable Automation should provide effective and immediate feedback to 
the operator allowing him/her to maintain awareness of system 
state. 
Understandable Decisions made by the automation should be understandable to 
the operator given the current state of the system and 
environment. 
Directable The operator should be able to direct the automation easily and 
efficiently. 
Robust The automation should be able to perform under a variety of 
conditions, not just normal operating conditions. 
Accountable The operator should be responsible for overall performance and 
therefore in charge of the automation. 
Error Resistant The automation should make it difficult for the operator to make 
an error. 
Error Tolerant The automation should have the ability to mitigate the effects of 
an operator error. 
Proactive Control The system should support the operator in predicting and 
controlling ahead rather than controlling reactively. 
Skill Degradation The automation should incorporate a method to guard against 
operator skill degradation. 
Table 2-6: Summary of Principles of Automation 
2.9 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has described the benefits and issues associated with automation. The 
effect of automation on human factors themes of trust, SA, workload, and monitoring 
were discussed and principles were developed from the literature to help minimise 
issues arising from these concerns. Different modelling techniques for describing the 
level of automation were also discussed and the advantages of the model presented 
by Parasuraman et al. (2000) were highlighted. This model will be used in the 
following chapter as the basis for a rail automation model describing the types and 
levels of automation present in different generations of UK signalling systems.  
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CHAPTER 3: RAIL AUTOMATION MODEL 
3.1 Chapter Overview 
A structured framework was developed for the description of types and levels of 
automation in rail signalling. The framework took as a starting point the model for 
types and levels of automation proposed by Parasuraman et al. (2000), although 
scales have been modified to make them more applicable to rail signalling. Data were 
gathered to support the development of these scales and three different types of 
signalling system were plotted using the final scales. The final model describes the 
levels of automation present in the UK railway, and can be used to identify areas 
where the level of automation may be inappropriate. 
3.2 Introduction 
Automation in rail signalling varies hugely depending on the type of signalling system 
employed. Three types of signal box are predominant in UK rail signalling; lever 
frame, NX panel and IECC and these three systems have been analysed to support 
the development of the rail automation model. Lever frame signal boxes were 
introduced in the 1800s and are still in widespread use today across the rail network. 
Routes are set for trains by physically pulling large, and sometimes weighty (Muffett, 
2007), levers which are directly connected to the trackside equipment. These boxes 
are very limited in terms of the support provided to the operator. Installation of NX 
panels was undertaken in the 1950s and represented a huge leap forward in 
assisting the operator with the physical workload associated with moving points and 
signals. The signaller simply presses buttons on the panel and the physical 
movement of trackside equipment is achieved automatically. The most recent form of 
signalling system are IECCs and principles similar to NX panels are used for manual 
signalling, but also introduced decision making automation capable of setting routes 
automatically (ARS). See Appendix C for more information on these signalling 
systems. 
 
The description of the levels of automation present in different generations of rail 
signalling systems was identified as a starting point for this research. This was a key 
part of the first research step identified in the Research Approach Framework (Figure 
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3-1), understanding the context of the research. It helped generate knowledge of 
general signalling principles which supported the research overall, but also identified 
which aspects of automation had advanced, and which had not. As such, it provided 
a basis on which to continue with the more targeted research.   
 
 
Figure 3-1: Position of Rail Automation Model in the Research Framework 
 
Models of levels of automation have typically been used to investigate the impact of 
different levels of automation on key issues such as SA (e.g. Endsley & Kiris, 1995; 
Kaber et al., 2000; Kaber et al., 2006) and workload (e.g. Kaber & Endsley, 2004; 
Kantowitz, 1994). The levels of automation identified in the models can be used as 
independent variables in experimental designs, allowing the effect of automation to 
be described on a continuum. Models of levels of automation may also be used to 
support the design of automated systems by providing a framework on which to base 
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decisions on allocation of function (Parasuraman et al., 2000). The rail automation 
model was originally developed to illustrate the differing levels of automation in 
different generations of signalling systems, which may be a new application of this 
type of model. The model may also be used in one of its more traditional roles; to 
identify areas where the level of automation may be inappropriate and hence 
potentially guide the development of new rail automation systems.   
 
There are a number of models detailed in the literature (e.g. Billings, 1991; Endsley & 
Kiris, 1995) but the model chosen as the basis of this research is the model for types 
and levels of automation described by Parasuraman et al. (2000). The ability of this 
model to discriminate between four functional dimensions of Information Acquisition, 
Information Analysis, Decision and Action Selection, and Action Implementation 
means it is a more powerful method of analysis. Simply describing automated 
systems along one continuum does not give an appreciation of the variability of 
automation which may be present within systems.  
 
Parasuraman et al. (2000) detailed their interpretation of how automation may vary in 
each functional dimension. For information acquisition, a low level of automation was 
suggested which simply helps gather the information; a mid-level is when the 
automation organises the information in some form, perhaps forming priorities; and a 
high level is where the automation filters the information so that a full set of raw data 
is not provided to the operator. Low levels of information analysis automation may 
involve the use of algorithms to extrapolate incoming data over time or predict, and a 
higher level may involve integration of input variables into a single value. Automation 
may assist the operator with decision making, for example by using conditional logic. 
Parasuraman et al. proposed that decision automation level increases as the 
automation narrows the decision alternatives. Automation of the final stage, action 
implementation, may be the easiest of types of automation to understand, with the 
level being defined by how much of the physical activity is replaced by automation. 
 
The rail automation model developed levels for each functional dimension on the 
basis of site visits and uses these levels to plot the three generations of signalling 
systems included in the model.  




The participants in this study were based in signal boxes which were visited to gather 
data on the requirements and capabilities for each of the four functional dimensions. 
In total nine signal boxes were visited to gather data for this study: three lever frame, 
three NX and three IECC. The number of signallers observed for the study was 
approximately 20. The data from these visits formed the basis of the rail automation 
model, although it was supplemented and further developed following less structured 
visits to signal boxes throughout the course of the research.  
3.3.2 Apparatus 
The data were recorded manually; no apparatus was used.  
3.3.3 Procedure 
Visits to signal boxes were arranged through SMEs and visits were undertaken with 
SMEs. The following questions, based on the model from the literature (Parasuraman 
et al., 2000), were asked at each signal box: 
 
x What information is required? 
x How is this information acquired? 
x What analysis is performed upon the information? 
x How is this analysis performed? 
x What decisions are made on the basis of the information? 
x How are these decisions made? 
x What actions must be implemented? 
x How are the actions implemented? 
 
The results for each question were noted and tabulated. The table was used, in 
conjunction with levels of automation found in the literature (Parasuraman et al., 
2000; Sheridan, 1999; Sheridan & Verplank, 1978) to generate new levels for each 
functional dimension. The levels of automation applied to each functional domain of 
each generation of signalling equipment were validated by SMEs, and the levels were 
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also re-evaluated at stages throughout the period of research to ensure they were still 
applicable in light of the information emerging from the research. 
3.4 Results 
The results from the site visits were collated and the data collected are summarised 
in Table 3-1. Automated elements are highlighted in green. Information that is 
required to be gathered for signalling purposes includes: 
x Train movements – train entering area and track occupation; 
x Train information – class, destination, timetable, and delay; 
x Infrastructure – position of points, signal aspects, routes set, infrastructure 
failures, and planned restriction of infrastructure. 
 
Analysis of this information during normal running was simply to determine which 
trains required a route to be set, which had priority, and which signals and points 
would need to be operated. The decision selection phase involved choosing which 
train to set a route for. The actions required once a routing decision has been made 
are: 
x Set points; 
x Clear signal aspects; 
x Cancel route after train has passed; 
x Communicate with relevant parties; 
x Complete paperwork. 
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 Lever Frame NX Panel IECC (ARS) 
Train entering area Block bell1 Panel (via TD2) VDU (via TD) 
Train location in area Block instrument3/visual Panel (via track circuits) VDU (via TC4) 
Train 
Movements 
Train leaving area Visual Panel VDU 
Class Block bell Panel (via TD) VDU (via TD) 
Destination Timetable Panel (via TD) VDU (via TD) 
Delay Timetable Timetable/TRUST/CCF5 Timetable/TRUST/CCF 
Train 
Information 
Special/Additional Trains Telephone Telephone Telephone 
Control area Track diagram/visual Panel VDU 
Position of points Lever position Point position switch VDU 
Signal Aspects Lever position Panel VDU 
Acquire 
Infrastructure 
Route set Lever position Panel VDU 
Analyse Analysis of acquired information and planning 
of regulating decisions 
Manual Manual Automatic (ARS) 
Decide Decide actions to be taken to regulate Manual Manual Automatic (ARS) 
Set points Lever Button ARS Set Route 
Clear signals Lever Button ARS 
Communicate Train movements Block bell TD TD 
Paperwork Record train movements Manual TD TD 
Signals back to danger Lever TORR6 TORR 
Action 
Cancel Route 
Set points to normal Lever TORR TORR 
Table 3-1: Requirements for Normal Train Routing
                                                
1
 Block bells are a form of telegraphic communication used between lever frame boxes. 
2
 Train describers (TD) are 4 digit alphanumeric identifiers for individual trains. They are displayed on the panel/workstation. 
3
 Block instruments are manually controlled devices showing the condition of the line between signal boxes, i.e. clear or occupied. 
4
 Track circuits (TC) are electric circuits running through the rails which detect the presence of a train. 
5
 Train Running System (TRUST) and Control Centre of the Future (CCF) provide information on train timetables and delays. 
6
 Train Operated Route Release (TORR) automatically releases routes following the passage of trains. 
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The scales developed for each of the functional dimensions are shown in Table 3-2.  
 
Information Acquisition 
1 None Human gathers all information without assistance from computer or 
technology, using senses for dynamic information and paper based 
sources for static information 
2 Low Human gathers all information but with assistance from IT 
(telephone/fax/email/CCF/TRUST) 
3 Med Information acquisition is shared between the automation and the human 
4 High Computer and technology provide the majority of the information to the 
human 
5 Full Computer gathers all information without any assistance from human 
Information Analysis 
1 None Human analyses all information. 
2 Low Computer analyses information as it is received and detects conflicts 
only as they occur. 
3 Med Computer gives a future prediction based on basic information for the 
short term (e.g. current trains on the workstation). 
4 High Computer gives a future prediction based on fuller information (e.g. 
trains arriving in future, infrastructure state, current situation on other 
workstations), and highlights potential problems/conflicts over a longer 
period of time. 
5 Full Computer gives a long term future prediction using all relevant data (e.g. 
up to date information on train speeds, infrastructure state etc.). 
Decision and Action Selection 
1 None Human makes all decisions, without any support. 
2 Low Computer provides decision support to the human to help ensure 
decision is not unsafe. 
3 Med Computer performs basic decision making (e.g. first come first serve, run 
trains to timetable) and leaves perturbed modes to the human.  
4 High Computer performs mid-level decision making (e.g. apply set rules to 
delayed trains) and has basic plans for implementation during perturbed 
operations. 
5 Full Computer makes all decisions under all circumstances using complex 
algorithms to determine the optimal decision (e.g. based on a high level 
prediction of the future state, optimal conflict resolution) and provides 
flexible plans for disrupted operations. 
Action Implementation 
1 None Human implements all actions and communications. 
2 Low Computer augments human’s physical labour (e.g. hydraulic assistance 
on lever). 
3 Med Computer implements physical actions but human is required to perform 
communications (possibly with assistance from ICT). 
4 High Computer implements physical actions and basic communications but 
human is required to perform complex or unusual communications. 
5 Full Computer implements all actions and communications. 
Table 3-2: Levels of Automation in the Rail Automation Model 
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3.5 Discussion 
New levels have been generated as a part of this work, as the original levels were 
found not to adequately describe the levels found in the rail environment. It may be 
that although the original levels were developed to be generic (Parasuraman et al., 
2000) they are not sufficiently powerful to be applied to any system. Sheridan (1998) 
used a similarly generic scale to describe levels of automation and plot the graph 
shown in Chapter 2; however, his interpretation of the scale for plotting the graph was 
quite liberal. It is also worth noting that the scales used by Sheridan have varied over 
time (Parasuraman et al., Sheridan, Sheridan & Verplank, 1978). This may indicate a 
difficulty in applying one scale to different systems. Such a criticism would not be 
limited to this model, as other examples were found of researchers changing levels 
used to describe automation between different studies (e.g. Endsley & Kaber, 1999; 
Endsley & Kiris, 1995). A further criticism of the scales developed by Parasuraman et 
al. is that they combined the functional dimensions, creating one scale for information 
acquisition and analysis and a second for decision making and action 
implementation. The advantage of their model is the division into the four functional 
dimensions, and combining these within two scales compromises some of the power 
of this approach. This model uses a separate scale for each of the functional 
dimensions and five levels of automation have been defined within each; (1) none, (2) 
low, (3) medium, (4) high, and (5) full. 
3.5.1 Information Acquisition 
The levels for information acquisition proposed by Parasuraman et al. (2000) 
included some form of analysis at the higher levels to determine the most relevant 
information and what information can be discarded. Pure information acquisition 
would more properly refer only to the sensing of relevant data. In this model, the level 
of automation depends entirely upon the level of assistance the 
automation/computer/technology gives the operator in gathering the required 
information. Information acquisition has moved beyond pure manual conditions in all 
signal boxes as they are required to be equipped with some Information and 
Communications Technology (ICT). Even the most basic signal box has a telephone 
and fax machine and the majority have a computer providing CCF and/or TRUST; 
however, in lever frame boxes, the primary method of information acquisition is 
manual, either visually or through the block instruments. Therefore, Lever Frame 
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boxes have been assigned to Level 2. In NX Panels and IECCs, the basic information 
of train position has been automated, via track circuits, but the signaller is still 
required to gather large quantities of information manually, including paper based 
timetables and information on incidents which comes in via the telephone. Therefore 
these have both been assigned to Level 3. 
3.5.2 Information Analysis 
An alternate approach to information acquisition is taken in this model to that of 
Parasuraman et al. (2000) whereby the levels of automation are based upon how far 
into the future an analysis is performed and the degree of accuracy of the prediction. 
In respect of rail signalling, any analysis performed is in support of regulating 
decisions which may need to be made, and in particular in determining where there 
may be conflicts in the future. Only where there is a route setting agent present (i.e. 
ARS) is any analysis currently automated and even then, conflicts are only detected 
and dealt with as they occur. Therefore, Lever Frames and NX Panels are both 
assigned to Level 1 and IECCs to Level 2. 
3.5.3 Decision and Action Selection 
As well as increasing the decision making power of the automation, the rail 
automation model proposes that decision automation can also be in the form of 
supporting the correct decision process, in rail signalling this is performed by the 
interlocking. The higher levels of decision automation in this model involve the ability 
of the automation to decide the route of trains and the levels increase with the 
complexity with which the automation can cope. 
 
The main decision required in signalling is which route to set for each train, and when 
to set it. Mechanical interlocking has been in use since the 1800s to support the 
signaller’s decision on route setting. The interlocking ensures that the route set is not 
unsafe. Basic route setting agents are capable of routing trains either according to 
first come first serve or running strictly to timetable. More complex systems, such as 
the ARS in operation in IECCs, use a set of rules at each junction to determine which 
route to set. Full automation could be envisaged as setting routes according to the 
output of a prediction and conflict resolution tool which ensures that the route set is 
optimal and does not impact negatively on other trains across the network. Lever 
Frame boxes and NX panels have been assigned to Level 2, as they have the 
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interlocking systems to support decision choices. The more advanced IECCs are 
assigned to Level 4.  
3.5.4 Action Implementation 
Lever Frame boxes are largely manually operated. There is a possibility, where 
heavy levers exist, to employ a hydraulic actuator to assist in pulling the lever but this 
is not often implemented on the railway. This level has been included because it is 
viable solution and in the wider context of automation it is one that is often used. 
Therefore, Lever Frames have been assigned to Level 1. On NX Panels the signaller 
is required only to push buttons to select a route and the system then ensures that all 
signals and points are changed accordingly. This is therefore Level 3 and IECCs are 
similar with regard to action implementation and have also been assigned to Level 3. 
The rail industry requires a large number of communications as compared to some 
other industries with a high level of automation. This is probably due to the complexity 
of the rail industry which is reflected in the number of different people with whom a 
signaller must communicate, for example train drivers, control staff, station staff, level 
crossing staff, members of the public, delay attribution clerks, and other signallers. At 
present there is relatively little support from automation in these communications. 
3.5.5 Rail Automation Graph 
On the basis of these scales the following graph was produced plotting each of the 
three generations of signalling technology, Lever frame, NX panel and IECC (Figure 
3-2). The case of IECC operating with ARS switched off has not been plotted 

















Figure 3-2: Model of Levels of Rail Signalling Automation  
 
The model indicates that the automation of Information Acquisition and Action 
Implementation have not been increased by the introduction of IECC. As these are 
areas in which automation can be of great assistance to the operator, for example by 
supporting SA (Kaber et al., 2006), there may be potential to increase automation in 
these areas. It is also clear that little automatic analysis of information is achieved, 
and this may be another area where there is scope to increase the level of 
automation to support the operator and improve overall system performance. 
Currently the operator must integrate information from many different sources to 
obtain a complete picture of the situation in his/her area of control. Good signallers 
also use the information at their disposal to generate predictions of future states 
which allow them to step in early. There is scope for automation to support operators 
in these early interventions, both by assisting in identifying where action needs to be 
taken and by predicting the impact of any changes made. Decision and action 
selection showed the largest increase in automation with the introduction of IECC. 
Such a high level of automation is likely to require high competency levels and good 
feedback from the system to ensure the operator trusts and uses it (Dzindolet et al., 
2003; Muir & Moray, 1989). If these are not provided this may not be an appropriate 
level of automation for this functional dimension, particularly without the supporting 
automatic analysis of information. Action implementation was not greatly increased in 
the move from NX to IECC technology, and this is primarily due to the lack of 
progress on automation of communications. Automation of the transfer of information 
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between railway control staff may be another area in which there is scope to increase 
levels of automation to support more efficient performance. 
3.6 Chapter Summary 
The model presented provides clarity on the different types of signalling systems and 
the levels of automation present in each. It also illustrates those areas where there is 
scope for expansion, and this is most evident in the information analysis functional 
dimension. Both information acquisition and action implementation may also hold 
potential for further automation in order to support signalling. However, the levels of 
decision and action selection may not be appropriate if supporting analysis and 
feedback are not provided. 
 
The development of this model facilitated understanding of the context of the 
research but did not provide any data on the use of, or issues with, the main system 
under investigation, ARS. An observation study was undertaken in order to begin the 
quantitative investigation of ARS by examining the levels of usage. This study will be 
presented in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4: STRUCTURED OBSERVATIONS OF IECC 
SIGNALLERS 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
An observation study of signallers using ARS at four IECCs was conducted in order 
to establish and record the behaviours signallers exhibit while using automation and 
to gather some initial data on the factors that influence automation usage. The results 
showed clear differences in signaller activity, even when circumstances on the 
workstations were very similar. The study was also designed to investigate whether a 
relationship exists between signallers’ trust in ARS and their observed interactions 
with it. A questionnaire was administered to support this aim and significant 
differences were found between groups exhibiting different levels of intervention and 
quiet time. 
4.2 Introduction 
The rail automation model described how automation levels increased in IECC but 
did not provide any information on the impact of that automation on the human 
operators. This study developed an observation method to gather empirical data on 
signaller behaviour in IECCs while using, or choosing not to use, ARS. Using this 
method, the study provided data regarding the magnitude of the differences in five 
activities between signallers and between IECCs. Anecdotal reports and opinions of 
signallers’ use or non use of the automation are common within Network Rail but this 
was the first empirical study of system usage. A questionnaire was also administered 
to gather data on individual operators’ levels of trust in ARS and the results from this 
questionnaire were related to the observed activities. As illustrated in Figure 4-1, 
these were two of the three quantitative methods used to understand the effect of 
automation on the signalling task.  
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Figure 4-1: Position of the Observation Study and Trust Questionnaire in the Research 
Framework 
 
Specifically, the aim of the study was to develop and apply a methodology for 
observing signallers at their workstations. This methodology was applied in pursuit of 
the following objectives: 
1. To determine what proportion of signallers’ time is spent monitoring, 
controlling, planning, communicating or not actively involved in signalling 
during normal operations. 
2. To determine whether different signallers have different strategies in how they 
use ARS and to establish whether attitudes and strategies within signal boxes 
are more similar than attitudes between signal boxes. 
3. To establish whether trust is related to how often the signaller intervenes and 
their level of monitoring. 
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Observation studies have previously been used to gather information in support of an 
ethnographic approach to systems design (e.g. Bentley et al., 1992). Observations 
have been undertaken in the rail domain to evaluate work systems and processes 
(Kauppi, 2006; Roth, Malsch, & Multer, 2001). Reinach (2006) created a framework 
to describe train dispatcher (signaller) activity and created six high level categories 
within this: actuating controls, issuing directives, granting permissions, carrying out 
communications, record keeping, and reviewing reference materials. This framework 
was intended for use in measuring signaller workload, although measurement of 
workload through observable tasks may not give a full indication of actual workload 
as it is not necessarily representative of cognitive workload (Pickup, 2006). However, 
it may be appropriate to use such a framework as part of a suite of workload tools. 
Reinach noted that frameworks such as this provide valuable information on number 
and diversity of tasks involved in signalling and may be used to create models of 
safety and performance. Lenior (1993) developed four categories for an observation 
supporting an analysis of cognitive processes of signallers in The Netherlands. The 
categories were route setting, train movements, telephone communications, and 
communications with colleagues. This framework differs from Reinach’s framework in 
that it is less exhaustive; all activities of the signaller would not be captured by 
Lenior’s framework. The categories relating to control activities are also more 
focussed on the outcomes or purposes of the activity. These differences are 
representative of the variation in research focus; Reinach was primarily interested in 
describing signaller activity while Lenior was conducting an investigation into 
cognitive processes. It is important to tailor an observation framework to the issue 
under investigation. The signalling systems involved in the research undertaken using 
these frameworks did not include automation, and so the frameworks developed are 
more applicable to the development of the method in this study than the results.  
 
Trust has been identified as a key issue in the use of automation; operators will not 
use automation if they do not trust it. Reliability of the automation is known to be a 
fundamental requirement in the development of trust (Wiegmann et al., 2001), but as 
signalling systems are safety critical, the automation is required to be highly reliable. 
It was expected therefore that other dimensions in the development of trust may 
emerge, some of which may not have as strong an empirical basis in the research. 
These included feedback (Sarter et al., 1997), understandability and predictability 
(Sheridan, 2002), and faith (Muir, 1987). Competence of automation is also 
fundamental to trust development (Muir & Moray, 1989).  
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The following key dimensions were identified from the literature to be included in the 
measurement of trust: 
x Reliability – in terms of both mechanical reliability and consistent functioning 
over time (Madsen & Gregor, 2000; Muir & Moray, 1996; Sheridan, 1999). 
x Robustness – the ability to function under a variety of different circumstances 
(Sheridan, 1999; Woods, 1996). 
x Understandability – the ability to understand what the automation is doing, 
why it is doing that and how it is doing it (Madsen & Gregor, 2000; Sheridan, 
1999). 
x Competence – the perceived ability of the automation to perform its tasks 
(Madsen & Gregor, 2000; Muir & Moray, 1996). 
x Explication of intention – the ability of the automation to explicitly give 
feedback on its intended actions (Norman, 1990; Sheridan, 1999). 
x Dependability – the extent to which the automation can be counted on to do 
its job (Muir & Moray, 1996; Rempel et al., 1985). 
x Personal Attachment – the extent to which operators like to use the 
automation (Madsen & Gregor, 2000). 
x Predictability – the ability of the operator to predict the actions of the 
automation (Muir, 1994; Rempel et al., 1985). 
x Faith – the extent of belief that the automation will be able to cope with future 
system states which it may not have yet encountered (Madsen & Gregor, 
2000; Muir, 1994; Rempel et al., 1985). 
 
Previous research has linked trust to automation usage (de-Vries et al., 2003; Muir, 
1987), but these studies have examined the use of automation as either all or 
nothing, on or off. This is possibly due to the nature of the automated systems used 
in the experiments which did not allow participants to simply intervene to force a 
decision; however, this approach is possible with the ARS system. This study 
therefore aimed to investigate the link between trust and the level of intervention in 
the system. Another strength of this study is that it examines expert users of a real 
world system in the live environment as opposed to simulations.  




Opportunity sampling was used for this study. Signallers were not specifically chosen 
for the study; the decision was purely based on who was working on the workstations 
of interest on the days the researcher was available, and whether they were willing to 
take part in the study. On three occasions the same signaller was observed on both 
workstations, but these occurred by chance. Therefore the total number of 
participants was 21. All participants were male and had at least five years IECC 
signalling experience.  
4.3.2 Apparatus 
A questionnaire was administered to gather data on signallers’ trust in the automation 
(Appendix E). Statements for each of the key dimensions identified in the literature 
were taken from previously validated questionnaires (Bisantz & Seong, 2001; Jian et 
al., 2000; Madsen & Gregor, 2000; Muir & Moray, 1996). The questions were slightly 
modified to suit the signalling environment. The 19 statements on the questionnaire 
are shown below.  
 
1. ARS is always available for use (Mechanical Reliability) 
2. ARS is capable of performing under a variety of different circumstances (Robustness) 
3. It is easy to understand what ARS does (Understandability 1) 
4. ARS is capable of signalling trains as competently as a signaller (Competence 1) 
5. ARS gives explicit information on its intended actions (Explication of intention) 
6. I can count on ARS to do its job (Dependability) 
7. I have a personal preference for using ARS (Personal Attachment) 
8. I can predict what ARS will do from moment to moment (Predictability 1) 
9. If ARS makes a routing decision which I am uncertain about I have confidence that 
ARS is correct (Faith 1)                           
10. I understand how ARS works (Understandability 2) 
11. ARS performs well under normal running conditions (Competence 2) 
12. ARS is very unpredictable, I never know what it is going to do (Predictability 2) 
13. I can rely on ARS to function as it is supposed to (Reliability 2) 
14. Even if I have no reason to expect that ARS will be able to deal with a situation, I still 
feel certain that it will (Faith 2) 
15. I understand why ARS makes the decisions it does (Understandability 3) 
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16. ARS performs well under disturbed conditions (Competence 3) 
17. ARS is very consistent (Predictability 3) 
18. ARS will always make the same routing decision under the same circumstances 
(Reliability 2) 
19. I trust ARS 
4.3.3 Design 
Eight workstations in four signal boxes were included in the study. Workstations A in 
each signal box were comparable in terms of workload and the type of demands 
placed on the signallers. Workstations B were also chosen to be comparable. The 
first three signal boxes chosen for the study, York, Liverpool Street and Ashford, were 
picked on the basis of the reported usage of ARS in each. Usage is reportedly high in 
Liverpool Street, low in Ashford, and variable in York. Tyneside was added to the 
study at a later date to gather additional data and was chosen on the basis of having 
comparable traffic levels and complexity to the other workstations in the study. Figure 
4-2 describes the workstations involved in the study. 
 
 
Figure 4-2: Study Design 
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Complexity of workstations was measured using Operational Demand Evaluation 
Checklist (ODEC) scores and verified by Subject Matter Experts (SME). The ODEC 
tool was developed to measure the demand placed upon the signaller due to the 
infrastructure on a particular workstation (Pickup & Wilson, 2007). The tool measures 
quantifiable aspects of the workstation such as number of signals, number of level 
crossings, and speeds of trains and then ranks each entity as high, medium, or low. 
Visits were undertaken and data collected to complete ODECs for all workstations in 
the four IECCs and, in order for the study to be comparable, the ODEC scores were 
matched as closely as possible for the workstations chosen for the study so the 
workstations were as similar as possible (Appendix F). In addition, SMEs were 
consulted to ensure that the specific demands of the chosen workstations were 
comparable, for example, the four workstations in Group A all have high traffic levels 
through station areas while all four in Group B have a depot.  Although every effort 
was made to make the workstations in the study as comparable as possible there are 
no two areas on the railway which precisely match and this variability must be 
accepted as a limitation of the study. 
 
York South workstation controls the area around York station. It is a relatively 
complex workstation controlling over a thousand trains a day. Leeds East workstation 
controls the area around Leeds station and is similarly complex. Shenfield and Ilford 
workstations control portions of the railway leading in towards Liverpool Street 
station. They have similar train service levels to the York workstations and although 
neither controls a large station, they both have several smaller stations. The number 
of trains is much lower on North Kent and Ashford 4 workstations in Ashford IECC but 
they were the highest scoring workstations in Ashford IECC. The Darlington 
workstation in Tyneside was similarly less complex than other workstations in the 
study. Newcastle workstation controls the area around Newcastle station and has 
similar traffic levels to York.  
 
It is a limitation of the study that the predicted workload demand from ODEC was 
estimated to be less on the Ashford and one of the Tyneside workstations. However, 
SMEs consulted agreed that they would be broadly comparable for the purposes of 
this study. Unfortunately there was a further unexpected limitation on Ashford 4 
workstation as the observations were carried out too early to catch the peak time. In 
general, the peak hours are between 16:00 and 19:00, and for this reason the 
observation time was chosen to be 16:30-18:00, but the peak is later at Ashford as it 
takes over an hour for the peak trains from London to reach Ashford. 
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The North Kent 1 workstation is not actually an IECC workstation but, aside from a 
minor difference in that the GP screen is not always displayed, the automation runs 
identically to an IECC workstation. The difference is in terms of the underlying 
structure of the signalling system, but the ARS system is identical. Most signallers do 
not use ARS on Ashford 4, but unfortunately due to opportunity sampling, two of the 




Figure 4-3: Newcastle Workstation 
 
 
Figure 4-4: Darlington Workstation 
 
GP Screen 
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Figure 4-5: Ilford Workstation 
 
 
Figure 4-6: Shenfield Workstation 
4.3.3.1 Coding Scheme for Data Collection 
A coding scheme was developed to support manual real time observations in the 





x Quiet Time 
A sixth supplementary code (Closed Circuit Television; CCTV) was added for one of 
the signal boxes included in the study. 
 
It is important to note that monitoring was coded when it was the only activity the 
signaller was engaged in. Within these five categories, additional sub-categories 
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were coded where possible. The full coding system including all sub-categories is 
described below. 
Monitoring 
MA:  Active monitoring.  
Monitoring was coded as active if the signaller was sitting up while monitoring. 
MP: Passive monitoring.  
Monitoring was coded as passive if the signaller was sitting back while 
monitoring. 
Intervention 
TB: Trackerball.  
Trackerball usage was only noted if the signaller used the button.  
K: Keyboard. 
This was the keyboard attached to the ARS system only. Other planning 
systems on the signaller’s workstation also have keyboards but use of these 
was classified as planning behaviour. 
Planning 
PS: Simplifier 
The simplifier is a printed simplified version of the timetable which tells the 
signaller what time each train should be at different points on the workstation.  
PT: TRUST. 
TRUST is a system that the signaller can interrogate for information on 
specific trains. It provides them with the scheduled route and current delay for 
individual trains (Appendix C). 
PC: CCF. 
CCF is a map based system showing the running of trains. Trains are colour 
coded reflecting their delay and the timetable can also be shown for each train 
with a prediction of future delay (Appendix C). 
PP: Paperwork. 
Paperwork such as completing the TRB7 was classified under planning 
behaviour in the absence of a more appropriate category. Instances of 
paperwork activities were very rare during the study period. 
                                                
7
 TRB (Train Register Book) is a log book kept on some workstations to log any incidents or 
occurrences (Appendix C). 
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R: Reading ARS Output. 
ARS can be interrogated for information on the scheduled routes of specific 
trains and to discover which train ARS is giving priority to at a junction. 
Therefore, reading of ARS output on the GP screen8 was classified as 
planning behaviour although in some instances the signaller may have 
actually been cancelling irrelevant alarms. Again, instances of this were 
sufficiently rare not to have had a significant impact on the data. 
Communications 
T: Telephone. 
Any telephone calls were classified under this heading. 
CS: Voice communications. 
Signallers frequently communicate with the signaller on an adjacent 
workstation or the shift manager. Only information which was relevant to the 
immediate signalling situation was thus classified. Conversations regarding, 
for example, situations which occurred in the past were coded as ‘Quiet Time’ 
as they would not have been relevant to the signalling at that time. 
CI: Intercom communications. 
Some IECCs use intercoms to communicate with Control. Effectively this 
replaces telephone communications with Control9. 
Quiet Time 
Q: Quiet time.  
This included any time when the signaller was involved in an activity not 
directly related to signalling. Conversations with other signallers or staff, 
conversations with the researcher, reading newspapers or magazines were all 
examples of activities classed as quiet time. 
QA: Signaller away from workstation.  
Signallers occasionally took time away from the workstation, for a variety of 
reasons but most commonly to make a cup of tea. If the workstation was left 
unattended this activity was classed as quiet time away from the workstation. 
                                                
8
 GP Screen – General Purpose Screen. The GP screen gives details on alarms, trains 
approaching the control area, and responses to signaller queries. See Appendix C for a 
description of the GP screen. 
9
 Railway control staff take a more strategic view of the railway. It may be necessary for 
signallers to co-ordinate with them to implement changing plans. 
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Closed Circuit Television 
Only one of the sites (Tyneside) had CCTV screens on the workstations. These 
screens are used to monitor and operate level crossings. When the signaller was 
involved in either monitoring or operating these, CCTV was coded. 
4.3.4 Pilot 
The study was piloted in Liverpool Street on Shenfield workstation. One of the aims 
of the pilot study was to establish whether it would be necessary to video the 
signaller. This would have provided additional data but some signallers were known 
to be uncomfortable with being videoed. It was established in the pilot study that 
video would not add to the study as the main missing information was what was 
happening on the screens and why the signaller was making the observed 
interventions. A static video camera would not have captured these data adequately 
as the data were spread across different systems and screens and so it was decided 
not to use video.  
 
The pilot study was also intended to test the coding scheme to ensure that the codes 
were exhaustive and that it was possible to easily differentiate between the 
behaviours. The basic coding scheme worked well during the pilot but a major finding 
was the existence of different levels of monitoring behaviour. The signaller’s position 
was observed to change substantially during the monitoring task and during the pilot 
study five different levels were identified. The highest level had the signaller sitting 
up, watching the screens intently with his hand on the trackerball and was very 
common when the signaller was waiting for the right moment to intervene. In the next 
level the signaller again was sitting up, with his hand still on the trackerball but 
scanning the screens rather than watching one spot intently. This monitoring was 
common when the signaller felt it was likely he may have to intervene but he had not 
yet decided where. The next level was similar but the signaller did not have his hand 
on the trackerball. This was inferred to be pure information gathering monitoring 
behaviour. It was often seen when the signaller was preparing to leave the desk, had 
just returned, or after an intervention. The next type of monitoring behaviour identified 
was passive monitoring, the signaller was sitting back but it was clear from his 
movements and posture that he was watching what was happening on the screens. 
The final type of monitoring behaviour seen during the pilot was complete passive 
monitoring. Often the signaller put his hands behind his head and it was not possible 
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to tell if he was even focussing on the screens. Although these five levels were 
clearly observed during the pilot study, to attempt to code these for all observed 
signallers subsequently would have greatly complicated the observer’s task. 
Therefore a decision was made to only differentiate between active and passive 
monitoring in subsequent observations. Pan, Gillies, and Slater (2008) stated that 
body movement is an easily observable indicator of a person’s state. Cues in the 
posture and behaviour of signallers were used to infer whether they were engaging in 
active or passive monitoring. The results of the pilot allowed the procedure for the 
observations to be finalised. 
4.3.5 Procedure 
The observations were carried out at the same time of day on each workstation. The 
observation time was 16:30-18:00. The researcher arrived at the signal box at 
approximately 16:00 and approached the signaller on the workstation of interest. 
Usually the signaller had been made aware of the study in advance to ensure they 
were happy with being observed, but in some cases this was not possible and a brief 
outline of the study was required before proceeding. The study was then explained in 
more detail and the signaller was given a consent form to read through and sign 
(Appendix G). Following this the researcher asked about the current state of the area 
under their control and whether there were any particular problems. Any instances of 
disruption or late running trains were noted. Once everything was explained 
satisfactorily the signaller was instructed to ignore the researcher as much as 
possible and to act as if she was not there.  
 
The observations commenced as close to 16:20 as possible. This was earlier than 
the scheduled time of 16:30, but there were a number of occasions where it was not 
possible to complete the observation period or where the signaller was replaced by 
the relief signaller10 for a few minutes, and so starting early gave an extra 10min of 
data to fill any gaps. The data were coded every 5s using the coding system outlined 
earlier. An Excel spreadsheet bound into a book was used to record the data 
(Appendix H).  
 
                                                
10
 Relief signallers are often used in bigger signal boxes such as IECCs. They rotate around 
each workstation during a shift allowing the signaller on duty to take a break. 
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At the end of the observation period, participants were given the questionnaire and 
asked to rate their agreement with each statement on a five point Likert scale. They 
were also asked to give a short debrief on any unusual occurrences on the 
workstation during the observation. Finally, they were asked what their most common 
reason for intervening during the observation was, and which intervention method 
they favoured. 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Overall Results 
Figure 4-7 describes the results of the observations. Each bar on the graph describes 
the distribution of activity for one signaller and each group of three bars describes the 
three observations for each workstation in the study. There are clear differences in 
activity between signallers. The same signaller was observed on Obs 3 and Obs 4, 
and these two graphs are remarkably similar. Obs 8 and Obs 11 also show the same 
signaller, but these graphs are different. In this case there was disruption during Obs 
11 which contributed to the difference in the graphs. Finally, the same signaller was 
observed for Obs 23 and Obs 24 but these graphs show a big difference, particularly 
in intervention. It is not possible to account for this difference as the workstation was 
reportedly running smoothly on both days. The signaller on Obs 17 was the only one 
to choose not to use ARS. 
 
 





























































































Figure 4-7: Observation Data 
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 Monitoring Intervention Planning Comms Quiet Time CCTV 
York A 34% (8%) 9% (4%) 16% (1%) 13% (7%) 27% (19%) n/a 
York B 49% (6%) 12% (2%) 17% (3%) 11% (5%) 10% (3%) n/a 
Liv. St. A 35% (19%) 4% (3%) 10% (8%) 6% (2%) 45% (24%) n/a 
Liv St. B 47% (19%) 13% (6%) 11% (4%) 8% (4%) 21% (17%) n/a 
Ashford A 57% (10%) 11% (3%) 8% (2%) 4% (2%) 20% (4%) n/a 
Ashford B 50% (19%) 8% (3%) 6% (3%) 8% (5%) 29% (24%) n/a 
Tyneside A 46% (10%) 6% (2%) 17% (7%) 10% (4%) 14% (9%) 7% (3%) 
Tyneside B 65% (7%) 10% (6%) 4% (1%) 2% (2%) 13% (10%) 6% (2%) 
Table 4-1: Average Percentage Occupancy and Standard Deviation per Workstation 
 
Table 4-1 describes the average time dedicated to each behaviour for each 
workstation in the study. The standard deviation (SD) is also given and the high 
values for these illustrate the variability of the data on workstations.  
 
The circumstances on the workstations during the observations were recorded 
(Appendix I). Out of the 24 observations, 13 had entirely smooth running with no 
problems whatsoever, eight had minor problems which the signallers stated had little 
or no effect on their work, and three had more major problems which had a slight 
effect on their work; late running following earlier failure of the overhead line 
equipment (OLE)11, a track circuit12 which was not operating correctly, and some 
major congestion due to trespassers further along the railway. Figure 4-8 shows the 
results of the observations ordered by these three groupings. This graph clearly 
shows that the three observations with some disruption did not have the highest 
monitoring or intervention levels. It is likely that the disruption would have had some 
effect on the observed behaviour of the signaller, but that effect was not large enough 
for these observations to be prominent. 
 
                                                
11
 OLE supplies power to trains through electric wires strung above the railway. 
12
 Track circuits use an electric current through the rails to detect the presence of a train 
(Appendix C). 
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Figure 4-8: Results by Disruption Levels 
No Disruption Disruption – little or 
no effect 
Disruption –  
Minor effect 
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4.4.2 Monitoring 
The mean percentage of time spent monitoring was 48%, a maximum of 73% and a 
minimum of 16% of the total 90min observation. Two types of monitoring behaviour 
were identified as a result of the pilot study and were coded during the remainder of 
the studies; active monitoring and passive monitoring. Passive monitoring was 
typically carried out for longer periods of time than active monitoring; the average 
length of time spent passively monitoring was 27s and the average length of time 
spent actively monitoring was 13s. The proportion of passive monitoring was higher 























Figure 4-9: Monitoring Results 
 
Figure 4-9 shows the average level of active and passive monitoring observed on 
each workstation in the study. The SD is also shown and the high SD values suggest 
that the individual rather than the workstation drives the monitoring level. As the 
observations were carried out at the same time of day the traffic encountered should 
have been very nearly identical. Although some of the workstations do show 
comparable monitoring levels (e.g. Obs 5 and Obs 6, see Figure 4-7), in the light of 
the other data gathered it is likely that this is a coincidence.  
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4.4.3 Intervention 
The average percentage time spent intervening over the course of an observation 
was 9%, the maximum was 19% and the minimum 1%. Two types of intervention 
were coded, use of the trackerball and use of the keyboard. The trackerball allows 
the signaller to set routes and other directive activities. These activities can also be 
achieved through the keyboard, but the keyboard may also be used to query ARS or 
to look up timetable information. As can be seen from the Figure 4-10, use of the 
trackerball was considerably higher than use of keyboard. The average time for an 
intervention with trackerball (8s) was only slightly longer than keyboard interventions 
(6s). Overall, use of the keyboard was very low as compared to use of the trackerball, 
but use was highest in York (Obs 1 - 6).  
 
Figure 4-10 shows the mean and SD of trackerball and keyboard use for each 
workstation in the study. Similar to monitoring, intervention levels differed greatly 
between individuals, as can be seen by the high SD for trackerball use in Figure 4-10. 
Since the three observations for each workstation were conducted at the same time 
of day, the train running pattern should have been almost identical and thus, barring 
any incidents or infrastructure problems, the workload and tasks encountered should 
have been very similar. An increase could be seen on workstations which 
experienced incidents during the course of the observation but even then these were 






















Figure 4-10: Intervention Results 
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4.4.4 Planning 
The average percentage of total time spent occupied with planning activities was 
11%, with a maximum of 23% and a minimum of 3%. The distribution of planning 
activities varied greatly across different IECCs, as shown in Figure 4-11. Use of the 
simplifier was highest in York, use of CCF was highest in Liverpool Street and both 
Ashford workstations and Darlington showed much lower CCF and TRUST use than 
the others. Use of TRUST was highest on the York A workstation in York, and why 
this was greatly reduced on the York B workstation is not known. Paperwork and 
reading ARS output occupied very little of the signallers’ time overall. The average 
length of time for an individual planning activity was 9s for use of the simplifier, 20s 
























Figure 4-11: Planning Results 
 
Planning is the only area where a difference between the IECCs can be seen. In 
particular the use of TRUST and CCF varied greatly between boxes. All four IECCs 
had both systems available to them but in Liverpool Street the TRUST terminal was 
shared between two workstations and so required the signaller to move away from 
his workstation slightly, whereas in York and Ashford both CCF and TRUST were 
available on the workstation. The use of TRUST was highest in York, perhaps 
because the signallers there have had access to TRUST for longer than CCF and so 
are more used to using it. The use of CCF was highest in Liverpool Street, probably 
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because it is available on the workstation and TRUST is not. Signallers in Ashford 
made little use of either system; the reason for this is not known but may reflect the 
lower complexity of the workstation. Tyneside showed a big difference in the use of 
planning tools between the two workstations. Tyneside B had the lowest use of 
planning tools in the whole study and this may be due to the lower complexity of that 
workstation. Tyneside A, however, had the highest use of planning tools. The 
observed use of planning tools is summarised in Table 4-2  
 
 Simplifier CCF TRUST 
York High use – printed off 
daily and used to 
record passage of 
trains 
Low use – some non 
use 




Low use – reference 
only 
High use – most 
utilised planning tool 
Low use – some non 
use 
Ashford Medium use – 
reference only 
Low use – some non 
use 
Low use – some non 
use 
Tyneside Varied use between 
workstations. 
Reference only 
Medium use Varied use between 
workstations 
Table 4-2: Summary of Planning Characteristics 
4.4.5 Communications 
The average percentage of time overall spent on communications was 8%, with a 
maximum of 21% and a minimum of 0.4%. The average time of an individual 
telephone call was 28s, whereas conversations with other signallers on adjacent 
workstations were 9s on average and the average use of the intercom was 30s. Only 
signallers in York had an intercom which allowed them to talk to Control, and this was 
used much more on the York South workstation (Obs 1-3), probably because of the 
presence of York Station on that workstation, requiring more coordination with 
Control. The majority of communications were carried out over the telephone. 
Conversations between signallers on adjacent workstations varied across the IECCs 
but were highest in York.  
 























Figure 4-12: Communications Results 
4.4.6 Quiet Time 
The average percentage of overall quiet time during the observations was 22%, with 
a maximum of 66% and a minimum of 4%. Two types of quiet time were coded, time 
spent at the workstation not actively involved in signalling, and time spent away from 
the workstation. Individual quiet periods at the workstation lasted for an average of 
20s, compared to 1min for quiet periods away from the workstation. The longest quiet 
period spent at the desk without monitoring or engaging in any other signalling 
activity was 4min 35s, but this was an unusually long time, the next highest time was 
2min 55s. As can be seen from Figure 4-13, quiet time at the workstation was 
considerably more common than quiet time away from the workstation. The longest 
time spent away from the workstation by any of the observed signallers was 2min 
55s. 
 
























Figure 4-13: Quiet Time Results 
4.4.7 Closed Circuit Television Operation 
Closed Circuit Television screens required to operate level crossings were only 
present on the workstations in Tyneside IECC. Signallers were required to lower the 
barriers for each train and confirm that the crossing was clear for trains to pass. This 
occupied a reasonable chunk of the signallers’ time on these workstations, between 















Figure 4-14: CCTV Results 
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4.4.8 Trust 
The results of the questionnaires examining each signaller’s perceived trust in the 
automation are described in this section. Although there were 24 observations, three 
signallers were observed twice but only completed the questionnaire after one 
observation. Therefore there were 21 questionnaire respondents. The results of the 
questionnaire are shown in Table 4-3 and the means for each question are graphed 

























Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree
 
Figure 4-15: Trust Questionnaire Results 
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Question Name Mean SD
ARS is always available for use Mech. Reliability 4.14 1.11
I can rely on ARS to function as it is 
supposed to Reliability 1 
3.33 0.73
ARS will always make the same routing 
decision under the same circumstances Reliability 2 
3.23 1.78
ARS is capable of performing under a 
variety of different circumstances Robustness 
2.76 0.89
It is easy to understand what ARS does Understanding 1 3.52 1.08
I understand how ARS works Understanding 2 4.10 1.00
I understand why ARS makes the decisions 
it does Understanding 3 
3.10 1.09
ARS is capable of signalling trains as 
competently as a signaller Competence 1 
2.29 1.10
ARS performs well under normal running 
conditions Competence 2 
4.57 0.51
ARS performs well under disturbed 
conditions Competence 3 
1.67 1.02
ARS gives explicit information on its 
intended actions Explicit 
3.05 0.92
I can count on ARS to do its job Dependability 3.00 0.71
I have a personal preference for using ARS Attachment 3.33 1.11
I can predict what ARS will do from moment 
to moment Predictability 1 
2.90 1.34
ARS is very unpredictable, I never know 
what it is going to do Predictability 2 
2.62 0.92
ARS is very consistent Predictability 3 3.05 1.07
If ARS makes a routing decision which I am 
uncertain about I have confidence that ARS 
is correct 
Faith 1 2.62 1.12
Even if I have no reason to expect that ARS 
will be able to deal with a situation, I still 
feel certain that it will 
Faith 2 3.05 0.76
I trust ARS Overall Trust 2.90 1.00
Table 4-3: Trust Questionnaire Results 
 
In order to analyse further the results of the questionnaires, the signallers observed 
were divided into groups of high, medium and low in terms of monitoring, intervention, 
and quiet time. Planning and communications were not analysed as levels for these 
were likely to be affected by factors outside of the signallers’ direct control. Each 
observation was compared to the other two observations on the same workstation to 
determine the groupings. Two observations (Obs 1 and Obs 9) were excluded from 
this part of the study on the basis that there was significant disruption on these 
Chapter 4: Structured Observations of IECC Signallers 
 84 
workstations during the observations and this may have affected the observed levels 
of each activity. These exclusions were in addition to Obs 3, Obs 11 and Obs 23 
which were omitted as the signaller in each of these had already been observed, and 
therefore had previously completed the trust questionnaire. The sample size was 
therefore 19. As data gathered using Likert scales can be regarded as pseudo-
interval data (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), t-tests were run between the high and low 
groups in each category to test for significant differences between the two groups.  
 
No differences were found in terms of monitoring, but a number of differences were 
found in terms of intervention: 
x Explication of intention – “ARS gives explicit information on its intended 
actions”, t(11)=2.385, p<.05. Low interveners were more likely to agree with 
this statement. 
x Understandability 2 – “I understand how ARS works”, t(11)=2.851, p<.05. Low 
interveners were more likely to agree with this statement. 
x Predictability 2 – “ARS is very unpredictable; I never know what it is going to 
do”, t(11)=-2.337, p<.05. Low interveners were less likely to agree with this 
statement. 
x Reliability 1 – “I can rely on ARS to function as it is supposed to”, t(11)=2.434, 
p<.05. Low interveners were more likely to agree with this statement. 
x Faith 2 – “Even if I have no reason to expect that ARS will be able to deal with 
a situation, I still feel certain that it will”, t(10)=2.373, p<.05. Low interveners 
were more likely to agree with this statement. 
x Understandability 3 – “I understand why ARS makes the decisions it does”, 
t(11)=2.782, p<.05. Low interveners were more likely to agree with this 
statement. 
x Overall trust – “I trust ARS”, t(11)=2.478, p<.05. Low interveners were more 
likely to agree with this statement. 
Chapter 4: Structured Observations of IECC Signallers 
 85 
Intervention Groups










Figure 4-16: Significant Differences for Intervention Groups 
 
A difference was also found between the groups for the overall understandability 
dimension (t(11)=2.571, p<.05) with low interveners rating their understanding of the 
automation higher. 
 
Two significant differences were also found between signallers engaging in high and 
low levels of quiet time: 
x Understandability 1 – “It is easy to understand what ARS does”, t(12)=-2.178, 
p<.05. Signallers displaying high levels of quiet time were more likely to agree 
with this statement. 
x Faith 1 – “If ARS makes a routing decision which I am uncertain about I have 
confidence that ARS is correct”, t(12)=-2.756, p<.05. Signallers displaying 
high levels of quiet time were more likely to agree with this statement. 
 













Figure 4-17: Significant Differences for Quiet Time Groups 
4.4.9 Inter-Observer Reliability 
Inter-observer reliability is the extent to which the results of two or more observers of 
the same situation agree (Robson, 2002). Cohen’s Kappa (K) can be used to 
determine the level of inter-observer reliability. Cohen’s Kappa uses a proportion of 
agreement (Po) between observers (i.e. the proportion of occasions when the 
observers used the same code for the same time interval) and a proportion of chance 
(Pc) (i.e. the probability of both observers using the same code at the same time) to 











Robson (2002) gave the following rules of thumb for interpreting the results: 
 
K = 0.40 – 0.60: fair inter-observer agreement 
K = 0.60 – 0.75: good inter-observer agreement 
K > 0.75: excellent inter-observer agreement 
 
Four of the observations were undertaken by two different observers to determine 
inter-observer reliability for the method. There was a crucial difference between the 
observers as the first observer had considerably more knowledge of the signalling 
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Figure 4-18: Inter-Observer Comparison 
 
The proportion of agreement for each 5s block and Cohen’s Kappa for each of the 




Agreement Cohen’s Kappa 
Inter-observer 1 67% 55% 
Inter-observer 2 66% 52% 
Inter-observer 3 65% 52% 
Inter-observer 4 80% 65% 
Table 4-4: Inter-observer Statistics 
4.5 Discussion 
4.5.1 Monitoring 
Monitoring behaviour showed considerable variation between observed signallers 
despite the observations on individual workstations experiencing similar conditions. It 
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seems likely therefore that monitoring levels under normal running are driven by the 
individual rather than the workstation. 
 
Two types of monitoring were identified and coded during the study; active monitoring 
and passive monitoring. No reference to different states or levels of monitoring was 
found in the literature on automation. However, a similar concept arose in the 
discussion on differences between ‘active control’ and ‘passive monitoring’ (Endsley 
& Kiris, 1995) where it was suggested that automation induced passive processing of 
information which was inferior to active. Both active and passive monitoring were 
frequently engaged in throughout the study but active monitoring was more common 
between interventions while passive monitoring was associated more with quiet time. 
It seems likely that rather than signallers working with automation constantly suffering 
from inferior information processing as is suggested in the literature, they actually 
actively process information when they believe decisions may be required and 
engage in a more relaxed form of monitoring (passive monitoring) when they feel the 
demands of the workstation are lesser. Although it was not possible to determine how 
much attention the signaller paid during passive monitoring, there are frequent 
examples of interventions following a period of passive monitoring so it can be 
concluded that information is still being processed. Cowan (1988) suggests that 
attention can be automatically triggered even during passive information processing 
states. If this is the case, the use of different levels of monitoring behaviour may be a 
very effective strategy for reducing workload associated with monitoring, which has 
been shown to be high (Warm et al., 1996), while still maintaining awareness of the 
system. There are probably more types of monitoring behaviour to be observed in 
other signallers, indeed one signaller in the study monitored the system through CCF 
(the map-based planning tool), but as monitoring was not the singular focus of this 
study the number of coded monitoring behaviours was reduced to two.  
 
High levels of monitoring (either active or passive) were associated with low levels of 
quiet time, and low monitoring was associated with high levels of quiet time. This 
would seem to suggest that monitoring and quiet time are interchangeable and 
signallers who can find a ‘distraction’ (i.e. someone to talk to in most cases) will use 
the time otherwise used for monitoring purposes. There is probably a lower threshold 
of monitoring below which signallers would feel uncomfortable, but further research 
would be required to identify what this might be. However, establishing that boundary 
would contribute towards understanding the necessary levels of operator awareness 
of the system. The association of active monitoring with interventions and passive 
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monitoring with quiet time provides some validation of the decision to differentiate 
between the two types of monitoring. More research is required to look at monitoring 
behaviours alone to identify what triggers each one and the quantity, quality and type 
of information gathered at each level. 
 
It is important to note that all observed signallers engaged in routine monitoring 
behaviour and the longest observed period when they were away from the 
workstation and could not monitor it was just under 3min. It would appear that 
monitoring is a critical ongoing activity for the signallers which they are not willing to 
neglect. This suggests that they place a high priority on maintaining awareness of 
their control area, even when ARS is running all trains. 
4.5.2 Intervention 
The results show a high degree of variation in intervention levels between signallers. 
Unfortunately it is not known why some observations had higher intervention levels 
than others. It is clear that it is not totally due to particular circumstances on the 
workstation, as the events experienced should have been very similar, but whether 
the difference in the times is due to some signallers intervening in more 
circumstances than others or to some signallers using more efficient strategies is 
unclear. For example, perhaps some signallers intervened in advance and were thus 
able to deal with problems quite quickly; perhaps even making some interventions to 
prevent a situation developing, or some interventions may be more efficient than 
others (e.g. STP13 as compared to manual route setting). Therefore, like monitoring 
levels, intervention levels appear to be driven by the individual rather than the 
workstation and research supports the theory that individual differences may account 
for these differences (Merritt & Ilgen, 2008). 
 
The trackerball was used far more often than the keyboard, probably because it 
represents a more direct method to interface with the system, in a similar manner to 
the common preference for mouse to keyboard commands in PC usage (Krisler & 
Alterman, 2008). Use of the keyboard was highest in York IECC but as this study 
recorded only intervention levels rather than the purpose of the interventions, the 
                                                
13
 STP – Special Timing Pattern. STPs are pre-programmed timetables for common routes 
across the workstations which can be applied to trains which have no entry in the timetable. 
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reason for this difference is not known. Further research could investigate common 
interventions, how they are achieved and the length of time required for each.  
 
Following the observations, signallers were asked for the most common reasons for 
interventions during the observation period. Common reasons were to regulate due to 
late running (most often achieved with reminders), to facilitate permissive working14, 
to ensure routes for trains were set in the correct order, and to route trains out of a 
depot. Some signallers also reported that they intervened to set manual routes 
because they did not trust ARS to do it. Setting manual routes using the trackerball 
and applying reminders to control ARS were the most common forms of intervention. 
This reflects the ease of use of these methods as compared to others. It was not 
possible to pursue this information further as part of this study, but these themes 
were picked up in the subsequent interviews which will be presented in Chapter 5. 
4.5.3 Planning 
The use of four different planning tools was coded. It was impossible to tell when the 
signallers were looking up information for immediate use, for background information 
or simply as something to do. There was an initial assumption that signallers would 
only look up information that applied to their signalling goals, even if it was not strictly 
necessary. However, a signaller in one observation reported that he was looking up 
the running times of the Eurostar. He was not involved in any aspect of signalling the 
Eurostar trains and only enquired about them to pass the time. Other signallers were 
observed to query specific trains which they or their colleagues intended travelling 
home on.  
 
Signallers in York had generally higher use of the simplifier; this was because they 
have a habit in York of going through the simplifier and crossing off trains as they 
pass through the workstation. This is not a requirement but every signaller observed 
in York did this, while no other signaller involved in the study did. Other signal boxes 
use the simplifier as a reference and do not mark it, in fact in other signal boxes the 
simplifier is kept in plastic sheets whereas York signallers print off a new copy each 
day. The advantage of striking trains off the simplifier is not clear, but one advantage 
of having a disposable copy was that any alterations to train running could be made 
                                                
14
 Permissive working refers to two trains occupying the same section of track, usually a 
platform, at the same time; ARS is restricted from setting these routes.  
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on the simplifier, whereas signallers in other IECCs had to make a note of changes 
separately. 
 
Reading ARS output (i.e. GP Screen) and filling in forms or TRB were very infrequent 
activities and accounted for very little of the signaller’s time. The North Kent 1 
workstation in Ashford is not an IECC workstation and it does not actually have a GP 
screen so the signallers have to exit a signalling screen and call up a separate screen 
to interrogate the ARS. This activity was not observed at all on this workstation 
suggesting that having the ability to interrogate ARS is ‘nice to have’ but signallers 
are not willing to go out of their way to use it, possibly because the quality of the 
information it supplies is poor. 
4.5.4 Communications 
Telephone communications are not within the direct control of the signaller; they are 
very much influenced by the events on the workstation at a particular time. 
Communications are not potentially influenced by the automation in the way that 
some of the other activities are and for both these reasons a detailed discussion is 
not required. However, increased voice communications between adjacent signallers 
indicates a perceived need to pass each other information on train running. This need 
should not exist, or should be greatly reduced, if the automation is running well. It 
appears that a bigger factor in the levels of voice communications is the control room 
layout; voice communications were greatly increased in York as compared to the 
other IECCs and the most obvious explanation for this is the relative openness of 
York IECC. Tyneside B (Darlington - Obs 22-24) had the lowest communications, 
probably reflecting the lower complexity of that area. 
4.5.5 Quiet Time 
Activities that were coded as quiet time included chatting to fellow signallers, looking 
at mobile phones, drawing up rosters, checking email, staring at fingernails, reading 
(letters, books, newspapers, magazines), tidying the workstation, searching in bags 
or drawers, doodling, eating, or simply looking around the control centre. Some 
signallers also found it impossible to ignore the researcher and time spent talking to 
the researcher was coded as quiet time. The researcher was careful not to initiate 
any conversations with the signallers and so any conversations were initiated by the 
signaller at times when he clearly felt he had time to spare. Although it was preferable 
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for the signaller not to speak to the researcher, the ongoing nature of this research 
meant that the researcher could not afford to alienate any potential participants. Two 
signallers in particular spent a good deal of time talking to the researcher, these were 
Obs 8 and Obs 18 (see Figure 4-7) and this is reflected in their high proportion of 
quiet time.  
 
Quiet time was largely interchangeable with monitoring time; there are many 
instances in the data where the coding flicked between monitoring, particularly 
passive monitoring, and quiet time. This indicates that when signallers are monitoring 
the system it is not always strictly necessary and sometimes they may be doing it in 
the absence of anything else to do. Another indication that monitoring and quiet time 
are interchangeable is that signallers who had a low monitoring percentage had a 
high quiet time, and vice versa. 
 
Signallers commonly left the workstation to have a tea, cigarette or toilet break. 
Sometimes a relief signaller took over for these, but particularly for tea breaks the 
workstations were frequently left unattended. The observed signaller rarely moved 
away from his workstation to have a chat with a signaller on another workstation but 
visits from other signallers on duty were frequent and gatherings of signallers around 
other workstations were noted during the observations. The act of being observed 
may have prevented the observed signaller from engaging in this behaviour when 
normally they would have spent considerably more time away from their own 
workstation.  
 
The level of quiet time is probably quite dependent on the individual signaller’s 
personality. More sociable and outgoing signallers probably spend more time chatting 
to other signallers both at their own workstation and away from it. More introverted 
signallers may spend the time monitoring, when perhaps it is not strictly necessary. 
Although signallers were requested to ignore the researcher, different signallers were 
comfortable with this to a greater or lesser degree. It is impossible to tell if they 
behaved exactly as they would have if the researcher had not been present but some 
signallers were capable of not speaking to the researcher at all. Some signallers 
spoke during quiet periods when they were obviously bored, and one or two 
signallers were not capable of ignoring the researcher at all and engaged in 
conversation throughout the observation.  
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4.5.6 Closed Circuit Television Operation 
As CCTV was only present in Tyneside it is not possible to compare operation times 
in different IECCs. However, it is unlikely that there is any interaction between this 
task and ARS so the data are not particularly relevant to this study and were 
gathered for thoroughness only. 
4.5.7 Trust 
4.5.7.1 Reliability 
The perceived mechanical reliability of ARS was considered high with most signallers 
reporting that it is always available for use. One of the signallers who disagreed with 
this statement was in Ashford IECC and the ARS had been unavailable on that 
workstation the previous day, but this is a very rare event and as there is redundancy 
in the ARS system it was only unavailable for a short period. The responses to this 
question were as expected, reflecting the very high mechanical reliability of the 
automation, as would be expected in a safety critical industry. 
 
There was general agreement that ARS could be relied upon to function as it is 
supposed to, with only two signallers disagreeing with this statement. However, when 
asked whether they agreed that ARS will always make the same routing decision 
under the same circumstances there was a higher level of disagreement among the 
signallers (six compared to two). Although there was more agreement than 
disagreement with this statement, six signallers felt that ARS does not always make 
the same routing decision under the same circumstances. As with any computer, 
ARS follows rules to arrive at its decisions and so it will always make the same 
decision under the same circumstances. That some signallers disagreed with this 
statement indicates that they may use different criteria in their decision making and 
they probably do not fully understand the factors on which ARS bases its decisions. 
This is likely to be due to poor feedback and has strong implications for the 
predictability of the automation.  
4.5.7.2 Robustness 
Only one question examined robustness, whether ARS is capable of performing 
under a variety of circumstances. Just five signallers agreed with this statement 
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reflecting ARS’s inability to perform efficiently when the railway is disrupted. This was 
expected as ARS performs well when all trains are running to timetable and there are 
no incidents but this leaves a wide variety of circumstances when the signaller is 
required to step in. However the impact of this upon trust may not be very great, 
signallers simply calibrate their trust accordingly by developing a set of situations that 
they trust ARS with and they assume manual control or inhibit the automation for 
other situations. 
4.5.7.3 Understandability 
Three questions examined signallers’ perceived ability to understand the automation. 
There was general agreement with the first statement ‘It is easy to understand what 
ARS does’ with only four signallers disagreeing. Signallers also agreed with the 
statement ‘I understand how ARS works’. The final statement was ‘I understand why 
ARS makes the decisions it does’ and although overall the response to this question 
was positive, there was a higher negative response rate than in other questions on 
understandability. This indicates that signallers may have a lower understanding of 
why ARS makes certain decisions than of what it is doing and how it does it. It may 
be that the basic operation of ARS is well understood by signallers but the more 
complex area of ARS decision making and conflict resolution is less well understood. 
Understanding why the automation makes the decisions it does is fundamentally 
important for predicting and controlling the automation and lack of understanding is 
likely to impact strongly upon overall trust and use of automation (Lee, 1991). Of 
course, the questionnaire only examined perceived understanding; actual 
understanding may be different to, and perhaps lower than, perceived understanding. 
4.5.7.4 Competence 
Signallers universally agreed that ARS performs well under normal running 
conditions, and this reflects very positively on ARS’s abilities during normal 
operations. There was a strongly negative response to the disturbed conditions 
question, which is not unexpected as ARS is widely reported to work less well under 
disturbed conditions. These two questions clearly illustrate the divide in ARS’ abilities 
between normal and disturbed conditions. 
 
The majority of the signallers disagreed with the statement comparing ARS 
competence to signaller competence (Q4). This is not surprising, both because ARS 
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reportedly does not perform well under disturbed conditions, and because to agree 
would diminish their own standing and undermine their employment. In this light, it is 
surprising that there was not stronger disagreement with this statement. The 
statement could perhaps have been clearer with respect to what ‘signalling trains’ 
exactly referred to. However, overall the responses were negative reflecting the 
inability of ARS to signal trains in a variety of circumstances, but also reflecting the 
confidence signallers have in their own abilities. 
 
As with robustness, the impact of the lack of competence of the automation in some 
situations may not impact overly on trust as long as the signallers are aware of the 
automations strengths and weaknesses and are able to take control when a situation 
arises that ARS cannot deal with (Lee & Moray, 1994; Madhavan & Wiegmann, 
2007). 
4.5.7.5 Explication of Intention 
The results for this question examining feedback were noncommittal, with the 
majority of signallers opting for a neutral response. The question may not have been 
well phrased or the signallers may indeed have felt neutral regarding the feedback 
they get from ARS. This could be explained by a lack of imagination on how 
information could be fed back better. 
 
ARS does not automatically give information on its intentions but it is possible to 
query ARS to determine which train it intends to route next at a junction. The 
feedback of such information could certainly be better supported and improving the 
feedback should have the result of increasing understanding and predictability, 
thereby improving trust and allowing the signallers to better control the automation 
(Dzindolet et al., 2003). 
4.5.7.6 Dependability 
Again the majority of responses to this question were neutral with an equal number of 
agreements and disagreements, but no signallers chose to score strong agreement 
or disagreement. In this case the phrasing of the question seems less likely to have 
been an issue and so it would appear that signallers were genuinely noncommittal 
regarding this question. It more likely reflects the discrepancy in ARS performance 
between normal and disturbed conditions and potentially some confusion about what 
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ARS’s job is. In as far as it routes trains it can be counted on, but some signallers 
may expect more from it and resent how often they are required to step in. If 
signallers are expecting more from it than is actually delivered there is bound to be an 
impact on trust (Merritt & Ilgen, 2008). 
4.5.7.7 Personal Attachment 
Again this question had a high neutral response but there was a tendency in the 
results towards agreement. It would appear then that most of the signallers in the 
study were at least happy to use ARS, with two from York and one from Liverpool 
Street the only signallers who indicated otherwise. It is interesting to note that the 
only observed signaller who did not use ARS was in Ashford IECC but he did not 
disagree with this statement.  
4.5.7.8 Predictability 
The responses to the three questions on signallers’ ability to predict ARS varied. The 
first (Q8) received a wide variety of responses with the most common being 
agreement, neutral and strong disagreement. No trend within the IECCs was 
apparent and so it seems that individual signallers’ ability to predict ARS varies 
considerably. The high number of signallers who strongly disagreed with the 
statement does not reflect well on the predictability of the automation. The majority of 
signallers were neutral in their responses to the second question (Q12) but there was 
a skew in the responses towards disagreement. This suggests that signallers do find 
ARS to be somewhat predictable. The responses to the final question (Q17) were 
again largely neutral, but with a slight skew towards agreement. This again indicates 
that signallers find the system somewhat predictable. The combined results of the 
three questions suggest that signallers feel they can predict ARS most of the time but 
are not comfortable predicting its every action. Better feedback and understanding of 
the underlying logic should improve signallers’ ability to predict the automation, but a 
display of the automation’s future intentions would be the best solution. 
4.5.7.9 Faith 
Two questions investigated the signallers’ faith in the automation, or belief that it will 
make the correct routing decisions. The interesting thing about the results for these 
questions was how positive the responses were. Although the overall response for 
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the first was negative, six signallers reported that if ARS made a routing decision they 
were uncertain about they would have confidence that ARS was correct. These 
responses came from across all four IECCs. The responses to the second question 
(Q14) were predominantly neutral, perhaps indicating that signallers are not sure 
which situations ARS can deal with. Most likely in this situation, the signallers would 
not leave a train in ARS to see what happened but would take it out and signal it 
manually and thus they rarely test their knowledge of or faith in ARS’s capabilities. 
4.5.7.10 Overall Trust 
Signallers replied to a general question on trust and again the responses were 
predominantly neutral but with three strong disagreements. This would appear to 
indicate that the overall trust in the system is low. It is an interesting situation 
because ARS runs on top of the interlocking, which the signallers do very much trust. 
Therefore, they can be sure that the interlocking will not allow ARS to make any 
grievous mistakes in terms of safety. So, while trust in the system may be low, this is 
likely to be in terms of efficiency and the safety risk is not very high. The impact of 
low trust is therefore not as strong as it might otherwise have been. 
4.5.7.11 Differences between Groups 
The results indicate that correlations can be found between the observed behaviours 
of signallers and their reported trust in ARS, particularly in relation to the amount of 
time spent intervening. Although the sample size was small, the direction of the 
differences between groups all indicate that lower trust results in higher intervention. 
 
Differences were found in questions relating to feedback, understanding, 
predictability, reliability and faith. Apart from reliability and feedback (Dzindolet et al., 
2003; Wiegmann et al., 2001), no other research is known to have found empirical 
evidence supporting the relationship of understanding, predictability, and faith to 
automation usage. The literature suggests a strong relationship between competence 
and automation usage (Muir & Moray, 1989), however this relationship was not found 
in this study. It is not known why this was. The responses to the questionnaires 
indicate that ARS is not a robust system (i.e. it is not competent during disruption). It 
may be that the perception of the competence of ARS is reasonably stable between 
signallers, but their ability to predict and understand it varies and it is this that 
differentiates their usage of the system.   
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4.5.8 Discussion of Method 
The framework developed for this study was designed to classify all activities 
observed. This was achieved through the identification of five high level activities and 
in this way it differed from frameworks found in the literature which attempted to 
capture the purpose of the observed activities (Lenior, 1993; Reinach, 2006). 
However, some commonalities do exist, for example, communications were captured 
in all three frameworks and Reinach used a category of ‘actuating controls’ which is 
very similar to ‘intervention’.  
 
The five main behaviours were comprehensive and easily distinguishable. However, 
the difficulty in determining the purpose behind interventions is a limitation of the 
method. Without expert knowledge of the signalling domain it may be difficult to 
interpret the events on the workstation, and even with expert knowledge it is not 
possible to fully understand the reasons behind each individual’s observed 
behaviours. This is compounded by the strict coding and unobtrusive nature of the 
method which prohibits asking the signallers for information on their behaviours and 
actions. Thus, although the method is reliable at recording observed behaviours, it is 
not sufficient to determine the reasons behind those behaviours. However, as with 
the framework developed by Reinach (2006), it may be used in conjunction with other 
methods to obtain a fuller picture of signaller workload. Alternatively, a less formal 
observation may give more insight into the reasons behind the observed behaviours, 
but it is also possible to use other methods, such as interviews, to gather these data. 
 
The workstations involved in the study were carefully chosen to match the demands 
as closely as possible. However, it is impossible to precisely match workstations due 
to the variability of rail infrastructure and this limits the confidence which can be 
placed on conclusions drawn from comparisons of workstations. Finally, a high 
demand is placed on the researcher over the 90min period of observation due to the 
requirement to code the data at 5s intervals. Alternative methods of coding the data 
could be investigated to reduce this burden. 
4.5.8.1 Inter-observer Reliability 
The inter-observer reliability study undertaken demonstrated the reliability and validity 
of the method. Good inter-observer reliability is highly desirable as it demonstrates 
that the coding system developed is applied consistently.  
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The graph comparing the two observers (Figure 4-18) shows very similar results in 
terms of monitoring, communications and quiet time, but there is a discrepancy in 
terms of intervention and planning in the first three graphs (Inter-observer 1, 2 and 3). 
This can be explained by the difference in knowledge of the two observers. The more 
knowledgeable observer was aware of which input devices were attached to the 
signalling system and which were for interacting with the planning systems while the 
less experienced observer coded all use of input devices as intervention. Once this 
discrepancy is removed, as it was in the final inter-observer reliability study (Inter-
observer 4), the inter-observer reliability appears very high. 
 
The discrepancy in the first three observations is reflected in the statistics but 
nevertheless the statistics indicate reasonable inter-observer reliability. The final 
observation shows much improved results with good agreement between the 
observers. These statistics are lower than might be expected given the similarity of 
the graphs and one possible explanation for this is the frequency with which the data 
were coded. It was possible that there was a slight lag between the observers and 
this would have been picked up by the statistics which compare each 5s block of 
data, but the graphs would not have reflected this. Using the overall times for each of 
the five behaviours the percentage agreements between the observers were 78%, 
76%, 83%, and 95% respectively. 
4.5.8.2 Smoothness of Data 
Graphs were developed to illustrate how the data changed over the period of the 
observations and to determine how smooth the data were over time (Appendix J). 
Although there are small changes visible over time in each observation, in general 
the data are remarkably smooth. The concern was that as the railway is a real time 
dynamic system the signallers’ activities would be driven by occurrences on the 
railway and so their activities over time could differ greatly. This was not found to be 
the case, although small changes can be seen. This is an interesting result, as it 
reinforces the theory that individual signallers drive their own activities. It also 
suggests that shorter observations which would be less resource intensive both in the 
data collection and data analysis stages would yield valid results.  
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4.6 Conclusions 
The main aim of this study was to develop a method to observe signallers at their 
work. The method developed used five basic activity or behaviour codes and resulted 
in graphs of the signallers’ division of time across these five activities. Clear 
differences could be seen in different signallers using this method and it also showed 
good inter-observer reliability. The data were also shown to be quite stable over the 
90min period, suggesting that shorter observations of perhaps an hour would be 
equally valid. Further research, perhaps using verbal protocols in addition to the 
observation method, would be required to identify the strategies underlying the 
graphs generated from the observations. The following chapters build on the data 
gathered during these observations and investigate the reasons behind signaller 
interventions and monitoring strategies. 
 
The framework divided signaller activity into five observable behaviours. Although the 
data gathered using this method are very variable, excluding quiet time, monitoring 
was typically the predominant activity followed by planning. The variability of the data 
indicates that signallers have different strategies in their approach when working with 
ARS, although this method was not sufficiently powerful to determine what these 
strategies are and why they vary.  
 
Two different forms of monitoring were clearly identifiable during the study. These 
were labelled active and passive as in the first the signallers appeared to be more 
involved in seeking information. Passive monitoring was usually characterised by 
removal of the signallers hand from the trackerball and the signaller sitting back in his 
chair, but maintaining his gaze towards the signalling screens. It is likely that the 
recognition of patterns of trains on the workstation suggests to the signallers that 
interventions are unlikely to be required for a few moments and they will take that 
opportunity to relax.  
 
The trust questionnaire results show that the perceived reliability of ARS is high, as 
would be expected from a safety critical system. Although signallers found ARS 
competent in normal operations its competence was rated much lower during 
disruption. The responses on signallers’ perceived understanding of ARS were quite 
positive but the responses on their ability to predict ARS were more varied and 
inclined to be negative. Overall, the trust in the system does not appear to be 
particularly high. A number of significant differences were found between groups of 
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high and low interveners. This would suggest that the signallers’ trust in the 
automation does have a noticeable effect on the strategy of use.  
4.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has presented a framework for structured observations of signallers and 
the results of 24 observations of signallers using ARS. Differences between signallers 
were found using the framework, and analysis of the trust questionnaire found that 
signallers who intervene more often report lower understanding, ability to predict, and 
faith in the automation. They also perceive the reliability and feedback from the 
automation to be lower. The study was limited by an inability to determine the 
reasons behind observed behaviours; hence interviews with signallers were 
undertaken to gain a richer picture of the impact of automation. These interviews will 
be presented in Chapter 5.  
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CHAPTER 5: SIGNALLER INTERVIEWS 
5.1 Chapter Overview 
Two qualitative methods were used to gain insight into the use and opinions of ARS. 
Both were essentially interview based, but one was an analysis of pre-existing video 
tapes of unstructured interviews with signallers at their workstation, and the other was 
semi-structured interviews undertaken for this research. The existing videos had not 
previously been analysed for the purpose of studying automation. Themes under the 
headings of opinion of ARS, system performance issues, knowledge of ARS, and 
interaction with ARS were identified from the data. These themes are discussed in 
this chapter. Key findings include signallers’ descriptions of how they go about 
monitoring their workstations, preferred methods of interaction, and signallers’ 
understanding of ARS. 
5.2 Introduction 
Qualitative data were collected in order to understand the knowledge, attitudes and 
opinions of signallers towards ARS. The previous observation study had provided 
data on the behaviour of signallers while using ARS but did not provide any 
information on the reasons behind the observed behaviours. This study aimed to 
address this gap and was an important step in understanding the effect automation 
has on the signalling task, one of the aims of this research. The people who use the 
system daily are best placed to provide information on its use and issues arising from 
it. Using interviews it was possible to elicit this information and to probe for additional 
information in areas such as signallers’ understanding of and ability to predict the 
automation.  
 
Figure 5-1 illustrates the methods used in the qualitative investigations detailed in this 
chapter. Two main methods were used to elicit information on ARS; a video interview 
archive analysis and semi-structured interviews with signallers. The overall 
participant observation approach to the research supplied additional information and 
context used to develop these methods and supplement and interpret the findings. 
The results of both studies have been collated in this chapter to give a rich 
description of the strengths and weaknesses of the current automation. 




Figure 5-1: Position of Interviews, Video Archive Analysis, and Participant Observation 
in the Research Framework 
 
The video archive analysis was based on eight previously recorded videos of 
interviews with signallers in an IECC which were made available to the researcher. 
These were undertaken by two researchers, Dr. Peter Timmer and Dr. Adam Stork, 
from University College London in 1999. The videos varied in length but were an 
average of approximately 3 hours long. Originally 10 videos existed however two had 
degraded over time and were unwatchable. In order to preserve the remaining eight 
they were transferred to DVD. The original research did not focus on ARS but rather 
was a more general investigation into signallers’ strategies. As ARS was in use at the 
signalling centre where the research was undertaken it featured frequently in 
signallers’ comments and discussions with the researcher and thus signallers’ 
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comments about ARS arose in a natural and unbiased manner throughout the 
interviews. The original researcher used an unstructured interview technique where 
the events on the workstation primarily drove the conversation. This meant that there 
was an element of verbal protocol in some of the data which emerged. Two video 
cameras were used in each interview; one trained on the signaller and one on the 
signalling screens. These were edited together to appear on one screen.  
 
The semi-structured interviews were designed to build on the data extracted from the 
video archive analysis. Each interview was held at the signaller’s workstation, 
allowing the interviewees to illustrate examples of issues and also to discuss anything 
that happened on the workstation during the interview. The structure of the interviews 
permitted any relevant themes to be pursued; hence the data collected were not 
constrained to pre-identified themes.  
 
In addition to the themes built on from the video archive analysis, themes from the 
literature were included in the interviews. Automation competence was identified as a 
principle of good automation (Muir & Moray, 1996). The questions on competence in 
the trust questionnaire showed a negative response concerning disrupted operation 
and so these interviews aimed to probe the areas in which ARS’s competence may 
be low in order to expand knowledge of its weaknesses. Similarly, other factors 
pertaining to trust, including understanding, feedback (visibility, observability, and 
querying in Figure 5-2), predictability, and expectations of automation (Merritt & Ilgen, 
2008; Sheridan, 1999) were probed in order to more fully understand whether future 
automation could better support these. 
 
Previous research in Sweden found that the automated tools provided to signallers 
are not predictable due to internal complexity and that they can surprise the operator 
by performing control actions which contradict the controller’s plan (Kauppi, 2006). To 
avoid surprises, particularly during disruption, the controller is required to take control 
manually and inhibit the automation. This form of control has been labelled ‘control by 
exception’ (Sandblad et al., 2002). The Swedish researchers advocated a system 
which allows the operator to ‘control by awareness’ in which operators would be able 
to see the development of the system over time and prevent disturbances. Lenior et 
al. (2006) suggested that feedback from the automation may be particularly important 
in rail signalling operations as the system is not as predictable as other industrial 
processes due to imprecision in the information provided to the operator. The 
literature therefore suggests that feedback, understanding and predictability are 
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important themes in rail signalling and may not be adequate in some signalling 
systems. 
 
The ability to control, or instruct, automation becomes important in such a system. 
Kauppi, Wikstrom, Hellstrom, Sandblad, and Andersson (2005), in studying Swedish 
signalling, stated that the nature of train operations means that the initial timetable 
can quickly become obsolete during disruptions. It follows then that the operator 
should be able to easily modify the existing plan or formulate a new plan, but 
automated signalling systems do not always facilitate this (Kauppi, Wikstrom, 
Sandblad, & Andersson, 2006). Better directability has been achieved in the 
Netherlands where signallers control disrupted situations by changing the timetable, 
thus allowing the automation to route trains according to a new plan (Lenior et al., 
2006). This is a powerful method of controlling the automation, but is difficult to 
achieve with ARS. On the basis of this research, methods used by signallers to 
interact with the automation was identified as a key theme for this study.  
 
The different levels of monitoring found in the observation studies prompted an 
interest in the investigation of monitoring, and this was added to the interviews. 
Previous research has found that nuclear operators were able to describe how they 
monitor nuclear operations (Vicente et al., 2004). However, it is unlikely that the 
specifics of monitoring in one domain will be applicable in another domain. Even 
research within the rail signalling domain (Kauppi et al., 2005; Roth et al., 2001) is of 
very limited use regarding monitoring strategies as vastly different interfaces were 
examined. Automation is also expected to impact on workload (Kantowitz, 1994) and 
this study offered an opportunity to gather users’ views on how ARS has affected 
their workload. As signallers have traditionally worked their way up through signalling 
grades by working in different signal boxes the comparison between NX panels and 
IECC was probed. Finally, accountability was identified as a principle of automation 
(Billings, 1991) and so the signallers’ views on whether they were responsible for 
system performance were sought.  
 
The data from both studies were combined during the analysis and so the results and 
discussion are presented together in this chapter. Figure 5-2 illustrates the themes 
extracted from both the visual interview archive analysis and the semi-structured 
interviews.  
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Figure 5-2: Qualitative Data Themes 
 
Place names, including junction, station and depot names, and train destinations, 
have been changed to maintain anonymity.  
5.3 Video Archive Analysis Method 
5.3.1 Participants 
No data concerning participants were included in the original report on the video 
analysis by Timmer and Stork (2000), so no details exist of age or experience of 
participants. From viewings, it can be said that all participants were male and were 
fully competent signallers at Liverpool Street IECC. A plan of observations was 
produced prior to the study and it seems likely that opportunity sampling was used.  
5.3.2 Apparatus 




Opinion of ARS 
Difference from NX 
Boredom 
Purpose 




SPAD Risk Shunt Moves 
‘Deaf and Dumb’ 
Early & late trains 
Disruption 
Regulation 
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5.3.3 Procedure 
The analysis of the videos for this research involved watching each one and making 
detailed notes each time ARS was mentioned. It was not possible to use the video 
data to study signallers’ behaviour towards and detailed interaction with ARS 
because the videos did not focus on this specific aspect of the signallers’ task so 
critical data for such a study were missing from the videos. However, the interviews 
on the tapes did provide information on signallers’ use and opinions of and interaction 
with ARS. Themes were drawn from the data using inductive thematic analysis and 
each theme was written up in a preliminary document. This was then used to help 
develop the questions for the semi-structured interviews. 
5.4 Semi-structured Interview Method 
5.4.1 Participants 
In total 10 semi-structured interviews were undertaken. Two of these were with 
signalling SMEs who no longer work as signallers but together have more than 80 
years experience working in the operational environment (Interviews 1 & 2); both 
have worked extensively with ARS and have managed IECC signal boxes. The 
remaining eight semi-structured interviews were with current signallers. All 
participants were male and had at least 5 years experience in IECC signalling. 
5.4.2 Apparatus 
A list of questions and probes was developed to support the interviews (Appendix K). 
Data collected were analysed using NVivo software.  
5.4.3 Procedure 
Interviews were arranged in advance with the Local Operations Manager (LOM) but 
individual signallers did not usually have advance warning of the interviews, 
especially in the bigger signal boxes, so sampling was opportunity based. Signallers 
from five boxes were interviewed; two London based signal boxes (three interviews), 
two boxes in Southern England (three interviews), and one Scottish box (two 
interviews).  
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Participants signed a consent form before the interview (Appendix L) and were given 
contact details of the researcher. The consent form explained the purpose of the 
interviews and assured participants that the data would be anonymous and not used 
for any other purpose. Participants were also given an opportunity to ask any 
questions they wished at this stage. 
 
Interviews typically took between 40min and 1 hour and were digitally recorded. The 
opportunity to conduct the final two interviews occurred late on in the research period 
and were not recorded or transcribed. Handwritten notes were taken instead and 
these have been used to supplement the findings of the earlier interviews. A list of 
questions was used but the wording and order of the questions was flexible and 
probes or prompts were used to elicit more information on a particular topic. The 
interviews were typed up immediately after each interview and analysed using NVivo.  
5.5 Results 
Transcripts of the first six interviews were typed up as soon as possible following 
each interview and were added to the detailed notes from the video archive analysis. 
Both were then analysed using theory-led thematic qualitative analysis (Hayes, 
2000). Each transcript was coded three times to ensure that all relevant data for each 
theme were picked up and the transcripts were analysed in NVivo. An example of a 
coded transcript page can be found in Appendix M. Card sorting was used to group 
the final themes together to better structure reporting of the findings.  
 
Top level themes were defined to group together similar concepts for presentation of 
results. The four top level themes were: 
x Opinion of ARS 
x System Performance Issues 
x Knowledge of ARS 
x Interaction with ARS 
 
Table 5-1 shows the sources and frequency for each of the themes which are 
discussed in the following sections. The table also indicates which themes have been 
particularly influenced or supplemented by the knowledge obtained through the 
participant observation approach.  















Opinion of ARS 
General Opinion  X 29 10 X 
Difference from NX X X 12 8  
Boredom  X 8 7  
Purpose X X 6 4  
Time left alone  X 6 6  
System Performance Issues 
Planning X X 19 11  
Programming X X 13 6 X 
‘Pink’ Trains X X 5 4  
SPAD Risk  X 2 2  
Shunt Moves X X 3 3  
‘Deaf and dumb’ X X 4 3  
Early/late trains X X 5 4  
Disruption  X 11 5 X 
Regulation X X 21 11 X 
Knowledge of ARS 
Expectations  X 7 6 X 
Training  X 5 5 X 
Experience  X 2 2  
Visibility  X 4 4  
Observability  X 3 2  
Understanding  X 23 10 X 
Predictability X X 53 12  
Trust  X 11 7 X 
Interaction with ARS 
Monitoring      
Individual Trains X X 6 6  
Route Setting  X 6 5  
‘Hot-spots’ X X 12 8  
Overview X X 7 5  
Plain Line  X 5 5  
CCF  X 1 1  
Querying X X 20 12  
Directability      
Manual Control X X 12 9  
Reminders X X 20 12  
STPs X X 10 6  
Contingency Plans  X 1 1 X 
Proactive Control X X 17 9 X 
Key/Trackerball X X 4 3  
Workload X X 37 15 X 
Responsibility X X 24 12 X 
Table 5-1: Sources and Frequency for each Theme from both the Video Archive Analysis and 
Semi-structured Interviews 
 
These themes are discussed extensively in the following discussion section. 
Quotations are used to illustrate the discussion and the interpretation of the findings. 
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5.6 Discussion 
5.6.1 General Opinion of Automatic Route Setting 
This section discusses the general attitude of signallers towards ARS and some of 
the more general effects it has had on the signallers and the signalling task. The 
signallers in the video archive analysis were not directly asked their opinion of ARS, 
and ARS did not arise in any conversation in such general terms, so the comments in 
this section are based on the 10 semi-structured interviews. Overall the interviewed 
signallers’ opinions of ARS were positive, but usually with some reservations. 
“Generally I think it’s quite good. There are a number of weaknesses in the 
system” (Interview 5) 
“ARS is a wonderful tool, but that’s all it is” (Interview 3) 
Only two signallers expressed reservations, one saying that he did like ARS but 
preferred to use it as a back up (Interview 8) and one preferred not to use it at all 
(Interview 6).  Both these signallers were working workstations with lower traffic 
levels and less complexity than the other signallers interviewed, and this might 
explain why they felt able to handle the workload without ARS aid. The only 
unqualified support for ARS came from Interview 7. 
“I like ARS. I think it is excellent.” (Interview 7) 
The most interesting comment on ARS was from Interview 3. 
“It’s like working with a woman. It’s like working with somebody you don’t 
understand and they’re working and yet you’re supposed to be equal, and 
we’re not.” (Interview 3) 
This comment, although somewhat strangely expressed, reflects the difficulties 
signallers sometimes have working with ARS; ARS is extremely competent at routing 
on time trains when there are no restrictions of infrastructure (i.e. the entire railway is 
available for trains to run). This is ARS’s ‘bread and butter’ and it achieves it 
successfully. 
“The headcode is blue, the ARS is pulling off for it, all my sub-areas are 
on…so we shouldn’t have any problems.” (Video 3) 
In a general sense it seems signallers are happy to work with ARS and although 
there were a number of areas which may cause concern, and which will be discussed 
in the remainder of this chapter, only one interviewed signaller preferred to work 
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without it. Much of what follows in this chapter deals largely with the failings of ARS, 
so it is worth pointing out that the system does work well under normal running and 
signallers do rely on it to a large extent. This is supported by signaller comments. 
“I know that ARS will perform most of the time, 85-95% of the time it’ll do what 
it’s supposed to do.” (Interview 1) 
“You do rely on ARS to do it.” (Interview 7) 
The following sections are intended to support the development of new systems 
which address the weaknesses of ARS for which signallers must compensate, but it 
is important to acknowledge that the system also has strengths. 
5.6.1.1 Difference from Panel Technology 
ARS changes the work of the signaller significantly and this was evident in comments 
on the differences between working an IECC and NX panels15. These comments 
were focussed on two main areas. The first was the change from manual route 
setting to monitoring as the computer set routes (6 comments). 
“It was very difficult for me to come off what I was used to and sit down and 
watch the computer doing the job for me. Because that’s what you’re doing, 
you’re just sitting back and watching something, some piece of machinery 
doing the work for you.” (Interview 3) 
“You are just sitting there watching a computer doing everything, whereas all 
the other signal boxes we’ve worked in, whether it be levers or NX panels, 
you’re doing it all yourself.” (Interview 8) 
 “NX was a good system. What you did was a direct thing.” (Interview 10) 
Secondly, the presence of ARS means that trains will not necessarily come to a stop 
if the signaller does nothing (4 comments). This is in contrast to NX panels where 
trains only have the authority to move if the signaller him/her self sets the route. 
Where ARS systems are employed the signaller must be prepared to step in quickly 
to stop ARS setting routes in any circumstances which require stopping trains. 
“It is reverse thinking with this…in an NX box, if you had a problem you just 
didn’t pull off the signal, you replaced what you needed to replace. With this, 
you have to prevent it from pulling off. Reverse thinking…it’s just different; 
you’ve got to react quicker. (Interview 4) 
                                                
15
 NX – Entry-Exit Panels. This is a very common type of signal box which many signallers 
would have operated prior to working in an IECC (Appendix C). 
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Comments such as this highlight that although signallers are physically less involved 
in signalling when working with ARS, they must still maintain awareness of system 
state so that they can react quickly and step in if necessary. However, there is a 
negative tone to the first set of comments which suggests that signallers preferred 
direct involvement with the system and do not enjoy the change to a system with a 
higher proportion of monitoring. 
5.6.1.2 Boredom 
The change to a system with a much higher degree of monitoring and lower degree 
of intervention, at least under normal circumstances, means that there is increased 
potential for signallers to become bored. Four interviewees admitted that the 
monitoring elements could be boring. 
“If it’s all running 100%, I mean, even in the evening peak you just sit there 
and watch it, you could say it’s boring, definitely.” (Interview 7) 
“If everything’s running on time and there’s no decisions to make there’s 
nothing to do.” (Interview 9) 
Some signallers may cope with this by switching ARS off and working manually. 
“Yeah, it just becomes boring. So again, there’ll be days, especially at 
weekends when it’s quieter when I might switch all the ARS off and just do it 
all manually.” (Interview 8) 
However, two signallers claimed not to get bored with monitoring. 
“I’d never find it boring as such, because I never know what it’s going to do 
next.” (Interview 3) 
“There’s always something slightly different going on; keeps you interested.” 
(Interview 10) 
It is not known why some signallers find the increased monitoring boring while others 
do not. Possible explanations include personal attributes of individual signallers, 
relative complexities of workstations, the level to which individual signallers think 
about situations, or a combination of all these factors and potentially others. 
5.6.1.3 Purpose of Automatic Route Setting 
Four signallers commented on their perception of the purpose of ARS. The first 
perceived purpose was as a tool to assist with manual route setting.  
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“ARS is supposed to assist us” (Interview 4) 
“The amount of trains that you would have to manually route without ARS, 
ARS is a useful tool.” (Interview 5) 
“This system was designed to take the mundane aspects of our job away from 
us.” (Video 4) 
Comments such as these have a positive tone which suggests that signaller perceive 
the automation as there to help them. However, two signallers noted that the 
introduction of ARS has meant that signallers control a larger area than previously 
and seemed to perceive ARS as less of a benefit to them. 
“ARS allows management to give us a bigger area.” (Interview 4) 
“It means I can work a bigger panel.” (Interview 2) 
Only one signaller mentioned ARS as an assistant during disruption. 
“The most important function of ARS in my mind is that if anything goes 
wrong, the signaller can deal with whatever they need to deal with in that area 
to make the railway safe, and ARS hopefully should go on happily running 
trains in other areas.” (Interview 5) 
The consensus from these few interview comments is that ARS is a tool to assist the 
signaller, primarily by relieving him/her of mundane train routing. However, there 
were some signallers who believed that ARS was introduced not to benefit the 
signaller but to enable him to control a larger area. 
5.6.1.4 Time left alone 
Signallers were asked how long they would be happy to leave their workstation, and 
ARS, alone for. In general the replies were between 2min and 5min, about the time 
taken to get a cup of tea.  
“I could leave it happily for 2 minutes maybe. That’s how long it takes to make 
a cup of tea.” (Interview 3) 
 “A couple of minutes really. You don’t want to be any longer or you’re sort of 
panicking as to what it’s doing.” (Interview 8) 
It was not possible to determine whether the signaller is unwilling to leave ARS or 
whether they do not want to be far away should an incident occur which requires their 
attention. It may be that there is an element of both in their unwillingness. However, it 
does highlight that signaller involvement is still an important and frequent element in 
the signalling system. 
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5.6.1.5 Summary 
This section has discussed overall signaller opinions towards ARS, and these are 
largely positive. There are reservations towards certain aspects of the system and 
these will be explored in more detail in the following sections. Signallers do rely on 
ARS to relieve them of the more mundane aspects of the signalling task (e.g. 
repeatedly setting routes for trains). However, some regret was noticeable at the 
corresponding reduction in their direct involvement with signalling trains. Four 
signallers also admitted they sometimes become bored while monitoring the system, 
although others claimed never to find it boring. The literature suggests that if 
involvement is sufficiently low for operators to become bored there may be a risk of 
vigilance decrement (Parasuraman, 1987; Warm et al., 1996) but no suggestion was 
found that signallers in IECCs suffer from such an effect. This supports the view that 
vigilance decrement may not exist for real world systems (Moray & Haudegond, 
1998). It appears that signallers do try to maintain a high degree of awareness of the 
system as indicated by their unwillingness to leave the system alone for any length of 
time. 
5.6.2 System Performance Issues 
A number of issues with ARS were raised during the course of the videos and 
interviews and these are discussed in this section. It is unlikely that these are a 
comprehensive list but are more likely to be the topics which concerned the 
interviewed signallers at that time. They do however give an insight into the types of 
problems encountered with the system. 
5.6.2.1 Planning 
The planning department is responsible for developing the timetable and inputting it 
into Timetable Services Database (TSDB) which ARS uses to run trains. Therefore, 
planning has a major impact on how well ARS runs.  
“Something we’ve had a lot of problems with historically is the information 
provided from TSDB to ARS” (Interview 5) 
“It was always having all these codes missing so it was coming to the ARS 
computer here as basically useless information.” (Interview 8)  
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Incomplete or inaccurate information (i.e. missing codes) means that ARS does not 
have all the data it needs to run a particular train correctly. Incomplete information 
means that the signaller must take responsibility for routing that train, as even one 
missing code will result in ARS not recognising the train. Inaccurate information can 
result in ARS setting the wrong route for a train resulting in delays to the service. In 
this way, planning can significantly affect ARS performance. However, the staff in the 
planning department are somewhat removed from the operational environment and 
may not always realise the impact they have.  
“You’re looking at a chain of people who sit in an office with very little 
experience of the running lines, I’m not being rude towards them, it’s not a 
requirement of theirs, but we think perhaps it could be.” (Interview 3) 
“Very few people in our train planning really understand what ARS does” 
(Interview 5) 
In addition to a lack of awareness of the importance of complete and accurate 
information to ARS, the planning team do not have a detailed understanding of the 
potential complexities of local infrastructure. The result is programmed train 
timetables which take no account of any local complexities and may make 
implementation of that timetable difficult, or impossible. 
 
Problems with the timetable are rectified over time as major issues are fed back to 
the planning department, so the effect is most noticeable following a timetable 
change. 
“Usually the programming is ok, until a new timetable comes in. Then you find 
a lot of problems with the extra programming of the service.” (Interview 4) 
Engineering work is one particular area in which the planning department can have a 
strong impact on system performance. As engineering work restricts the 
infrastructure available for running trains, the planning department should plan trains 
around the works and input this new plan into the TSDB. In practice this happens 
quite rarely.  
“When I cleared the signal for that move earlier with 4L82 and I cleared the 
signal across it went pink16 because the train had actually been programmed 
to go straight through a T3 possession17 instead of around it. Which is not 
only unhelpful but potentially dangerous as well.” (Video 3) 
                                                
16
 Pink trains are those which ARS does not control. 
17
 Possessions refer to the control of a portion of the railway by engineering staff during 
engineering works. 
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“Planning affects ARS…Engineering work over the weekend and during night 
not being pre-programmed into ARS” (Interview 2) 
Only in one site was replanning of traffic around engineering work frequent.  
“Most of the planned engineering works, most of the stuff’s in ARS. Someone 
somewhere is doing their work.” (Interview 7) 
Signaller workload tends to increase during engineering work as they have a higher 
than usual volume of communications and paperwork associated with facilitating the 
engineering work. Manually routing trains which have not been reprogrammed 
represents an additional load for the signaller. 
 
IECCs do have a timetable processor (TTP) which allows them to change the 
timetable for trains in their area in the short term. However, the interface for this 
system is disk operating system (DOS) based and staff have found it difficult to use. 
“Right behind you is a machine called the timetable processor. Which I have 
taught myself how to use, and I can get into it and I can look at train data and 
adjust things where need be. The thing is, it’s 1988 technology, very old, very 
slow, very user unfriendly. And it’s also, to quote an old railway phrase, ‘not 
really anyone’s job to do that’.” (Video 8) 
Very recently there has been an upgrade to the TTP which has made it much easier 
to use, but it is still ‘not really anyone’s job to do that’ so full benefit from this system 
is unlikely to be achieved.  
 
An unstructured interview with an experienced member of the train planning team 
revealed frustration at their end with the additional burden of work ARS places on the 
planners. Train plans for non ARS areas can, and do, omit codes as the signaller can 
easily compensate. As discussed above, this is not the case with ARS areas and a 
significant workload may be required to ensure that all codes are correctly entered. In 
addition, there is no formal feedback from the IECCs to the planning team so 
problems with the timetable go unresolved until they cause delays. At this point, delay 
is attributed to the originator and thus the planning team become aware of problems 
with their timetable.  
 
The planning department is perhaps the department which has the most direct effect 
on ARS performance but being removed from the operational environment they may 
not realise just how important their inputs are. This can be quite frustrating for 
signallers who work with the system but have very little control over the inputs which 
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dictate system performance. A structured feedback process from the IECCs to the 
planning team is one way in which ARS performance could be greatly improved. 
5.6.2.2 Programming 
Programming of ARS is another large area of influence on system performance. If the 
programmers get it right, or largely right, ARS performance will be much improved. 
Unfortunately the complexity of the railway means that a bespoke ARS must be 
designed and programmed for every workstation it is installed on. This programming 
involves drawing up complex tables of data for each section of the workstation in 
order to provide ARS with weighting for the factors it uses in its conflict resolution 
algorithms. The complexity of the infrastructure, and hence the data, means that it is 
almost impossible to ensure the algorithms calculate the optimal choice in every 
situation and the result is usually ‘quirks’ in the programming which signallers learn 
over time and must pre-empt. 
“that’s a regular with empties…pull off into that depot, even though it knows 
that train is booked first, just don’t know why it does it.” (Interview 8) 
“It makes some very strange decisions at times, so I think the weighting 
factors could do with tweaking” (Interview 5)  
“there’s a couple of dodgy things you’ve got to watch out for, but you can 
override that and make use of, perhaps, reminders and lock up where you 
know there’s a dodgy.” (Interview 7) 
Signallers learn through experience where ARS programming is not optimal and they 
either monitor these areas carefully to ensure they can intervene in time or they use 
reminder devices to stop ARS making any moves in an area.  
 
In addition to the existing programming issues, as the systems age the traffic patterns 
over a workstation may change and the programming at junctions becomes out of 
date. 
“What you’ve got is an ARS system the logic of which, or the structure of 
which, has been designed 1988/89 thereabouts and nothing since. Things 
have come in since, like regulating policies and business priorities and things 
but it’s not in ARS” (Video 8) 
It is possible to change the programming, but it requires a data change which must 
be extensively tested and carries a large cost.  
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“The problem is to have any amendment to the system costs big 
money…we’ve made quite a few suggestions. In all fairness a lot of things 
have been ironed out but there have been over the years a lot of software 
problems and a lot of ARS problems that have had to go back and back and 
back to sort out” (Video 3) 
“At the moment I think it’s too complicated a process, the hoops you have to 
jump through to get anything changed…and the money you have to pay, 
which is prohibitively expensive.” (Interview 5) 
Signallers therefore learn to live with many of these problems as only those issues 
which are a safety concern would generate a business case for immediate change. 
Other issues are logged over time and if the designers can develop a fix this may be 
implemented during a periodic upgrade to each ARS system. 
 
These programming issues are potentially the single most disruptive issue for 
signallers working with ARS and they stem from the system designers’ attempts to 
make ARS as ‘intelligent’ as possible. However, the result is unreliable automation 
whose complexity is such that signallers find it difficult to predict. Problems with 
prediction will be discussed further in Section 5.6.3.7. 
5.6.2.3 ‘Pink’ trains 
Pink trains are those which are not in ARS. This can be for a number of reasons: 
x they were not put into the timetable database; 
x key information is missing in the timetable database; 
x they have been routed off their planned path; 
x the signaller has removed them from ARS to control them manually; 
x the ARS sub-area containing the train is switched off. 
They are called pink trains because the headcode for any train which is not being 
routed by ARS appears pink on the signalling screens. Trains which are in ARS have 
a blue headcode (Figure 5-3). 
 
 
Figure 5-3: Pink and Blue Train Headcodes 
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Freight trains are commonly pink. 
“Unfortunately you get a lot of freight trains that aren’t properly programmed in 
this area” (Video 6) 
As they are not in ARS, signallers are responsible for routing these trains manually or 
putting them into a special timing pattern (STP). These methods of interacting with 
ARS will be discussed further in Section 5.6.4.3. 
“4Z53 in Appleby approach berth is not in timetable…so now as far as all us 
lot are concerned now that’s a manual train, we’ve got to look after it 
manually. Not a problem.” (Video 8) 
This is not a big area of concern, particularly as relatively few trains are commonly 
pink, and even may be beneficial during routine operations as they keep the signaller 
involved in the signalling task. In fact, one IECC has requested that freight trains be 
left out of ARS control as they often run outside their timetabled time and cause 
problems on the workstation. However, during disrupted working when the signaller is 
already busy these pink trains may represent an additional task which may easily be 
forgotten.  
5.6.2.4 Signal Passed At Danger Risk 
Although SPADs are primarily a risk for train drivers rather than signallers there are a 
couple of ways in which signallers can reduce the risk. First, the signaller must not 
change the signal aspect to red as a train approaches it, unless absolutely 
necessary. Secondly, the signaller can attempt to ensure that trains do not encounter 
red signals; that is, if the route ahead of the train is available then the signaller will try 
to ensure that the route is set for a train and no train approaches a red signal 
unnecessarily. One interviewed signaller complained that ARS frequently signals 
trains up to red signals before setting the rest of the route.  
“ARS will signal trains up to red signals all the time… they’re constantly on the 
back of signalmen about SPAD mitigation, sending trains up to red signals 
possibly tricking drivers into passing signals at red, and yet ARS does it as a 
matter of course.” (Interview 7) 
This is likely to be a local problem where ARS has been programmed to keep options 
open in case a higher priority train comes along on a conflicting route. A similar 
problem was encountered in Liverpool Street. 
“This is where ARS is quite infuriating when you watch it, because a normal 
signalman would pull off for that signal straight away…ARS won’t prioritise it 
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until the last minute in case another move comes along that’s more 
important.” (Video 6) 
This is a good example of the types of problems that can occur with ARS 
programming, and creates additional work for the signaller to monitor these areas 
where they feel ARS is not operating competently. 
5.6.2.5 Shunt moves 
Shunt moves involve moving a train a short distance, usually to change platform or 
attach to another train. As these are usually un-timetabled, ARS cannot set routes for 
these shunt moves. 
“I’m going to clear the next signal because the equipment doesn’t understand 
how to shunt the train. So when I clear this next signal 5F02 goes pink and 
the equipment says it’s off planned path...It’s saying you can’t do it and I’m 
saying ‘well, there’s not a lot of other ways for it to be done’.” (Video 3) 
“It’s not programmed. I’ve shunted that manually.” (Interview 7) 
In the case of one IECC some of the ARS sub-areas are permanently turned off due 
to the number of shunt moves required in the area. 
“It can’t be trusted….there are a number of shunt routes…that ARS can’t 
physically clear the route” (Interview 5) 
Although these shunt moves impose only a small load on the signaller they are an 
illustration of one part of the signalling task which ARS cannot achieve. As with pink 
trains, these shunt moves do not pose a problem during normal operations but 
represent an additional demand which may serve to push an already increased 
workload higher during disrupted operations. 
 
A method to ‘trick’ ARS has been developed in some areas where each possible 
shunt move (for example between a depot and each of the platforms in a station) has 
a unique train headcode associated with it and the relevant timetable is permanently 
programmed in to ARS. In this case the shunter can input the headcode for a 
required shunt move and ARS will be able to recognise and route that train. This is an 
example of a strategy devised by one signal box in conjunction with the system 
designers to improve system performance.  
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5.6.2.6 ‘Deaf and dumb’ 
The ARS gives priority to trains based on its calculations of relative delay. However, 
ARS has been labelled ‘deaf’ as it cannot be aware if the train it is prioritising cannot 
move, perhaps because of problems with that train or because the route ahead of 
that train is already occupied. A situation then develops where ARS will not route 
other trains with potentially conflicting routes until the route has been set for the 
priority train and hence several trains come to a standstill. This information is not fed 
back to the signaller by ARS (i.e. it is ‘dumb’) and so it is their responsibility to 
determine which train is causing the standstill and take it out of ARS, or take over 
manually.  
 
“Let’s knock 5D11 out of the system” 
- And you’ve knocked 5D11 out because…? 
“It’s delaying other trains” 
- It’s stuck? 
“Yeah, it can’t go anywhere and other trains are waiting for it” (Video 7) 
 
Similarly with priorities for trains, ARS does not know when there are problems on the 
infrastructure and this can cause problems as it continues to route trains as though it 
has full access to the complete infrastructure. 
“ARS doesn’t know when anything is wrong does it, at the moment, that’s 
what catches a lot of signallers out.” (Interview 7) 
Signallers are then required to keep on top of any situations and ensure that ARS 
does not set incorrect routes towards problems or for trains which have reported 
problems. To do this the signallers must maintain an awareness of the state of the 
infrastructure on their workstation at all times as well as constantly reviewing the 
trains in the area and predicting their progress and ARS’s intentions for them. 
5.6.2.7 Early and late running trains 
ARS works extremely well when trains are running on time and there are no 
restrictions of the infrastructure. It does not always work so well with late running 
trains. 
“Usually it starts to mess up when you’ve got late running. It can’t make a 
correct decision, so you have to prompt it.” (Interview 4) 
Late running trains are likely to conflict with other trains and so the conflict resolution 
algorithms come into play. Statements such as that shown above by the signallers 
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indicate that the algorithms are not producing correct answers as far as the signallers 
are concerned. Similarly it can cause problems with trains which are running early. 
“It can’t differentiate between early running trains and late trains. Where sets 
of empties come out of Kidderminster if they’re coming up early then it’ll just 
run them into the station and delay other trains, right time trains. So you have 
to constantly watch that.” (Interview 4) 
Signallers must monitor for these kinds of problems and intervene to ensure the train 
service runs smoothly. Thus, a good signaller’s awareness of the system must 
remain very high, even if he/she is not making many interventions. 
5.6.2.8 Disruption 
ARS does not deal with disruption well, and in many cases not at all. 
“Usually you switch it off. It’s got to go straight away” (Interview 9) 
“If things are disrupted it doesn’t make logical decisions” (Interview 10) 
However, ARS was praised for its ability to keep one part of the workstation running 
while there were problems on another part. This allows the signallers to devote their 
attention to the disruption and leave ARS to run the rest of the workstation. 
“The most important function of ARS in my mind is that if anything goes wrong 
the signaller can deal with whatever they need to deal with in that area to 
make the railway safe and ARS hopefully should go on happily running trains 
in other areas.” (Interview 5) 
“I’ve got to admit; when you’ve got big trouble, particularly one end of the 
area…you do rely on ARS to do it.” (Interview 7) 
“Your attention goes to that area so you’ve got to let ARS try to run the rest of 
the area” (Interview 9) 
However, not all signallers agreed that ARS worked well during disruption, 
particularly if there is a ‘trickle down’ effect from the disrupted area. 
“ARS should be there to help you when things are degraded but you find it 
actually makes it worse, because you’re actually switching it all off, like if 
you’ve got a big major incident somewhere, ok, I’ll deal with that and 
Poppleton will deal with itself because ARS is on, it wouldn’t, it would totally 
crucify you.”  (Interview 8) 
“It gets more difficult if there is a problem on one part of the workstation and 
late running to cope with as well.” (Interview 9) 
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It is likely that both the layout of workstations and the programming of ARS determine 
how much help it is likely to be during disruption. If ARS can assist the signaller 
during disruption it becomes a very valuable tool.  
5.6.2.9 Regulation 
One of the signallers’ main goals is to ‘regulate’ trains. A definition of regulation is 
given in Chapter 5, section 5.3.6.1. When regulating, signallers aim to set routes for 
trains in order to minimise deviations from the timetable. The interviewed signallers 
all agreed that ARS was not capable of regulating as a signaller could. 
 “ARS does not regulate. It gives the impression of a regulating system and it 
is not a regulating system.” (Interview 1) 
“If you want something to pull signals, it’s fine, but when you want something 
to regulate, no, I wouldn’t say it’s the best regulating piece of kit in the world.” 
(Interview 8) 
Signallers carefully evaluate the relative delay to trains and relative importance of 
different trains and use their experience to decide which train should be routed first in 
the event of a conflict. In doing this they take their whole control area into account 
and may even consider the consequences for other signallers down the line. Their 
decision does not always match that made by ARS. 
“The later the train gets, the greater priority it gets. So ARS thinks ‘I don’t care 
if you’re a Class 6 carrying a thousand tons or more, you’re late, you go first’. 
And all these Class 1 trains are braking everywhere as this train goes across 
in front of them. It’s not quite how it should be.” (Video 8) 
“It can only do what it’s programmed to do really. It’s kind of one dimensional. 
It will only look at one train at a time, it can’t think about three or four trains…it 
can’t really see the bigger picture” (Interview 9) 
It seems that despite the complexity of its algorithms ARS does not take into account 
all the factors that signallers would in making regulating decisions, for example the 
relative speeds of trains and restrictions ahead of them. 
“It’s quite simplistic in the way it makes its decision, and it doesn’t always 
consider factors that, for example it would be helpful if ARS was to have 
speed restriction information programmed into it, and that kind of thing…it’s 
very black and white the way it’s been designed to regulate.” (Interview 5) 
Recently a new performance measure, Public Performance Measure (PPM), has 
been introduced under which trains must arrive at each destination less than 5min 
late to avoid incurring a penalty. This new performance measure was introduced after 
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ARS was developed and programmed so ARS does not attempt to take it into 
account. 
“Obviously something else that is a weakness is ARS doesn’t work to PPM in 
the same way that signallers would” (Interview 5) 
Although the ability to regulate is one of the selling points of ARS, the results from the 
interviews indicate that it is not one of its strengths, and compensating for this forms 
the basis of a large part of the signallers’ job. 
5.6.2.10 Summary 
This section discussed some aspects of ARS capabilities and system performance. It 
is most competent when dealing with on time trains for which it has a complete 
timetable. However, a number of problems relating to automation competence were 
identified, including the more complex issues of dealing with disruption and regulating 
late trains. As with any automated system, ARS is only as good as the information 
provided to it, and the quality of the data input does affect the competency of ARS 
(Sheridan, 1996). Both the data entry by the planning department and the initial 
programming by the designers play a critical part in determining system performance 
but both these factors are largely outside the control of the signal box and signallers. 
It might be expected that these issues with competence would strongly affect 
signaller trust and hence usage of the system (Muir & Moray, 1989), but it appears 
that signallers’ knowledge of the system performance issues allows them to calibrate 
their trust accordingly and judge when they can rely on ARS (Madhavan & 
Wiegmann, 2007). 
 
The system performance issues discussed in this section influence the quality of the 
automation and the level at which it can operate. The issues illustrate the challenges 
signallers face in working with ARS. In general, signallers can cope with the areas in 
which ARS is not as competent as might be wished. They accept its limitations and 
are prepared to work around them to achieve the best results they can. However, the 
efforts ARS makes in regulating and disruption can cause problems for the signaller. 
It is clear that the automation is not sufficiently capable in these areas and perhaps 
should instead focus on supporting the signaller rather than attempting to make these 
decisions itself. 
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5.6.3 Knowledge of Automatic Route Setting 
This section discusses the expectations, training and experience signallers have with 
ARS and their resulting understanding, ability to predict ARS, and trust in the system. 
5.6.3.1 Expectations 
Signallers and SMEs over the course of the study frequently spoke of the 
expectations they had of ARS before they started working with it and how it has failed 
to live up to these expectations. This is particularly noticeable among signallers who 
worked with ARS when it was first introduced.  
“Basically we were led to believe that the signallers’ job was to monitor ARS. 
We weren’t here to actually signal trains, we were here to monitor it and they 
expected it to be that good…I did really think that I was coming up here for 
that…ARS just wasn’t capable of that.” (Interview 7) 
- What were you told it would do? 
“It would basically work the job for you” (Interview 2) 
“You think it’s going to do everything” (Interview 9) 
The expectation was that ARS would be capable of running almost autonomously 
and the signaller’s role would be to manage incidents when they occurred. In practice 
the signaller is involved in considerably more routine running of trains than was 
probably anticipated.  
 
Only one signaller declared low expectations of the system. 
“It was pretty early in my career down here that I was told it wasn’t bought for 
regulating, it was just a signal puller, so I suppose that’s part of the reason 
why I haven’t trusted it since.”  (Interview 8) 
Signallers interviewed, both in the course of the semi-structured interviews and 
during informal box visits suggested that while ARS did not usually live up to their 
expectations, their expectations still influenced their use of and trust in it. 
“I’m not really anti ARS, what I’m saying is, when we were taught to use it and 
it stems back from the way it was hailed, and it really is ingrained in your grey 
matter what it would do.” (Interview 2) 
It seems likely that the difference between signallers’ expectations and actual system 
performance has influenced attitudes towards the system. As with any system, it may 
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take a considerable amount of time working with ARS to reverse any negative initial 
perceptions. 
5.6.3.2 Training 
There is no standardised training for ARS. New signallers attend a nine week 
signalling training course where they learn signalling principles and rules but ARS is 
not covered at all at this stage. They then go to the signal box in which they will be 
working and acquire ‘local knowledge’ allowing them to work each workstation in the 
box. This typically takes several months depending on the size of the box and 
complexity of the infrastructure. Signallers transferring to an IECC must learn to 
operate the workstations without ARS so there is limited opportunity for training on 
ARS. The focus is on learning the workstation, not on learning about ARS and how to 
work it. 
“I learnt it without ARS. If I got to use it a bit more then perhaps I would use 
it.” (Interview 6) 
Additionally, training in the box is not standardised and tends to be an experienced 
signaller showing the trainee the ropes. What training there is on ARS takes the form 
of informal lessons or knowledge passed on by the existing signallers to new recruits. 
Consequently, information passed on is haphazard and over time key pieces of 
information are likely to be lost.  
“Signallers have never been fully briefed on what they’re supposed to do in 
certain circumstances with ARS” (Interview 5) 
“If you’re not programmed to work with it, you won’t understand it. And 
therefore you don’t know what it’s going to do next.” (Interview 3) 
Training is likely to be a key missing element which would help signallers to both 
understand and predict ARS (discussed in sections 5.6.3.6 and 5.6.3.7). 
5.6.3.3 Experience 
The lack of training on ARS means that much of signallers’ knowledge of the system 
comes from their experience using it.  
“Through the years we’ve just built up enough competence to work with it and 
understand it. You can’t understand ARS in say 12 months, I’ve been at it 
several years and I still don’t understand it.” (Interview 3) 
Commenting on signallers who choose to turn ARS off, one interviewee said: 
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“I think they’d find the job a lot easier over there if they did turn it on, got more 
confident with it, you know. If you don’t switch it on you’re not going to get 
confident with it” (Interview 7) 
This learning through experience has been demonstrated recently at Edinburgh IECC 
where signallers at first preferred to work without ARS. Management staff insisted 
that they leave it on and gradually the signalling staff became more competent at 
using it and now seem to prefer to work with it. However, it should be noted that 
improvements in both the programming and timetable data entry are likely to have 
also contributed to this change of attitude. 
5.6.3.4 Visibility 
ARS is not particularly good at displaying and feeding back relevant information to 
the signaller. The only ARS pertinent information permanently displayed is the train 
colour, which indicates whether the train is in ARS or not; that is, blue if ARS is 
routing the train according to timetable, pink if it is not in ARS, and brown if the train 
is running to a contingency plan or STP (see Figure 5-3 on page 118).  
 
One piece of information which would be very useful to the signaller is the status of 
the trains (i.e. whether they are running right time, early, or delayed). This information 
is currently available from CCF on most workstations but this information might be 
better displayed on the signalling screens. 
“The biggest problem for me is that it does not show you that it actually is late 
running” (Interview 1) 
The use of different systems to present complementary information reflects the 
gradual evolution of signalling systems and the slow introduction of pieces of 
technology developed in isolation. Integration of all the existing systems could greatly 
assist the signaller by gathering all pertinent information into one place rather than 
fragmented across different systems. 
5.6.3.5 Observability 
Signallers are very keen to know what ARS is planning to do before it does it; 
however, this is impossible under the current programming as ARS only considers 
potential conflicts as they arise and it re-runs its calculations every 10s. Therefore if 
queried, it can tell you what it is planning to do now, but that might not be what 
actually happens when the route is set.  
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“It won’t necessarily tell you the truth. That’s probably the best way of looking 
at it.” (Interview 3) 
Providing the information on a constant basis, rather than the signaller having to 
query it for each train might be a better solution, allowing the signaller a constant 
window into ARS operations. This may have the benefit of increasing the signallers’ 
awareness of ARS in real time as well as increasing their knowledge of how ARS 
works.  
“I know you can call it up, i.e. if I want to find out what this train is going to do 
here, so it’ll tell me its path, that’s it, constantly having to do that, I mean if you 
had something like this and it’s just telling you whatever train is going to 
do…that’d be a help.” (Interview 4) 
However, the best solution would be a system that can provide the signallers with 
constant accurate information about its intentions far enough in advance to allow the 
signallers time to intervene if necessary. 
5.6.3.6 Understanding 
Signallers’ understanding of ARS was probed during the semi-structured interviews. 
The levels of understanding varied but all signallers were aware that ARS matches 
trains in the area to the timetable and routes them accordingly.  
“ARS stands for automatic route setting, so it will automatically set a route for 
a train that it recognises, basically, to a timetable. To its planned path. Don’t 
really know much else really.”  (Interview 6) 
 “Whatever train, you’ve got the TTP, which is the timetable and all the service 
is actually loaded into that and once it comes in it’ll start pulling off for that 
train” (Interview 4) 
When asked about how ARS approached conflict resolution, there was considerably 
less knowledge among signallers. 
“It normally brings everything to a stand and looks at every single train that’s 
involved and eventually it’ll work out which one’s to go first, pull off for it and 
whilst doing that, it just brings everything to a stand.” (Interview 3) 
- Do you understand how ARS resolves conflicts? 
“Not entirely, no…I understand that there are certain parameters programmed 
into ARS to decide how it’ll make decision, depending on the class of trains 
and tidal flows, and that kind of thing.” (Interview 5) 
“I’m told that this bag of jellybeans does X and Y, but I’m not convinced it 
does because I’ve used it so often, and been involved with it so often that the 
bag of jellybeans doesn’t actually bear fruit from what they say” (Interview 1) 
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“Yes, I do understand, but ARS doesn’t understand….it’s like two magnets 
pushing against each other, gets stuck, can’t make a decision.” (Interview 10) 
One SME commented on the importance of understanding ARS. 
 “I actually think fundamentally they need to know what they can do to 
maximise its performance potential. Or its potential to enhance performance” 
(Interview 2) 
These comments reflect a vague knowledge among signallers that ARS takes some 
factors into account but most do not have detailed knowledge of what these are or 
how ARS uses them. The comments also reflect dissatisfaction both with the time 
ARS takes to make a decision and the results of the process. The lack of 
understanding means that signallers cannot rationalise some of the decisions made 
by ARS and it limits the signallers’ ability to maximise performance and work 
cooperatively with ARS. It also has an impact on their ability to predict the 
automation. 
5.6.3.7 Predictability 
Signallers’ inability to predict the automation was a strong theme from the video 
archive analysis. There were frequent examples on the tapes of signallers stepping in 
because they were not sure if ARS would make the decision they wanted it to. 
“I put the reminder on 281 signal for the fact that ARS once it’s down to the 
platform could possibly route it off in front of that Mickle Trafford because ARS 
is unpredictable. You can never trust it. You don’t know what it’s going to do 
to be honest.” (Video 5) 
“I don’t know which is going to go first” (Video 7) 
The semi-structured interviews probed this issue further and found that signallers did 
not think ARS consistent in its decisions. 
 “In all your research, that’s the one thing you’ll actually find with signallers, 
that ARS at times does things that you don’t expect it to do.” (Interview 2) 
“You can’t really…you wouldn’t say 100% say what it was going to do if you 
sat there watching it knowing the trains were running late.” (Interview 8) 
“Even with things running to time it does unexpected things.” (Interview 9) 
“You see dents on the workstation [from signallers banging their heads in 
frustration]. You sit here head butting the workstation thinking ‘why the hell did 
it do that?’” (Interview 3) 
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Some signallers admitted that they believed ARS must be consistent but they were 
unable to predict it because they didn’t have sufficient understanding to be able to do 
so. 
“I’d say it has to be consistent; however, I don’t always understand the 
processes, factors that ARS is taking into consideration when it makes that 
decision...it doesn’t always appear consistent, but one would imagine as a 
computer it’s making that decision it must be consistent.” (Interview 5) 
“You could have the same scenario two days on the trot, i.e. a late running 
train up the suburban and it’ll pull off out of the platform but the next day it’ll 
run the late running train…there probably is a reason for it, there might be 
something I hadn’t realised the system’s done.” (Interview 4) 
Signallers also find that ARS surprises them at times. 
 
“It constantly surprises you” 
- Even after 17 years? 
“Yeah, it does….sometimes you’ll look and think ‘I’ve no idea why it’s done 
that.” (Interview 5) 
“Oh yeah, it’s constantly surprising” (Interview 4) 
Unpredictability makes the automation harder to control, and thus makes the 
signallers’ job more difficult. 
“Without being able to predict what it might do you get stitched up.” (Interview 
2) 
“If I’m to be proactive I need to know what it’s going to do before it does it.” 
(Interview 1) 
The lack of predictability means that signallers must constantly be aware of the areas 
in which they are unsure of ARS and be prepared to take over, either by manually 
routing one train or by turning ARS off. In this way the lack of predictability affects 
ARS usage. 
“It’s predictably unpredictable. You know what it might not do.” (Interview 10) 
“It’s just too unpredictable. If it was consistent you’d sort of know more what it 
was going to do, but because it’s unpredictable the only safe thing to do there 
is to have all of Gospel Oak off until this little patch of trains is gone.” 
(Interview 8) 
“With conflicts…you will find that signallers will stick reminders on to make 
sure it does it.” (Interview 1) 
There was an exception to the agreement on the lack of predictability, and that came 
from a signaller interviewed in the least advanced IECC included in the interviews. 
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The ARS in this particular IECC does not attempt conflict resolution but just routes 
according to the timetable. This wasn’t a decision made during commissioning but 
rather reflects a lack of funding to programme the ARS at junctions.  
 
“You know what’s coming” 
- You can predict it? 
“Yeah” 
- So you find ARS very predictable? 
“Oh yeah, definitely.” (Interview 7) 
 
ARS could still surprise the signaller in this case; he related a recent event where 
ARS routed a train in an unexpected direction. Initially he thought it was a mistake by 
the automation but on checking the timetable he discovered the route for that train 
had been changed and ARS had routed it correctly. 
“It had done the right thing but I was expecting it to do something completely 
different” (Interview 7) 
The same signaller felt strongly that his ability to predict ARS was very important. 
“Oh yeah, got to know what it’s going to do…I can’t imagine being a signaller 
if you didn’t know what the trains were actually going to do and where they 
were going to go, just integral part of the job isn’t it, knowing what’s going on. 
It’d be awful sitting here not knowing what it’s going to do next.” (Interview 7) 
The interview results indicate that there are two main reasons why ARS is 
unpredictable. The first is the lack of feedback, but this would not be a great problem 
if ARS was perceived as consistent. However, the second reason ARS is not 
predictable is that the attempts it makes to regulate are based on complex algorithms 
which are not transparent to the signallers and so make it very difficult for them to 
predict the outcomes. This means that signallers cannot themselves work out what 
ARS will do, and ARS is not capable of feeding this information back to them. These 
two factors combined make ARS a difficult system with which to work cooperatively. 
5.6.3.8 Trust 
The observation study indicated that trust in automation is related to the level of 
intervention. This study probed signallers’ general trust in ARS. Signallers were wary 
about saying they trusted ARS 100%. 
“Not implicitly, but I do trust it generally.” (Interview 5) 
“When you’ve worked with this system for a while you begin to distrust it. It’ll 
do something for no apparent reason. You’ve got a train coming in, you know 
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it’s booked in first and it’ll pull off for an outgoing train for no reason at all. 
Don’t know why, just does it.” (Interview 4) 
“If I was really honest, no. Your ability to say can you trust it is that you can 
not always hold your hand on your heart and say it was going to do what it 
said on the tin.” (Interview 2) 
However, signallers do completely trust the interlocking which prevents both them 
and ARS from implementing any unsafe routings. This removes the danger from 
using ARS, as the most it can do wrong is make a bad regulating decision or wrong 
route a train. 
“I trust the interlocking 100%, the ARS I wouldn’t say 100%” (Interview 8) 
“It’s the interlocking that I trust” (Interview 5) 
- Do you trust ARS? 
“Yes…there’s a net underneath you see, called SSI18” (Interview 1) 
 
The lack of predictability impacts on the signallers’ trust. 
“I think you should be able to predict it, because then you could trust it and 
perhaps leave it on more. But when its unpredictable like this and you sit here 
all day it is just on off on off all the time.” (Interview 8) 
“When you’ve worked with this system for a while you begin to distrust it. It’ll 
do something for no apparent reason. You’ve got a train coming in, you know 
it’s booked in first and it’ll pull off for an outgoing train for no reason at all. 
Don’t know why, just does it.” (Interview 4) 
It seems that although signallers do not find ARS completely trustworthy they have 
strategies to cope with this and work with it. They identify what areas it can be trusted 
in and pay careful attention to all other areas. 
5.6.3.9 Summary 
It is clear from the results that ARS has not lived up to signallers’ expectations of it 
and that their training on it is limited. Research has found that differences between 
operator expectations and actual system performance can strongly influence 
automation use (Merritt & Ilgen, 2008). It is therefore important to ensure that 
signallers begin working with ARS in possession of a correct mental model. However, 
in reality, it is the experience they gain from using the system that contributes most to 
their understanding of how ARS works. The development of this knowledge through 
experience depends on the visibility and observability of the automation (Dekker, 
                                                
18
 Solid State Interlocking (Appendix C). 
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2004; Endsley, 1996; Parasuraman & Riley, 1997), but ARS is widely referred to as 
‘dumb’ as it does not feed back valuable information to the signaller. It is not 
surprising then that there are gaps in the signallers’ knowledge, particularly with 
regard to the more complex functions of ARS (i.e. conflict resolution). Without this 
knowledge it becomes very difficult to predict ARS and signallers stated that they 
cannot always predict what ARS will do in a given situation. Factors including 
understanding, predictability and feedback were found to differentiate high and low 
interveners in the observation study (Chapter 4). This lack of ability to understand 
and predict the system is likely to have the effect of making working with ARS more 
difficult, and research suggests that it may reduce the success of the overall socio-
technical system (Hopkin & Wise, 1996). 
 
These issues have made it difficult for signallers to develop an accurate mental 
model of the system and may contribute towards a lack of trust in the automation 
(Dzindolet et al., 2003). However, this lack of trust was tempered by their experience 
with it and knowledge of its limitations which influence trust calibration (Madhavan & 
Wiegmann, 2007). This means that signallers know when they can trust ARS to make 
the correct decision and when they cannot. From a safety point of view signallers can 
trust ARS because all its decisions must go through the interlocking which is widely 
regarded as foolproof.  
 
The gaps in signallers’ knowledge of the system can be explained by the lack of 
training and the reliance on experience, but the improvement of their knowledge may 
yield results in their ability to control and work with the automation. Ideally, future 
systems would rely less on training and experience by improving the visibility and 
observability of the system and thus increase the operator understanding and ability 
to predict the automation.  
5.6.4 Interaction with Automatic Route Setting 
The strategies signallers employ to monitor and control the automation are reported 
here with the perceived effect on workload and responsibility. 
5.6.4.1 Monitoring 
Automation has reduced the amount of manual route setting by signallers and 
correspondingly increased the time spent just monitoring the system. The interviews 
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probed the types of things signallers looked for when monitoring the system. 
Signallers spoke of four main monitoring strategies they employ; monitoring individual 
trains, monitoring route setting, monitoring hot spots or pinch points, and maintaining 
an overview of the whole workstation. The interviews also gathered data on the 
monitoring of plain line (i.e. pieces of straight line which have no junctions or 
crossovers), use of CCF for monitoring, and the need to pre-empt ARS. 
Monitoring individual trains 
Signallers learn through experience which trains are likely to cause problems and 
they will monitor these carefully. They also monitor late running trains which may 
conflict with others and watch for any trains which do not appear to be running as 
expected. 
“I suppose really there’s certain train numbers coming down, anything that 
was a problem train, watch that.” (Interview 8)  
“Unusual train running pattern, i.e. that it’s not running as fast as I would 
expect it to. Sometimes just the system reaction.” (Interview 1) 
“I will watch individual trains if it’s going to conflict with another train obviously 
like over there crossing from the fast to the slow at Rainhill and I know there is 
going to be a problem there I’m going to watch it” (Interview 6) 
Monitoring for these trains and situations allows time for the signallers to step in to 
prevent situations developing further, with the objective of reducing or preventing 
delay. 
Monitoring Route Setting 
Signallers monitor that routes are being set for trains, and that each train is running 
on two green signals wherever possible. 
“You just quickly make sure that all the signals are off that should be off” 
(Interview 8) 
“How ARS is actually clearing signals. Whether it is actually clearing signals” 
(Interview 5) 
“I’m looking for the finer points that the ARS doesn’t know about maybe, or 
doesn’t understand. The basic system for running trains in ARS is to run trains 
with a minimum of two green signals at all times. Now if you see a train, 4L87, 
he’s got two greens at the moment, that’s fine. Now he’s down to one, wait for 
the route to call so he goes back on to two. Now if there’s something wrong, 
that route won’t call...it is doing the job correctly, but for a little bit too long as I 
see it, it was running on one green instead of two. It should have called the 
route earlier.” (Interview 3) 
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This monitoring strategy is about maximising the efficiency of the signalling rather 
than picking up or preventing more major problems. 
Monitoring ‘hot-spots’ 
All workstations have junctions or regulating points19 where decisions can be made 
on the order of trains. Signallers indicated that these areas are monitored carefully. 
“Anywhere we’ve effectively got a pinch point….just monitor what ARS is up 
to in that area.” (Interview 5) 
“I think you establish in the early time working any workstation, establish the 
criteria where you think the crunch points are, pinch points are.” (Interview 1) 
In terms of junctions, the interviewed signallers indicated that they tend to monitor the 
approach to the junction rather than the junctions itself. 
“The approach…it’s about presentation, it’s about what’s about to present 
itself.” (Interview 2) 
Hot spots may also be depots. 
“Coming out of Whittlesea car sheds, if you didn’t monitor that, control that, 
then it would mess the evening peak up all the time.” (Interview 4) 
Monitoring these areas is probably the most critical as these locations are where 
decisions are made, either by the signaller or ARS, which affect the signalling 
performance.  
Maintaining an overview 
Signallers indicated that they maintain a general awareness of their whole area of 
control. They appear to achieve this by setting an expectation of what they should 
see next time they look at the signalling screens. Any deviation from this expectation 
is quickly noticed and can be investigated further. 
“You look at the general picture, an overview of all trains on the area” 
(Interview 5) 
“You see the whole screen, and you know if something’s not moved. It’s a sort 
of, I’ve seen that, capture, gone, I’ve seen that, capture, that now should not 
look like that, that should look like this. And there’s this sort of mental, it 
should look like this and it doesn’t. Why doesn’t it?” (Interview 1) 
“When ARS pulls for something, particularly if it’s something you’re not 
expecting, then yeah, it’s probably going to catch your eye straight away.” 
(Interview 7) 
                                                
19
 See Appendix C for a description of regulating points. 
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“You’re looking for where change has not occurred. But your attention is 
drawn to it.” (Interview 1) 
It is not known whether this overview is maintained through peripheral vision or scans 
of the whole area of control, or a combination of both. 
Monitoring Plain Line 
Signallers stated that they tend not to monitor areas of plain line20 to the same extent 
as other areas on their workstations. 
“You wouldn’t really worry, you don’t worry about what ARS is doing in those 
sections so much, you worry about what the train is doing, but you’re not as 
concerned with ARS because you really make an assumption that it is 
clearing the routes it needs to clear. It’s plain line, there’s nothing in front of it”. 
(Interview 5) 
“These bits here where you’ve got several green lights21…you don’t pay no 
attention, you pay less attention to them, because something could happen, 
one of those signals could black out22. So again, you do attend to it, but not in 
such detail. And you automatically look, you see a row of green lights…you 
can glance at it and carry on. If there was one black in there, you would pick it 
up very quickly.” (Interview 3) 
Monitoring of plain line is clearly a much lower priority for signallers and there may be 
very little direct monitoring of these areas. Signallers are likely to pick up any 
problems in these areas through their maintenance of an overview of the workstation.  
Monitoring CCF 
Some of the information signallers are looking for can be more effectively gathered 
from other sources. Late running trains is a good example of this; the information can 
be collected much more easily from CCF than from the signalling system which would 
require querying the routing of the train on the general purpose (GP) screen23 and 
then comparing this with the simplifier for the workstation. On CCF each train is 
colour coded according to its delay. 
                                                
20
 Plain line is a section of track with no points. Therefore any train travelling over a piece of 
plain line can only go forward; there is no potential to change its route. 
21
 “Green lights” refers to automatic signals. These differ from controlled signals as they 
routinely display a green aspect and only show red if a train has just passed through into the 
section. They can be regarded as having a constant route set and therefore the signaller has 
very little interaction with them. They would usually only be used on plain lines. 
22
 This refers to failures of signals, either failure of the lamp out on track or of the indication on 
the workstation. In this event, the indication on the workstation shows a black aspect rather 
than red, yellow, or green. 
23
 The GP screen gives details on alarms, trains approaching the control area, and responses 
to signaller queries. See section 5.4.1 for a description of the GP screen. 
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“We usually, mainly we use this [CCF], you’re constantly looking at that. If 
everything is green it’s on time, you’re not worried about it.” (Interview 4) 
Use of CCF varies greatly between signal boxes and individuals. Some signallers 
have been observed using CCF for a large proportion of their monitoring while most 
only refer to it occasionally. However, it is clear that CCF contains information 
pertinent to the signalling task and this might be better integrated with the main 
signalling screens. 
5.6.4.2 Querying 
Signallers have the ability to query ARS about individual trains. This gives them 
information on the timetable ARS has for that train and the current status, for 
example, if it is giving priority to another train. This is quite a useful tool particularly 
when ARS has not set an expected route for a train. 
“The best policy is always to interrogate the system and say why aren’t you 
pulling off” (Video 4) 
“Signallers question paths quite a bit, and to find out platform information it’s 
quite good actually, tell you where the train’s going to be routed into the 
platform. Also, sometimes you use it to find out what ARS is going to do in a 
particular area, it’s not always apparent.” (Interview 5) 
“We can question it as to what it’s timetabled next move is going to be, which 
is quite handy to have.” (Interview 7) 
 
But signallers do not always understand the information they get from ARS. 
 
- What does that mean? 
“I have got no idea…It does annoy, this system. That to me doesn’t mean 
anything.” (Video 4) 
“Sometimes you’ve got information that a train was standing at x or y because 
of another conflicting move and the train that was conflicting was miles away, 
nowhere near it. And yet it saw it as something that was close. Don’t know 
why.” (Interview 1) 
In addition, ARS can say it is giving priority to a train when queried but later change 
its mind, so signallers have learned not to always trust the replies from ARS. 
“If something’s got priority it’s not to be trusted; if it’s holding it for a certain 
time you know you can trust it.” (Interview 8) 
“Sometimes you’ll ask it why it isn’t routing the freight and it says it’s waiting 
for another train and 30 seconds later it set the route” (Interview 9) 
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“It won’t necessarily tell you the truth. That’s probably the best way of looking 
at it.” (Interview 3) 
Sometimes ARS does not provide the information signallers are looking for. 
“I had one earlier when there was absolutely no other trains about but the 
train that was leaving only had a yellow to the junction, and it wouldn’t pull no 
further so I was like asking it why and it was saying that it had tried, it had 
already requested the signal, but that was the one it had already pulled…it 
was going to stop it on the red on the junction, and when I asked what it was 
doing it said ‘well I pulled this bit’. Basically as if to say ‘what more do you 
want?’…It just came up with useless information really, on that occasion” 
(Interview 8) 
In this case the signaller was trying to establish why ARS would not set further route 
for a train. The ARS can be queried for this information but the feedback on this 
occasion only gave information on the route already set. This was not what the 
signaller was looking for, but it was not possible to obtain any further information from 
ARS. 
 
Querying ARS is one way which signallers can learn more about it and understand it 
better. 
“I think if signallers make more use of that then they get more confidence in 
using ARS” (Interview 7) 
As discussed in Section 5.6.3.4, even with the limited information provided it may be 
more beneficial if this information was displayed constantly, rather then signallers 
having to query ARS for it. This would make the information more accessible and 
help signallers develop a better understanding of how ARS works. 
5.6.4.3 Directability 
There are a number of methods the signallers can use to interact with and control the 
automation. 
Manual Control 
The first method for signallers to control ARS is to take trains out of ARS control and 
route them manually, or to manually set routes for trains before ARS gets a chance 
to.  
“I just like to take them out if I can to give me more control over it” (Video 1) 
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“I’ll make him non ARS. That’s my personal choice because that way I’ve got 
complete control over the train.” (Video 8) 
A more drastic method of taking control is to turn off one or more ARS sub-areas24. 
This means that any trains within that area will have to be routed manually while the 
sub-area is off.  
“Switch it off if there’s some late running” (Interview 8) 
Signallers may choose to do this if there is congestion in an area to ensure that they 
have total control over the movement through that area. One unwanted movement by 
ARS can ruin a plan. 
Reminders 
Reminders appear to be the most common method employed to control ARS. 
Reminders are a legacy from the older signalling systems where they took the form of 
a physical cap over a lever or button. Their purpose was to ‘remind’ signallers not to 
set a certain route, usually in the case of some form of line blockage, for example, a 
failed train or engineering works. Their purpose is primarily as a safety device. A 
reminder function was provided on IECC systems to serve the same purpose and as 
well as reminding the signaller not to set a route it also prevents the ARS from setting 
the affected route. Therefore, setting a reminder in a particular location can be a very 
effective way of preventing ARS from calling a route. 
“Just put a reminder on the up main there, just in case something comes 
along. Don’t want ARS routing across.” (Video 1)  
“I put the reminder on 281 signal for the fact that ARS once it’s down to the 
platform could possibly route off in front of that Croft because ARS is 
unpredictable.” (Video 5) 
“We do use reminders on here quite extensively, yes” (Interview 5) 
“I look at a situation and if I want a particular train to go in before one comes 
out then I’ll actually put a reminder on there or turn ARS off so it won’t pull off 
for outgoing trains. A lot of us do that.” (Interview 4) 
These comments reflect widespread use of reminders to control ARS. The preference 
for reminders seems to be because they are considered easier to use. 
“It’s a lot easier, it’s so much easier just to stick a reminder on and hold it 
rather than lock the points or take it out of ARS, because you could forget 
                                                
24
 Each workstation is divided into a number of areas for the purposes of ARS. Each of these 
is called a sub-area and may be turned on or off as the signaller wishes. 
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about it. So the easy way out is just to stick a reminder on, take it off, leave it 
and come away from it. Laziness if you like.” (Interview 3) 
Signallers need to be quick at applying reminders or ARS will set the route before 
they apply the reminder to stop it. 
“He should follow 1F14. So what I’ll do, reminder there, reminder there, damn, 
too late. The route has just called and caught me.” (Video 8) 
There was only one interviewed signaller who didn’t consider reminders the easiest 
way to control ARS.  
“It’s easier to turn the sub-area off. It’s just one click of a button….I don’t 
believe in putting reminders everywhere, you just do the routes as you want to 
do them.” (Interview 8) 
This comment was from one of the less busy workstations. In the larger IECCs 
turning off a sub-area can potentially affect more trains and this may explain why 
turning sub-areas off is not the preferred interaction method on busy workstations. 
 
However, this mixed use of reminders may decrease their value as a safety device, 
and both SMEs pointed out that they should not be used for controlling ARS.  
“Reminders are only used, primarily as a safety value, or as a specific reason 
that you need to do something, not for routing or pathing reasons.” (Interview 
1) 
“Reminders are not designed for that. Once I put a reminder on I knew what it 
was for.” (Interview 2) 
Only one interviewed signaller was concerned by this use of reminders, but he was 
quite disturbed about reminders being used for regulating purposes instead of purely 
as a safety device. 
“We are conditioning people to remove collars…collars are being used for the 
purpose of not delaying trains and they should be just for safety purposes..” 
(Interview 10) 
This is a very valid concern. The routine use of reminders as regulating tools may 
degrade their status as a safety device. The danger is that signallers may forget 
which reminders are in place to protect track workers, particularly if applied in an area 
where reminders are frequently used to control ARS. Signallers may also become 
conditioned to removing or override reminders to let trains pass and under pressure 
the possibility exists to do this in error. Clearly reminders are a valued tool for 
controlling ARS and banning their use for this purpose would greatly reduce the 
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directability of the system for a large number of signallers. One possible solution is to 
provide another tool which achieves the same results but has a different name and 
appearance, for example an inhibitor. 
Special Timing Patterns 
Special Timing Patterns (STPs) are pre-programmed timetables for common routes 
across the workstations. If a train arrives on a workstation and ARS cannot find a 
timetable for it in the database, the signaller has the option of putting the train into an 
STP rather than routing it manually. These are commonly used, particularly for freight 
trains. The signaller simply types the headcode of the train into ARS followed by the 
‘name’ of the STP; ARS will then route that train according to that STP. 
“It’s looked after itself all through the patch and hasn’t bothered me again, 
which is an excellent way of reducing your workload.” (Video 3) 
“You have the special timing patterns for traffic that doesn’t belong to us, so 
out of region traffic we can put in a programme that will take it from Bingham 
say, to Hednesford.” (Interview 3) 
However, signallers didn’t always know all the STPs available to them, and in some 
cases they would have liked to have more STPs programmed. 
“The ones that perhaps you don’t often use you wouldn’t know…and when 
you get to certain workstations like Grindleford where you could have 20 or 50 
codes if you don’t use them for weeks and weeks you’re not going to 
remember them so you just refer to the sheet.” (Video 3) 
“We’ve been given some codes that have turned out to be used very little and 
other actions which are quite repeated which you could successfully use a 
special timing pattern codes for haven’t been put in” (Video 3) 
STPs have been demonstrated to be a useful tool but could be greatly improved if 
signallers had more control over the design and modification of STPs.  
Contingency Plans 
Contingency plans are similar to STPs but apply to all trains travelling over a certain 
area rather than to just one train. They were envisioned as helping the signallers in 
the event of a restriction of infrastructure in a particular area. In this situation they 
could be invoked to route all trains around the restriction. In practice, no signallers 
seem to have ever used one and the majority are not aware of what contingency 
plans are available for use. The reason for this appears to be that they are not fine 
tuned enough to be of real use. In practice they do not match events on the 
workstation because these events can be so complex and variable. Even if they do 
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match, the signallers are largely unaware of what contingency plans are available, 
and whilst they are dealing with a restriction of the infrastructure they do not have the 
time to look up manuals. 
“I put a contingency plan in for the down sub, so I don’t want any Oakham 
trains, any Wymondham trains, or anything of that nature to come down that 
road because that junction is out. So if I put a contingency plan in, I would 
actually block the whole line and not just that bit [the crossover needed by the 
Oakham and Wymondham trains]…what I’d need is a contingency plan that 
says I can run you, but I can’t run Ts, Hs, Os and Ss [i.e. headcodes of trains 
travelling the same route].” (Interview 1) 
In this quotation one SME has described a system whereby contingency plans could 
be built up to match a situation rather than a rigid plan. This may be considerably 
more beneficial than the current system. 
Keyboard vs. Trackerball 
There is a choice of interaction method with ARS; either via the keyboard or using the 
trackerball. The majority of signallers prefer the trackerball. 
“The way you interact with the keyboard…I’m not computer literate…the way 
it’s been designed, the big failing with it is that it was designed by the 
technicians at Derby…they did a really good job with it, but it’s designed from 
the engineer’s point of view, from the designer. “It’s not designed with the user 
in mind. So, to do things on the keyboard are a lot longer than they need to 
be.” (Video 8) 
“When I first heard of trackerballs I thought ‘oh, that’ll be difficult’ but it’s not. 
It’s so easy, so so easy” (Video 8) 
- Generally you prefer the trackerball? 
“Yes…it’s quicker” (Interview 4) 
“Unfortunately you’re encouraged to be lazy with IECC interface because of 
the cursor and the keyboard. Which one do you use? You use the trackerball 
because it’s easier and lazier. A monkey can use the cursor, the trackerball, 
but it takes a bit of intelligence to use the keyboard.” (Interview 1) 
With practice the keyboard routes may become a quicker and more convenient 
method to interact with the system. However, it is rare for signallers to use this 
method, perhaps because it requires detailed knowledge of the names of each route 
on each workstation. The use of the trackerball places less of a burden on the 
signallers’ memory, but may also represent a less advanced form of interaction with 
the automation.  
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Proactive Control 
The ability to proactively control the ARS was frequently spoken about. The poor 
feedback from the system constrains signallers’ ability to control proactively, but 
signallers regarded good signalling as seeing problems developing and dealing with 
them in advance.  
“I think you’ve got to be sort of six trains ahead of yourself…that’s part of 
being a signaller…you can’t just work by what the next train is that’s running 
up, you can see a problem coming miles away and you know that you’ve got 
to do something about it” (Interview 7) 
“A lot of people sit here and ‘oh look at what ARS has done’ but the majority 
of us sit here and if you held your hand up you know a lot of the things it’s 
going to do that you don’t want it to do, so there’s a lot of times where you 
should be intervening during the day” (Interview 8) 
“I can decide what to do with the system. You’ve got control really.” (Interview 
10) 
One of the SMEs was concerned that signallers do not take full advantage of ARS 
allowing them to be proactive. 
“I think that we’ve got the problem in our culture in that signallers are basically 
reactive and not proactive. That’s my biggest problem…there is an aspect of 
being proactive on a panel….but I would say that ARS give you more of an 
opportunity to do that. Because you can actually set the system up to 
operate…well ahead of actually doing the operation.” (Interview 1) 
In one sense ARS forces signallers to be proactive as they must intervene early to 
stop ARS setting unwanted or wrong routes. In another sense it can force them to be 
reactive as the unpredictability of the system can result in unexpected routes being 
set which causes a situation that the signaller must retrospectively attempt to fix.  
5.6.4.4 Workload 
The perceived effect of ARS on workload was an interesting topic. Generally 
signallers felt that ARS reduced their workload and made their job easier. 
“With this equipment, if you switched it all off, you really would have your work 
cut out, but I have done it on weekdays before, and you soon get caught out 
delaying trains…you do need it if you’re going to work this area” (Interview 8) 
“It’s easier for the signaller workload wise, without any doubt…in these sort of 
areas, you couldn’t work without it. Probably one man wouldn’t cope with it, 
not in the height of the peak….off-peak you wouldn’t be able to take your eyes 
off the screens” (Interview 7) 
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It may not reduce workload as much during disruption. 
“It has made it easier. The difference with ARS, when it’s working manually 
you’ve got to do everything. When it’s working automatically you’ve got to step 
in to stop it doing everything. When you’re busy you then find you’ve got to 
reminder, reminder, reminder everywhere to stop things happening and then if 
you want it to happen you’ve got to override the reminder. That creates as 
much work in itself as everything being manual.” (Video 10) 
“Overall, out of 100% of one day, I would say it’s far easier. You get a 
disturbance and it’s far harder.” (Interview 1) 
 “The majority it’s eased it, but only when things are going well. It’s higher 
workload when there’s problems.” (Interview 10) 
The interviews suggest that there is a lower level of workload below which the benefit 
from ARS is not realised. 
“I’ve got…four trains on the panel, over there, there’s more traffic over there 
so the ARS is a good tool to be used….over here I can’t see the point in it.” 
(Interview 6) 
ARS has allowed one signaller to work a much larger area than in the past; typically 
one IECC workstation will have replaced several lever frames or NX panels. In the 
semi-structured interviews the workstations had replaced between two and five signal 
boxes.  
“I wouldn’t say it’s reduced our workload…ARS allows management to give a 
signaller a bigger area.” (Interview 4) 
Most of the reduction in workload seems to be in the physical domain. The effect on 
the signallers’ cognitive workload is less clear. 
“I think all it’s actually really done is made the signaller not to have to 
physically do a lot more routing. Clearing of routes...it’s lowered the physical; 
it’s not lowered the mental” (Interview 2)  
“The workload is totally different. From being a physical element, it becomes a 
mental element.” (Interview 1) 
“I wouldn’t say harder, there’s just another facet on it that you’ve always got to 
check.” (Interview 10) 
The overall effect on workload therefore is not clear cut. The general consensus 
seems to be that there is a definite reduction in physical workload during normal 
operations. The effect on mental workload, and during disruption, is not as clear and 
it seems that workload in these areas has probably increased, but it is not known how 
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much of this increase is due to the larger area of control and how much to the 
presence of ARS. 
5.6.4.5 Responsibility 
The introduction of automation such as ARS has the potential to blur the lines of 
responsibility. Signallers were asked who was ultimately responsible for running 
trains. The majority felt they were and considered it good practice to ensure that 
trains were signalled as well as possible between themselves and ARS. 
“The signaller is responsible for running the trains, ultimately” (Interview 5) 
“I find it a bit embarrassing saying ‘ARS did it’. Because there’s things ARS 
can do that you can’t prevent. There’s other characteristics that ARS has got 
that you learn, and learn to deal with. And in my opinion I think I’m learning 
with it. It shouldn’t do what it does, but I’m dealing with it.” (Video 8) 
Although the majority of signallers felt that ARS was simply an aid and did not bear 
any responsibility, some were more circumspect preferring to allow ARS to take the 
blame and considering their role as only stepping in when a situation developed 
which ARS could not cope with alone. This attitude was expressed by one signaller 
on the video tapes in particular and another during the interviews, and other 
interviewees complained of the attitude among their colleagues. 
“As far as I’m concerned, this is the system we operate to because the thing 
is, if you start pre-selecting routes on the system there are people who 
program the system, the timetable into the system, to my mind then, if you 
start trying to be three or four steps ahead of the system and you cause delay, 
then that’s got to go down to you, as a signalman. Otherwise it’s ARS.” (Video 
4) 
“It’s better not to step in…if ARS is going to make a move and it’s a stupid 
move and I stop it the delay goes down to me…I’d have to say ARS is 
responsible or there’s no point in having it.” (Interview 9) 
“When I first came here…one of the guys who was here told me…because 
management brought this system in, they’ve got to take the delay. ARS is my 
slave. It saves me having to set every single route monotonously. It saved me 
that, but it’s my slave. I’m not its slave. But there’s some people…” (Video 8) 
“Quite often to be honest I have sort of sat and watched some people and I 
think ‘Yeah, ARS is in charge over there’…signallers tend to use it to their 
advantage, don’t they? Blame ARS. You know, a lot of that goes on” 
(Interview 7) 
Leaving ARS to operate autonomously is not always a good plan however. 
Chapter 5: Signaller Interviews 
146 
“We have a signaller up here…he’s quite famous for it, he was on this 
workstation and he wandered off with his back to the workstation, just made 
some comment about how fantastic ARS was, and it like signalled him into 
oblivion over here. And it took him about the rest of the shift to get back to 
normal.” (Interview 7) 
This refusal to take responsibility for system performance by some signallers seems 
to be due more to organisational factors, such as management attitudes and the 
attribution of delay to the originator, rather than difficulties with working with ARS. 
5.6.4.6 Summary 
The introduction of automation has changed the level and nature of the signallers’ 
interaction with the system. In particular, the level of monitoring has increased. 
Where previously signallers only monitored for trains coming on to their patch of 
railway and failures, IECC signallers now also monitor the automation and how well it 
is operating with the aim of intervening where necessary. They use a variety of 
techniques for this including monitoring the progress of individual trains but also 
closely monitoring ‘hot-spots’. Their monitoring strategies allow them to pick up on 
areas where they need to intervene. The lack of predictability of the automation 
makes this more difficult but signallers can query the automation to get some insight 
into its intentions. However, this does not always provide useful or understandable 
information. 
 
There are also a variety of techniques signallers use to interact with the automation. 
They use different methods to control the automation depending on suitability to both 
the railway in their area and the specific situation and personal preferences also 
seem to play a part in their choice of interaction method. Similar to Swedish signalling 
systems (Kauppi et al., 2006), signallers in this study indicated that they cannot easily 
control the automation and have resorted to using reminder devices to constrain it. 
However, reminder devices were not intended for regulating purposes and their use 
in this context may degrade their effectiveness as a safety device. 
 
In terms of workload, signallers were very clear that ARS has reduced their physical 
workload by removing the need to set routes for each train. However, as suggested in 
the literature (Macdonald, 1999), this has allowed management to assign larger 
control areas to signallers in IECCs. Mental workload therefore has probably not had 
a corresponding reduction, both due to the increased control area which the signaller 
must monitor and the need to ‘think ahead’ of ARS. Megaw (2005) has discussed the 
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potential for technology to increase cognitive workload in general, but no reference to 
this concept was found in relation to automation of control systems. Overall workload, 
although considerably lower during normal operations, suffers an additional burden 
during disruption due to the need to constrain ARS as well as dealing with the 
disruption itself. This study therefore suggests that the label ‘clumsy automation’ may 
be applied to ARS in this respect (Woods, 1996). 
 
In general, signallers considered themselves, not ARS, responsible for running the 
railway. There were comments of the opposing nature however, where signallers 
believed that it was not their job to deviate from what ARS was programmed to do. 
They considered their job to be applying rules and procedures in the event of 
disruption. The lines of responsibility therefore appear to be ambiguous and this may 
make operators less likely to intervene (Mosier et al., 1994).  
5.6.5 Discussion of Method 
5.6.5.1 Video archive analysis 
The video archive analysis was a first step in gathering data on the specific issues 
with ARS. It was based on eight previously recorded videos of unstructured 
interviews with signallers at their workstations. The strength of this approach was that 
the interviews had not primarily been aimed at ARS and so any comments that arose 
were natural and extremely unlikely to be biased. There was also an element of 
verbal protocol as the signallers explained what they were doing to the researcher, 
and why. This gave some insight into signallers’ strategies when dealing with ARS. 
Overall, the videos were a rich and useful source of data and provided a good 
starting point for researching the issues signallers have with ARS.  
5.6.5.2 Semi-structured Interviews 
The semi-structured interviews were extremely effective and gathered a large amount 
of information on signallers’ views on ARS. Carrying out the interviews at the 
workstation gave the signaller the opportunity to illustrate any examples they gave, 
and this was utilised by all participants. Although a subjective methodology, several 
interviews were carried out to obtain a range of views. The results were analysed in 
the light of the knowledge gained from participant observation and direct field 
observations, thus increasing the validity.  
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5.7 Conclusions 
A great deal of information with regard to system monitoring was gathered, in 
particular from the semi-structured interviews. It appears there are a variety of 
strategies signallers use when monitoring the system, including monitoring individual 
trains, routes set, ‘hot-spots’, and maintaining an overview of their control area. The 
importance signallers place upon maintaining awareness of the system is evidenced 
by their unwillingness to leave it unattended for any length of time. However, the 
increased level of monitoring associated with ARS does not appear to have been an 
entirely welcome change as some signallers expressed regret at the reduction in 
direct involvement in signalling trains. 
 
Signallers’ interaction with the system was also examined and the variety of methods 
they use to interact were identified. The choice of method of interaction varies 
depending on the circumstances and the personal preferences of the signaller, but 
reminders were widely used to control the automation. This is a misuse of reminders 
as they are intended as a safety device and their use for regulating purposes may 
reduce their effectiveness as a safety device. Their use in this context indicates the 
lack of other powerful tools to direct automation (Lenior et al., 2006).  
 
Signallers’ understanding of the automation was found to be generally quite low. 
Although they had a reasonable understanding of the basic operation of ARS under 
normal circumstances there was considerably less understanding of ARS’s 
operations during disruption. This lack of understanding stems from both the 
unstructured training signallers receive on ARS operations and the lack of feedback 
or observability of the automation. The result is poor predictability of the automation 
and signallers are obliged to intervene more frequently as they are unsure of what the 
automation will do if they do not intervene. This situation must be improved by 
supporting the development of accurate mental models (Sheridan, 2002). There may 
be a consequential effect on trust which makes it difficult for signallers to work 
cooperatively with the automation, a situation compounded in some cases by the 
blurring of responsibility between the automation and the signaller. 
 
While there are a number of issues with ARS, including incorrect programming, 
inability to regulate, poor feedback, and poor data entry, they are not sufficient to 
prevent the majority of signallers using the system. This is in contrast to previous 
research which suggested that such competency issues are the strongest predictor of 
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automation usage (Muir & Moray, 1989). It may be that in real world systems, 
operators have the time and opportunity to calibrate their trust to an extent which 
allows them to identify when the automation can be trusted. Most successful 
operation is achieved by ARS when there are no problems on the infrastructure and 
all trains have a timetable provided for them. During disruption, when well designed, 
ARS can be of benefit if it is capable of keeping other parts of the workstation moving 
reliably. It is not useful in the area where disruption is occurring and in most cases 
must be switched off. The introduction of ARS has clearly reduced the physical 
workload of signallers as it has removed the need for signallers to manually set 
routes for each train. However, this has meant that a larger control area can be 
assigned to each signaller and as they are expected to maintain an awareness of this 
larger area it is likely that their mental workload has increased. There are a number of 
situations which ARS is unable to manage alone and the signallers must be aware of 
these as they develop and be prepared to step in and take over. Furthermore, during 
disruption the signaller is required to constrain ARS while dealing with the disruption 
and this represents an additional burden during situations where workload may 
already be high. 
 
Overall, ARS seems to have been a positive addition to the signalling environment 
enabling one signaller to control a large area and by and large they themselves are 
positive about it. However, it is far from perfect and there are a number of areas upon 
which future automation could improve, for example, specific competency/ 
performance issues, improved feedback, and improved control interfaces. However, 
the imperfections in the current system do have the advantage of keeping the 
signaller involved and this is a positive trait which should be desirable in any future 
system. 
5.8 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has presented the results of qualitative investigations into ARS. 
Descriptive data were gathered on system performance issues, knowledge of ARS, 
and monitoring and interaction with ARS. Key findings include identification of specific 
competency issues, a lack of support in mental model generation, types of monitoring 
strategies, and a lack of directability. An important finding was the use of safety 
related devices (reminders) to control the automation.  
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The qualitative data provided a rich picture of ARS but could not quantify the effect of 
automation on performance and workload. An experimental study was designed to 
investigate these relationships, in addition to data on signaller gaze and behaviour, 
and SA. This experiment is discussed in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 6: LEVEL OF AUTOMATION EXPERIMENT 
6.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents the design and results of an exploratory simulator experiment 
examining the effect of level of automation (LOA) and disruption on a number of 
dependent variables in a signalling context. Three LOA were examined and two 
levels of disruption. The dependent variables were workload, behaviour observations, 
gaze fixations, performance, and SA. Key results indicate that workload, during both 
normal and disrupted phases of the experiment, decreased as the level of automation 
increased. However, the high automation condition saw the greatest average 
increase in workload between the normal and disrupted phases of the experiment. 
Higher and more consistent performance scores were achieved in the high 
automation condition as compared to the other conditions.  
6.2 Introduction 
Building on the previous studies, an experiment was designed to gather empirical 
data on the impact of automation. Signalling simulators are available for use in most 
IECCs and though they are generally used for training it was thought to be also 
possible to use them for research. The level of automation can be varied on a 
simulator by turning off the automation (i.e. manual control). When ARS is not 
available for use, signallers can use a lower form of automation, Auto-routes, in which 
trains can be automatically signalled along a particular route. The simulators 
therefore meant it was possible to design an experiment to compare three LOA. 
Figure 6-1 illustrates the position of this experiment as the final piece of quantitative 
data collection for this research.  
 




Figure 6-1: Position of the Level of Automation Experiment in the Research Framework 
 
The previous interview study indicated that ARS is most effective during normal 
operations but can become a hindrance to the signaller during disruption; that is, it 
conforms to what has been labelled “clumsy automation” (Sarter et al., 1997). This 
piece of research aimed to gather targeted information on the effect of automation 
during both normal and disrupted operations. Workload and performance were 
identified as the main variables of interest. The previous studies indicated that 
workload was generally reduced by ARS, although perhaps less so during disrupted 
running. This corresponds with findings from other research (Kaber et al., 2000; 
Kantowitz, 1994).  Performance was not investigated in any of the previous studies in 
this research as the methods employed did not facilitate effective measurement of 
performance. However, the simulator used for this experiment provided an objective 
performance score for each scenario. Performance in terms of mission effectiveness 
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is a popular metric for evaluating and comparing levels of automation (Donmez, Pina, 
& Cummings, 2009). Without improving performance, or at least maintaining 
performance, it is difficult to see the benefit in automation. Data on performance are 
therefore an important part of evaluating an automated system. The coding scheme 
developed in Chapter 4 to support structured observations of signallers was also 
employed in this study. The observation study looked at the differences in individual 
signaller behaviour. This experiment provided the opportunity to examine the 
differences in signaller activity and behaviour under different levels of automation.  
 
Throughout this research data were collected on monitoring. The observation studies 
indicated that signallers engage in different types of monitoring behaviour under 
different conditions, and the interview data generated some hypotheses on types of 
monitoring in which signallers may engage (e.g. monitoring hot-spots or monitoring 
route setting). However, the information gathered from these studies was quite high 
level and more precise data on monitoring strategies are required to help inform the 
design of future automation interfaces. In pursuit of this, eye tracking equipment was 
used to determine eye fixations under the different conditions. Eye tracking 
equipment allows the experimenter to track the movement of a participant’s eyes 
within a domain. Duchowski (2003, p. 3) stated that we may presume that this follows 
the participant’s path of attention and hence gives “some insight into what the 
observer found interesting”. Eye tracking assumes that visual attention is 
predominantly represented by the participant’s foveal focus (i.e. the direct focus of 
the eyes) and neglects information which may be processed using peripheral vision. 
Thus, eye tracking equipment can help identify what pieces of information are 
important to the operator and how their monitoring strategies differ under the different 
experimental conditions. This information can be used in the design of interfaces or 
training programmes (Ottati et al., 1999).  
 
A piece of research examining signaller SA and its measurement was ongoing at the 
time of this experiment and as part of that research a questionnaire was developed to 
be administered at the end of an experimental scenario (Golightly, Balfe, & Sharples, 
2009). Research in domains such as telerobotics and automobile control has shown 
that SA varies with level of automation (Endsley & Kiris, 1995; Kaber et al., 2006). 
The results predominantly indicate that operator SA is better during intermediate 
levels of automation, although there is some indication that high levels of automation 
may improve SA if the automation is used to relieve a high operator workload 
(Endsley & Kaber, 1999).  The interviews conducted with signallers found that they 
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had difficulty understanding and predicting the automation suggesting the possibility 
that automation may have a negative affect on signaller SA. This experiment offered 
an opportunity to test this hypothesis using the questionnaire developed for 
signallers. However, the first step in measuring SA in a new domain is the 
identification and thorough understanding of the elements necessary to build and 
maintain SA in that domain (Endsley & Rodgers, 1994) and only one previous study 
was found which had made any attempt to measure SA in a signalling environment 
(Wilson et al., 2001). The conceptual understanding of SA in a signalling context was 
not therefore very advanced, and the questionnaire administered during this study 
was a pilot of the method.  
 
Trust also emerged as a theme in both the previous studies. However, trust was not 
investigated as part of this study; as expert signallers were recruited their levels of 
trust in the system would already have been well established and it was unlikely that 
the independent variables would be powerful enough to affect these. Nor was it 
desirable to manipulate participants’ trust in a system they work with daily. As the 
experiment already had five dependent variables a decision was made to exclude 
trust.  
 
It is important to note that this was an exploratory experiment and it involved use of 
new techniques and procedures. For example, the simulators had never been used in 
this context previously and the eye tracking equipment employed to determine gaze 
fixations had not previously been used in this environment. Therefore, it was not 
expected that all the measures would be fully successful, but the knowledge gained 
in applying them would help inform future research in this area. 
6.3 Method 
6.3.1 Participants 
Six participants took part in this study. All were male signallers from Liverpool Street 
IECC. Signaller participation was arranged in advance, although it proved extremely 
difficult to procure signallers for the experiment due to staff shortages in the signal 
box in which the experiment was based. The embarrassment of wearing the head 
mounted eye tracking equipment also made recruitment of participants difficult. For 
this reason, the number of participants was limited to six. The participants had a 
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minimum of 5 years experience in the signal box and thus were expert signallers with 
familiarity of the signalling area used in the experiment. 
6.3.2 Apparatus 
6.3.2.1 Liverpool Street Simulator 
The existing simulator in Liverpool Street IECC was used for this experiment (Figure 
6-2). This simulator is typically used for training new recruits and to assess existing 
signallers. All the workstations in the IECC are accurately represented on it and 
Stratford, as the most complex workstation, was chosen for the experiment. Although 
not an exact physical replica of the real workstations, this simulator functions in an 
identical manner to a real workstation and has the same number of screens and 
identical input devices (i.e. trackerball and keyboard). The simulator gives a 
percentage score based on performance compared to the timetable. 
 
 
Figure 6-2: Liverpool Street Simulator 
6.3.2.2 Integrated Workload Scale 
The Integrated Workload Scale (IWS; Appendix N) was used to measure participants’ 
perceived workload. This is a nine point scale developed specifically to measure 
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perceived mental workload in the signalling environment. A high score on the IWS 
indicates a high workload. Pickup, Wilson, Norris, Mitchell, and Morrisroe (2005) 
report that this tool has proven to be a valuable measure of peaks and troughs in 
workload over time or within a set of scenarios. They also report that the tool is 
acceptable to signallers, having been developed specifically for use in the signalling 
environment, and maps well onto expected workload measured using other 
techniques. It was constructed using the Thurstone technique and so the ratings can 
be used as interval data. Participants were provided with a laminated copy of IWS 
and asked to verbally rate their workload on this scale at 2min intervals throughout 
the experiment. 
6.3.2.3 Head Mounted Eye Tracker 
Participants’ gaze fixations were determined using eye tracking equipment. An SMI 




Figure 6-3: Head Mounted Eye Tracker 
 
The eye tracker is attached to a bicycle helmet which holds the equipment stable on 
the participant’s head. It is connected to a laptop via two USB cables and collects 
data in the form of a video of the participant’s field of view with a red cross-hair 
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indicating the participant’s gaze location (Figure 6-4). Following data collection, this 
video can be loaded into The Observer XT for analysis.  
 
 
Figure 6-4: Screenshot of Eye Tracking Data 
6.3.2.4 The Observer XT 
The Observer XT (Noldus, 2007) software was used to analyse the data gathered 
from both the behaviour observation and the gaze fixations described. This software 
is used for the logging and analysis of observation data. Figure 6-5 shows a 
screenshot from The Observer XT software. The coding scheme was pre-
programmed with the codes for the signaller observation, gaze position, and IWS 
scores. The signaller observation and IWS Scores were coded live during the 










Figure 6-5: The Observer XT Screenshot 
6.3.2.5 SME Performance Scale 
A three point performance scale was created for an SME to rate signaller 
performance throughout the experiment at the same intervals as the IWS scores 
were collected (Appendix P). This scale was provided in a laminated format for the 
SME to refer to during the experiment. The SME also made notes of the activity on 
the workstation which were intended to provide rich data to contextualise some of the 
other more objective measures.  
6.3.2.6 Situation Awareness Questionnaire 
A questionnaire containing two measures was administered to assess SA (Appendix 
Q). The first measure was a simplified version of SAGAT (Endsley, 1995) which was 
administered only at the end of the simulation, so was not disruptive. The second part 
of the questionnaire was a rail contextualised version of 3D-SART (Situation 
Awareness Rating Technique) (Jones, 2000). The simplified SAGAT consisted of 
blank representations of the two overview screens (i.e. main signalling screens) of 
the workstation used in the experiment and the rail contextualised 3D-SART 
consisted of three questions asking the participant to rate the complexity, attentional 









Table 6-1 shows the experimental design. A part-counterbalanced repeated 
measures design was used in which three LOA were examined; ARS, Auto-routes, 
and Manual. Each condition lasted for 30min and used the same scenario based on 
the same section of the timetable. After 15min disruption was introduced. 
 
Order Group A Group B Group C 



















Table 6-1: Experimental Design 
 
In order to balance the potential learning effect the participants completed the three 
conditions in different orders. However, a learning effect was not anticipated as the 
participants were expert signallers who operate this timetable and area on a daily 
basis and are competent to deal with any disruption which may occur. The 
experiment was not fully counterbalanced as this would have left only one participant 
in each group. 
 
The Independent Variables for the experiment were: 
x Level of Automation 
x Level of Disruption 
 
The Dependent Variables for the experiment were: 
x IWS Scores (perceived workload) 
x Signaller Behaviour 
x Gaze position 
x Performance Scores (generated by the simulator) 
x SME Performance Scores 
x SA 
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6.3.3.1 Level of Automation 
Three levels of automation (LOA) were examined in this experiment; ARS, Auto-
routes, and Manual. In the ‘ARS’ condition ARS was operating and available for use 
and all trains were running in ARS. In the ‘Auto-routes’ condition all of the ARS sub-
areas25 were switched off, and therefore ARS was not available for use, but signallers 
could set up auto-routes. These are a lower form of automation whereby a route set 
by the signaller remains permanently set and all trains arriving on that section of track 
are automatically signalled along that route. Any trains taking a different route require 
the signaller to cancel the auto-route and set the alternate route. Finally, in the 
‘Manual’ condition the signallers were required to route all the trains manually without 
any automated assistance. 
 
The route setting for each level of automation is described in Table 6-226. Provided 
ARS has access to a timetable for a train it will set the route in front of the train. It will 
always set two green signals in advance of the train if possible. The signals behind 
the train remain red, unless another train requires that route. In the Auto-routes LOA 
all the signals remain green, unless a train has passed into the section the signal 
protects. In this case, the signal changes to red to protect the train by preventing 
other trains from passing into the same section. In the Manual LOA, the signaller is 
required to set all routes and this controls the colour of the signals. The signal 





     
ARS Red Red Red Green Green Red 
Auto-
routes Green Green Red  Green Green Green 
Manual As set As set Red  As set As set As set 
Table 6-2: Route Setting for Each Level of Automation 
                                                
25
 ARS sub-areas divide the area of control into small pieces; ARS can be turned on or off in 
each area.  
26
 This illustration uses a two aspect signalling system for simplicity. The signalling on the 
simulator was four aspect. See Appendix C for an explanation of two, three and four aspect 
signalling. 
Direction 
of travel  
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6.3.3.2 Level of Disruption 
A form of disruption was introduced half way through the experiment, meaning there 
were two levels of disruption, normal and disrupted. Choice of disruption was a key 
part of the experimental design as a noticeable effect on workload was required. 
Many disrupted conditions on the railway involve a high degree of communication 
and/or knowledge and application of the rules. It was necessary to control 
communications as far as possible to ensure that they did not affect the results. It 
was also desirable to avoid application of the rules as this held ethical considerations 
in the event of mis-application of the rules by any participant. For these reasons, 
disruption in the form of closing a section of track, a platform at Stratford Station, was 
chosen as it minimises communication and application of the rules. The participants 
were required to route trains around the closed platform and regulate this change to 
the service.  
 
The disrupted condition was always second in the experiment; the participants 
encountered 15min of normal running and then 15min of disruption. It was not 
possible to vary the order as disruption has consequential effects and even if the 
platform had reopened, the signaller would still be required to regulate around the 
resulting delays.  
6.3.3.3 Behaviour Coding Scheme 
The participants were observed during each scenario to note their activity. The same 
method was used as in the earlier observations presented in Chapter 4 but with one 
important difference; rather than coding manually at 5s intervals; the signaller activity 
was coded live using a software package. This allowed for much more accurate time 
intervals. Fewer codes were required than during the live observations as planning 
tools and communications were limited in the simulated environment. 
 
The codes used were: 
x Active monitoring – as with the previous observations, active monitoring was 
coded when the signaller was sitting up while viewing the signalling screens. 
x Passive monitoring – this was coded when the signaller was sitting back while 
viewing the signalling screens. 
x Trackerball – use of the trackerball. 
x Keyboard – use of the ARS keyboard. 
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x Communications – any communications pertaining to the signalling task. An 
SME was present to deal with these.  
x Simplifier – use of the paper based simplified timetable. 
x GP Screen – looking towards the GP screen. 
x Quiet Time – not involved in the signalling task. 
 
The use of software also allowed the purpose of trackerball use to be logged. The 
following interventions were coded: 
x Route Set – setting a manual route. 
x Cancel route – manually cancelling a route. 
x Sub-area on – turning on an ARS sub-area. 
x Sub-area off – turning off an ARS sub-area. 
x Set auto-route – setting an auto-route. 
x Cancel auto-route – cancelling an auto-route. 
x Change view – the workstation has several views, two overviews and eight 
detail views, but only four screens. These four screens may display any of the 
ten views and the signaller uses the soft keys to move between them. 
x Use of a reminder appliance – applying or removing a reminder appliance. 
x Unknown – any use of the trackerball for which the reason was not clear. 
6.3.4 Pilot 
The experiment was piloted twice before data collection began. The outcomes of 
each pilot and subsequent changes are detailed in the following sections. 
6.3.4.1 Pilot One 
The study was initially piloted with a signalling SME from the NR Ergonomics team. 
This team member had previously worked and managed the signalling centre where 
the trial took place so was familiar with the infrastructure and traffic patterns, although 
not up to date. The SME was used for piloting because problems were anticipated 
with sampling for the real experiment due to staff shortages and reluctance to 
participate by some staff in the signal box. The use of the SME preserved the largest 
possible sample size for the experiment. 
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The pilot revealed a number of issues, specifically: 
x The disruption half way through did not create a large enough change in 
workload; 
x Each scenario was too long, resulting in fatigue by the end of the three 
scenarios; 
x The eye tracking equipment was not sufficiently accurate to pick up exact 
locations of fixations; 
x It was difficult to control the experiment with only one researcher; 
x Difficulties using the eye tracking equipment; 
x Three different scenarios were too complicated; 
x The SA test had been based on the incorrect maps. 
 
These are addressed in the following sections. 
Workload Adjustment 
The IWS scores were captured for each of the three scenarios (Figure 6-6). It 
became clear early on in the pilot that the perceived workload was not greatly 
increased following the disruption. The disruption for the pilot was the closing of the 
electric line to the next workstation (Ilford). This meant that all traffic on the electric 
line travelling in that direction had to be routed across to the main line. The ‘ARS’ 
condition showed an increase in workload immediately after the disruption was 
introduced. This was as the participant identified all the areas requiring reminder 
devices to stop ARS routing over the affected line, and as he applied these 
reminders. However, once these had been applied the workload dropped off. Both 
the ‘Auto-Routes’ and ‘Manual’ conditions showed only small increases in workload, 
although these were sustained.  
 
Following the pilot it was decided that a larger and more sustained effect on workload 
following the introduction of a disruption was desirable. An additional day was spent 
with the pilot participant testing effects of different disruptions. The following 
scenarios were tested, all with ARS on (Figure 6-7): 
1. Closing platform 8 at Stratford; 
2. Closing platform 8 at Stratford during the start of the evening peak; 
3. Closing platform 8 at Stratford slightly later in evening peak; 
4. Closing platform 8 at Stratford slightly later in the evening peak with two 
additional trains. 
 
Chapter 6: Level of Automation Experiment 
 
164































Figure 6-6: IWS Scores for First Pilot 
 










































Figure 6-7: IWS Scores for Workload Adjustment Tests 
 
During these tests it became apparent that the major problem with manipulating the 
workload was the decision to exclude any disruption containing elements of 
communication. Regulation is the signaller’s main task during disruption, but although 





Disruption introduced Applying 
reminders
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attention and concentration away from the regulation task and without this effect it 
was difficult to greatly increase workload.  
 
Despite this finding, a decision was made to still withhold communications from the 
experiment. There were a number of reasons for this. Most importantly, the original 
reasons still stood. This experiment was intended as a pilot in the area and it aimed 
to look solely at the interaction between the operator and the automation. 
Communications would add another dimension into the experiment and the results 
would become more difficult to interpret. Secondly, this experimental design avoided 
any issues with signaller competence by keeping the actions within the capabilities of 
the interlocking; that is, the scenario chosen meant that the interlocking supported all 
decisions made by the signaller and no unsafe decision could be enforced. If 
communications were to be introduced into the experiment it would open up the 
possibility of a signaller breaking, or not following, the rules. There may then be 
ethical issues surrounding reporting of the signaller’s competence. In addition to the 
original reasons, time pressures meant that fundamentally redesigning the scenario 
of the experiment was not an attractive option. Finally, Figure 6-7 indicated that it was 
possible to manipulate the workload upward and keep it there for the duration of the 
second half of the experiment. 
Time Adjustment 
During the pilot each scenario was 40min long. It was apparent that this was slightly 
too long resulting in participant fatigue and a decision was made to reduce each 
scenario by 10min. This meant that each scenario would yield 15min of normal 
running data and 15min of disruption. No difference in the quality of the data collected 
was anticipated as a result of this decision. 
Eye tracking accuracy 
If the participant moved significantly during the experiment, the accuracy of the eye 
tracking was lost. This was due to the parallax error induced when the participant 
moved from the position they were in when the equipment was calibrated. Instead of 
being accurate to within 2-3mm as is possible if the participant remains in the same 
position for the duration of the experiment, the accuracy appeared to be more of the 
order of 2-3cm. It was possible to estimate this because data gathered during the 
manual condition in the pilot showed the eye tracking cursor preceding the trackerball 
cursor but with an offset of up to 2-3cm. It is reasonable to assume that when setting 
routes the signaller does look at the signal head as he/she moves the cursor to it. 




It may have been possible to request the participants to sit as still as possible for the 
duration of each scenario, or to use a harness to restrain them, but as previously 
noted in the observation studies, signaller position may give an indication of the level 
of attention the signaller is paying to the monitoring activity. The experiment was 
aiming to look at the differences between three levels of automation and eye tracking 
was only one measure being used. Restraining the signaller would have affected the 
other data collection. It would also have caused discomfort to the participants and 
perhaps influenced their actions by increasing the artificial air of the experiment. For 
this reason a decision was made to allow the signallers to move as they wished and 
accept the parallax error induced. 
 
There was an initial intention to record very accurate eye tracking data which would 
allow an analysis of the differences in monitoring between LOA in terms of detailed 
fixations on signals or tracks. The results from the pilot indicate that such a level of 
detail was impossible due to the parallax errors. As a result, the proposed coding for 
the eye tracking data was greatly simplified, dividing the screens into the eight areas 
shown earlier in Figure 6-27 and Figure 6-28. This had the added advantage of 
making the data considerably easier to code in The Observer XT but still held the 
potential to yield information on the differences between the conditions, for example 
in the difference in attention paid to the identified areas. It was still likely that some of 
the data collected would not be usable, but this is not unusual with eye tracking 
(Morimoto & Mimica, 2005). As this was an exploratory experiment and the first time 
eye tracking had been used in a signalling environment in the UK, the limitations of 
the equipment within this experiment were accepted. 
Additional researcher 
It was found to be difficult to run the experiment efficiently with only one researcher 
as they were required to set-up, calibrate and record the eye tracking, code signaller 
activity data live, administer IWS and the SA pilot test whilst also ensuring that the 
experiment kept on track. A decision was made to utilise a second researcher to 
administer IWS and the SA pilot and to be responsible for timekeeping, leaving the 
first researcher free to concentrate on the eye tracking and data coding. A third 
researcher, a signalling SME, gathered additional performance data and handled any 
communications with signallers required as part of the experiment. 
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Use of the Eye Tracking 
The pilot of the experiment was the first occasion the eye tracking equipment had 
been used in a signalling environment by this research group. Unsurprisingly, a 
number of problems were encountered including: 
x Problems calibrating the equipment; 
x Remembering to press record after calibrating and setting up the experiment; 
x Remembering to save the data after each scenario; 
x Remembering to focus the camera on the screen; 
x Getting the participant in a good position for calibration; 
x Lead loosening on the helmet and corrupting data. 
 
Due to these problems much of the eye tracking data were lost, and that which was 
gathered was not very high quality. However, it was a very useful learning experience 
and prompted the production of a checklist to ensure that these issues would not 
arise in the subsequent experiment (Appendix R). 
Reduction in scenarios 
As it was found to be difficult to increase the workload following the disruption a 
decision was taken to use the same scenario for each of the three conditions. This 
did risk a learning effect through the three conditions, but the order of conditions was 
balanced to take account of this. This decision also meant that the data would be 
more comparable as even minor changes to the timetable could have a major effect, 
but under the new design exactly the same scenario would be encountered in all 
conditions.  
SA questionnaire 
The maps used in the SA questionnaire were found not to accurately match the area 
being simulated as they had been based on old diagrams. The SAGAT element of 
the questionnaire therefore did not work in this pilot.  
6.3.4.2 Pilot Two 
The experiment was re-piloted to ensure that it ran as expected with the changes 
made following the first pilot. The participant on this occasion was the trainer in 
Liverpool Street IECC. While he continues to work as a signaller his main duties 
involve training new recruits on the simulator. He was not eligible as a participant in 
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the experiment as he had been involved in the setting up of the experiment. Thus the 
full sample pool was still preserved for the experiment. 
 












































Figure 6-8: IWS Scores for Second Pilot 
 
Figure 6-8 describes the IWS results for the second pilot. An increase in workload 
can be clearly seen following the introduction of disruption. It was still not as large as 
desired but it is unlikely that a large increase could be manipulated without the 
introduction of communications. The increase was at least sustained. Other issues 
encountered during the first pilot, including eye tracking difficulties, participant fatigue, 
and researcher pressure were not repeated in the second pilot. However, the new SA 
questionnaire was not prepared in time for this pilot and so was not included.  
6.3.5 Procedure 
Six signallers participated in the experiment and three researchers were used to 
gather the data. The first researcher used a laptop to code signaller behaviour in The 
Observer XT. The second researcher administered the verbal IWS and the paper 
based SA test, and was responsible for timekeeping. The third researcher, a 
signalling SME, sat in the adjoining room and gathered performance data. The SME 
also handled any communications with the participants required as part of the 
experiment. The experimental set-up is shown in Figure 6-9. 
 




Figure 6-9: Experimental Set-up 
 
The researchers typically arrived at the signal box in the morning, loaded and paused 
the experimental scenario on the simulator and set up the eye tracking equipment. 
The participant was then invited into the simulator room and the experiment was 
explained to him. He was asked to read the briefing sheet and sign the consent form 
(Appendix S). The participant then took his place at the simulator and was asked to 
sit as he would when signalling. The eye tracking helmet was placed and secured on 
his head (Figure 6-10) and calibrated to the middle screen of the simulator.  
 
 
Figure 6-10: Signaller at Simulator with Eye Tracking Helmet 
 
Once the eye tracking was calibrated and tested, recording began on both the eye 
tracking data and the observation data. The participant was asked to clap his hands 
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in front of his face so that the two data files could be synced within The Observer XT 
during later data coding. Following the clap, the simulator was un-paused and the 
experiment began. The signaller began signalling as he normally would; the first 
researcher used The Observer XT package to code his behaviours live, the second 
researcher requested IWS scores at 2min intervals, and the third researcher, 
assessed the signallers’ performance on the assessor’s workstation (Figure 6-11).  
 
 
Figure 6-11: Assessor's Workstation 
 
At the mid-point of the experiment, the third researcher announced the closure of 
Platform 8 at Stratford Station to the signaller. The remaining half of the experiment 
was therefore under disrupted conditions. Data collection continued as before.  
 
At the end of the experiment the simulator was paused and the eye tracking and 
behaviour coding were stopped. The screens were switched off and the second 
researcher administered the SA questionnaire while the first researcher downloaded 
performance data from the assessor’s workstation. Following completion of the 
questionnaire, the participant was given a break, although in most cases the eye 
tracking remained in place for ease of re-calibration, and offered a cup of tea or 
coffee. Once rested, the same procedure was followed for the second and third 
scenarios for which the level of automation was changed according to the group to 
which each participant was assigned. 
 
Following successful completion of all three scenarios, the signaller was thanked for 
his time and received a gift for his participation.  





The participants were asked to verbally rate their workload on the IWS Scale every 
2min. The results are presented here as a graph showing the average workload 
scores for each level of automation (LOA) at each 2min interval. It is clear from 
Figure 6-12 that the ARS LOA was consistently rated lowest and the Manual LOA 
was consistently rated highest. The Auto-routes LOA initially showed increased 
workload scores which quickly tapered off. This was due to the necessity to set up 
the auto-routes. Once these were established the workload fell and remained 
reasonably consistent until the disruption was introduced. All three LOA showed an 
increase in perceived workload following the introduction of disruption. The ARS LOA 
showed a steep increase in workload immediately after the introduction of disruption. 
This was as the signaller applied reminder devices both to remind himself not to route 












































Figure 6-12: Mean IWS Score for Each Condition 
 
Table 6-3 shows the mean score during the normal running phase of the experiment 
(i.e. the first 15min of each scenario) and the mean score during the disrupted phase 
(i.e. the last 15min of each scenario) for each of the three LOA. The difference 


















ARS 1.77 3.69 +1.92 
Auto-routes 3.31 4.38 +1.06 
Manual 4.40 5.63 +1.23 
Table 6-3: Mean IWS Scores during Normal and Disrupted Conditions 
 
A 2 x 3 ANOVA was run on the IWS data to determine whether there were any 
significant differences due to LOA or disruption. A significant main effect of LOA was 
found (F (2, 30) = 12.431, p<.001); Tukey’s post-hoc comparison revealed this 
difference was between the ARS (M = 2.74, SD = 1.01) and Manual (M = 5.02, SD = 
0.69) LOA (p<.001). The Tukey post-hoc did not show a significant difference 
between ARS and the lower form of automation, Auto-routes (M = 3.82, SD = 0.69). A 
significant difference was also found between the normal and disrupted conditions (F 
(1, 30) = 14.216, p<.001). No interaction effect was found. 
6.4.2 Performance 
Two performance measures were used; a simulator score based on the delay 
minutes caused by the participant and those recovered by the participant, and a SME 
rated performance score.  
 
Figure 6-13 describes the simulator generated performance score of each signaller 
for each LOA. It shows that performance was the most consistent across different 
signallers for the ARS LOA. This was also consistently the highest performance, 
followed by Auto-routes and finally Manual control, both of which showed a large 
variation between signallers. A one-way ANOVA was run on these data and a 
significant main effect of LOA was found (F(2, 15)=9.903, p<.005). A Tukey post-hoc 
test showed differences between the Manual group (M(Manual) = 75.17, SD(Manual) 
= 3.97) and both automation groups (M(Auto-Routes) = 81.83, SD(Auto-Routes) = 
5.00, p<.05; M(ARS) = 84.83, SD(ARS) = 1.94, p<.005).   
 






















Figure 6-13: Performance Scores 
 
The SME performance scores became corrupted due to a misunderstanding 
regarding the scale. Participants 1 and 2 were marked on a three point scale, but the 
remainder were marked using a nine point scale. Although an attempt was made to 
compensate for this by dividing the remaining performance scores by three, it 
seemed likely that the consistency of the scale had become corrupted as the SME 
had allocated a ‘3’ on the original scale considerably more often than he allocated a 
‘7’, ‘8’, or ‘9’ on the new scale. It was not clear how this corruption occurred as the 
SME had a printed scale provided during the experiment. One possible explanation is 
that the SME mistakenly used the nine point IWS scale, and therefore may have 
been rating his perception of the participants’ workload rather than performance. For 
this reason the SME performance scores were not analysed.  
 
Similarly the qualitative comments of the SME were not as useful as anticipated. It 
was hoped that some form of analysis would be possible on these data but the 
internal consistency of the data collected was not very high. This was compounded 
by the SME’s position in an adjoining room. Although the actions of the signaller were 
visible to the SME through the Assessor’s workstation it was not possible for him to 
determine the reasons behind the signallers’ actions and thus much of the benefit of 
an SME commentary was lost.  
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6.4.3 Behaviour Observation 
6.4.3.1 Active Monitoring 
The following graphs show the amount of time spent actively monitoring; first during 
normal running (Figure 6-14) and second during disrupted running (Figure 6-15). The 
results for each signaller are shown on each graph for each of the three LOA. 
 




















Figure 6-14: Active Monitoring Results: Normal Condition 
 




















Figure 6-15: Active Monitoring Results: Disrupted Condition 
 
A 2x3 ANOVA found no significant differences for LOA or level of disruption, but 
active monitoring was lowest during the ARS LOA, and was very variable between 
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different signallers during this condition. Figure 6-16 shows the mean time dedicated 







































Figure 6-16: Mean Active Monitoring and IWS Scores 
6.4.3.2 Passive Monitoring 
Passive monitoring was coded in the same manner used during the observation 
studies (i.e. when the signaller sat back from the workstation). Figure 6-17 and Figure 
6-18 show the passive monitoring results for each signaller during the normal 
condition and disrupted condition respectively.  




















Figure 6-17: Passive Monitoring Results: Normal Condition 
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Figure 6-18: Passive Monitoring Results: Disrupted Condition 
 
A 2x3 ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of LOA for passive monitoring, (F = 
9.562 (2, 30), p<.05). Tukey’s post-hoc comparison revealed this difference was 
between the Manual LOA and both automated conditions (M(Manual) = 21.5, 
SD(Manual) = 43.29; M(ARS) = 365.17, SD(ARS) = 272.95, p<.001; M(Auto-routes) 
= 235.58, SD(Auto-routes = 222.74, p<.05). Passive monitoring therefore increased 
with the LOA. Figure 6-19 describes the mean time dedicated to passive monitoring 



































Figure 6-19: Mean Passive Monitoring and IWS Scores 
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6.4.3.3 Use of the Trackerball 
Figure 6-20 and Figure 6-21 show the results for the use of the trackerball for the 
normal and disrupted conditions respectively.  
 






















Figure 6-20: Use of Trackerball Results: Normal Condition 
 






















Figure 6-21: Use of Trackerball Results: Disrupted Condition 
 
A 2x3 ANOVA revealed a significant effect of LOA in trackerball use (F (2, 30) = 
99.410, p<.001). A Tukey post-hoc comparison showed this effect was between all 
LOA (M(ARS) = 107.75, SD(ARS) = 66.58; M(Auto-Routes) = 184.75, SD(Auto-
Routes) = 59.76; M(Manual) = 388.92, SD(Manual) = 45.95; p(ARS/Manual)<.005, 
Chapter 6: Level of Automation Experiment 
 
178
p(ARS/Auto-Routes)<.005, p(Auto-Routes/Manual)<.001). There was a significant 
interaction due to the increase in trackerball use when disruption was introduced 
(F(2, 30) = 6.190, p<.01).  
 
The purpose of the trackerball interventions was also coded. Figure 6-22 describes 



































Figure 6-22: Mean and Standard Deviation of Intervention Types 
 
A series of one-way ANOVAs were run on the data and four significant differences 
were found. A significant difference was found for route setting (F(2,15) = 58.627, 
p<.001), and a Tukey post-hoc revealed that this difference was between the two 
automated conditions (M(ARS) = 31.33, SD(ARS) = 11.34, p<.001; M(Auto-routes) = 
81.17, SD(Auto-routes) = 25.20, p<.001) and the Manual condition (M(Manual) = 
254.00, SD(Manual) = 57.84).  A significant difference was also found for setting 
auto-routes (F(2, 14) = 39.193, p<.001) and this was between the Auto-routes 
condition (M(Auto-routes) = 28.40, SD(Auto-routes) = 11.17) and both other 
conditions (M(ARS) = 0, SD(ARS) = 0, p<.001; M(Manual) = 0.33, M(Manual) = 0.82, 
p<.001). The third significant difference was cancelling auto-routes (F(2, 15) = 7.500, 
p<.01), and Tukey’s post-hoc again showed this was between the Auto-routes 
condition (M(Auto-routes) = 2, SD(Auto-routes) = 1.79) and both other conditions 
(M(ARS) = 0, SD(ARS) = 0, p<.005; M(Manual) = 0, SD = 0, p<.005). The final 
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significant difference was applying reminder devices (F(2, 15) = 27.257, p<.001), and 
this was between the ARS condition (M(ARS) = 27.17, SD(ARS) = 8.73) and the 
Manual and Auto-routes conditions (M(Manual) = 4.00, SD(Manual) = 3.69, p<.001; 
M(Auto-routes) = 5.83, SD(Auto-routes) = 4.45, p<.001).  
6.4.3.4 Use of the Keyboard 
Figure 6-23 and Figure 6-24 describe the observed use of the ARS keyboard during 
the experiment.  
 



















Figure 6-23: Use of Keyboard Results: Normal Condition 
 
Signaller 1 showed increased use of the keyboard during the Auto-routes LOA; this 
was most likely due to an unintended fault on the simulator at the start of the 
simulation which he was attempting to rectify using the keyboard. There was no 
further effect of this fault. 
 
Although codes were programmed into The Observer XT to collect data on the type 
of keyboard inventions, as was achieved for the trackerball data, it proved too difficult 
to identify what each intervention was during the experiment and the vast majority of 
keyboard use was coded as ‘unknown’. It was therefore impossible to do any analysis 
on the types of keyboard intervention. 
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Figure 6-24: Use of Keyboard Results: Disrupted Condition 
 
As can be seen from the graphs, use of the keyboard occupied little of the signallers’ 
time, and no significant differences were found either between LOA or disruption. 
6.4.3.5 Quiet Time 
Figure 6-25 and Figure 6-26 describe the signallers’ observed level of quiet time 
during the experiment. 
 






















Figure 6-25: Quiet Time Results: Normal Condition 
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Figure 6-26: Quiet Time Results: Disrupted Condition 
 
Considerable variation can be seen between participants and between LOA for quiet 
time, but a 2X3 ANOVA found no significant differences.  
6.4.4 Eye Tracking  
Gaze fixations of eight areas on the two signalling overview screens were coded; 
these are the screens used most frequently for signalling purposes. These areas 
were determined in consultation with a SME with expert knowledge of this area. 
Figure 6-27 and Figure 6-28 show the coding scheme for both overview screens. The 
eight main areas are outlined, as well as the sub-area icons and soft keys which were 
also coded. In addition, fixations on the general purpose (GP) screen, the detail 
screens, missing data and ‘other’ were coded. These codes proved useful for 
determining when the calibration was lost during the experiment as high values for 
any of these codes, particularly ‘other’, indicated that it was likely calibration had 
been lost.  




Figure 6-27: Eye Tracking Coding Diagram - Screen 1 
 
The eight areas coded were Bow, Channelsea, Thornton Fields, Stratford, Maryland, 
Forestgate, Woodgrange Park, and Tottenham and Hampstead. Signalling diagrams 
are not always easy to follow, so for clarity, a train travelling from London would enter 
this workstation on one of the four lines at Bow (top left of Screen 1). It would travel 
from left to right across Bow which links to Thornton Fields. From Thornton Fields the 
train would travel through the Stratford area before moving to Screen 2 and Maryland 
to Forestgate and then on to Woodgrange Park. Most commonly trains would exit the 
workstation at the far right of Woodgrange Park but alternatively they may be routed 
through Tottenham and Hampstead exiting the workstation to the far right of that 
area. This describes the most common route for trains from London across the 
workstation, and the reverse describes trains travelling towards London. In addition, 
trains may enter the workstation from the Channelsea area, the bottom left of the 
Tottenham and Hampstead area, and a depot in the Thornton Fields area. 




Figure 6-28: Eye Tracking Coding Diagram - Screen 2 
 
The eye tracking videos were imported into The Observer XT for analysis. As 
expected, a considerable amount of eye tracking data were lost during the 
experiments, primarily due to the adverse lighting conditions and the difficulty of 
maintaining calibration throughout the experiment. In order to determine which data 
were useful, each minute of data was plotted for each experimental condition. Those 
sessions with high missing data or ‘other’ were eliminated from further analysis. In the 
case of high ‘other’ data, this probably indicated that the eye tracking was not 
calibrated, but those with high missing data may have simply had trouble picking up 
the participants’ eyes but still remained calibrated. However, it is impossible to be 
certain so the data were eliminated from the analysis as a precaution. The data from 
11 of the 18 scenarios were included in the analysis (61%).  
 
Each video was played in The Observer XT software package and the crosshair 
position logged throughout using the coding diagrams. Coding these videos was an 
extremely laborious and mundane task. The coding scheme was developed and one 
set of data coded from the pilot. Following this it became clear that the time and effort 
required to code all the data gathered during the experiment required additional 
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resources. Hence, a research assistant was engaged to code the data gathered. This 
assistant also helped with the data collection and so was familiar with the experiment. 
Once all the data had been coded total durations in each area could be calculated for 
each video as well as the transfer of attention between areas (i.e. where gaze moved 
to from each area). 
 
Link diagrams showing the transfer of attention from areas of the screens and heat 
diagrams showing the proportion of time signallers’ gaze rested in each area were 
constructed from the data. Data showing the number of times the signaller transferred 
gaze from one area of the display to another, a lag sequential analysis, were 
obtained from The Observer XT as well as total durations in each area. Link diagrams 
were constructed from the lag sequential analysis to illustrate the most common 
visual gaze path of the signallers in the experiment (Figure 6-29 and Figure 6-30). 
The arrows in these diagrams indicate where participants’ gaze most commonly 
moved from each observed area. The proportion of time the signallers’ gaze dwelled 
in each area is also illustrated in these diagrams by the size of the yellow circle in 
each screen section. There were only minor differences in the data for different levels 
of disruption so the following diagrams are based on the total scenarios. 
 
 
Figure 6-29: Screen 1 Link and Heat Diagram 
 




Figure 6-30: Screen 2 Link and Heat Diagram 
 
A series of 2 x 3 ANOVAs were performed on the duration spent on each screen area 
to determine whether the LOA or the level of disruption condition had a significant 
effect on the length of time signallers dwelt on each area. Only one area (Bow) 
showed significant results, and this was both in the case of LOA (F (2, 16) = 3.636, 
p<.05) and level of disruption (F (1, 16) = 6.546, p<.05). A Tukey post-hoc 
comparison showed that the difference in LOA was between the Manual condition (M 
= 30.44, SD = 5.10) and the two automated conditions (M(ARS) = 36.78, SD(ARS) = 
11.55, p<.05; M(Auto-routes) = 35.96, SD(Auto-routes) = 5.43, p<.05). A greater 
average time was spent monitoring Bow during the disrupted conditions (M = 37.24, 
SD = 8.77) than during normal conditions (M = 31.69, SD = 6.62).  
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Figure 6-31: Gaze Duration at Bow 
6.4.5 Situation Awareness 
Neither SA measure showed any significant difference between the levels of 
automation; simplified SAGAT (X2 = 0.9, df = 2, p>.05), and 3D SART (X2 = 3.9, df = 
2, p>.05). The SAGAT analysis is based on the amount of data recalled only. The 
actual positions of trains on the workstation at the end of each experimental scenario 
was not recorded, and so it is impossible to determine the accuracy of the information 
that was recalled. The level of detail in the results was very variable with some 
signallers indicating only the position of trains with an X, while others gave the first 
two digits of the headcode (i.e. indicating the priority and destination of the trains), 
and others still were about to give the full headcode. No correlation could be found 
between either the LOA or the order of scenarios to account for these differences. 
6.5 Discussion 
6.5.1 Workload 
A steep increase was seen in the ARS condition when disruption was introduced and 
the signaller began to apply reminder devices. It was also necessary to apply these 
reminders in the other LOA (Auto-routes and Manual), but the same steep increase in 
workload is not seen on those graphs. The increase seen on the ARS LOA graph is 
likely to represent the signaller becoming more involved in the signalling and 
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processing more information to support awareness. The ARS condition still showed 
the lowest workload scores overall, so on the basis of this experiment it cannot be 
labelled ‘clumsy automation’.  
 
The difference between the normal and disrupted conditions indicates that the 
disruption introduced was sufficient to generate a significant difference in workload 
and validates the form of disruption used. The difference found in the LOA condition 
shows that ARS does significantly reduce workload. Automation may reduce 
workload within the four functional dimensions (Parasuraman et al., 2000) and 
previous research has indicated that automation is most successful at reducing 
workload when applied to the information acquisition and action implementation 
functional dimensions (Kaber et al., 2006). It is not possible to state with certainty 
how ARS reduces workload; however, complex decisions were not required in the 
normal running scenario, and ARS was inhibited or turned off in the area where 
disruption was introduced. This implies that it was not useful in decision making. The 
interview data suggested that ARS reduces workload by relieving the manual task of 
setting routes. Nevertheless, the overall reduction in workload is an important finding 
as the strengths of ARS can often be forgotten in the light of its weaknesses. These 
data also provide the basis for a preliminary estimation of the effect on workload of 
introducing ARS into a system and will be used in future to help determine how much 
additional infrastructure may be acceptable if ARS is provided.  
6.5.2 Performance 
The results indicate that performance was significantly improved with the assistance 
of automation and ARS showed the most consistent performance across all 
signallers. Unfortunately, it was only possible to measure performance for the whole 
experiment so the difference in performance between normal and disrupted 
conditions could not be investigated. It is possible that the performance decrement in 
the Manual condition came from the physical workload of setting routes manually 
rather than reduced quality of decision making. The volume of route setting required 
may have resulted in differences in efficiency between the manual and automated 
conditions. There was not a significant difference between the ARS and Auto-routes 
LOA, which supports this theory as the signaller was still required to make decisions 
on train routing in the Auto-routes LOA.   
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6.5.3 Behaviour Observation 
6.5.3.1 Monitoring 
When the two levels of monitoring (active and passive) were differentiated in the 
observation study it was noted that active monitoring was associated with 
interventions and this study provides further evidence that active monitoring has a 
strong association with route setting, as high levels of active monitoring were 
sustained by all participants in the Manual condition. Active monitoring in the ARS 
condition also rose to comparable levels with both other conditions after the 
introduction of disruption. This was as the participants became more involved with 
route training around the blockage and further indicates the link between active 
monitoring and interaction. It can be seen that there was little difference between the 
normal and disrupted conditions in the Auto-Routes and Manual LOA but the ARS 
LOA shows a large increase and a corresponding increase in workload scores. 
 
Passive monitoring was almost exclusively confined to the automated conditions, and 
a sharp reduction could be seen in the ARS condition when disruption was 
introduced. Interestingly, the average passive monitoring observed in the Auto-routes 
condition actually rose following disruption. This is in contrast to workload scores, 
which rose in the Auto-routes condition following disruption. However, this was not a 
sharp rise, and taken with the result on passive monitoring, it can be said that Auto-
routes is a more stable condition than ARS. The significant difference found between 
the Manual LOA compared to the ARS and Auto-routes LOA for passive monitoring 
was as would be expected as the physical necessity to set routes left little time to sit 
back.  
 
The results from this study appear to support the hypothesis that signallers regulate 
their workload by engaging in passive monitoring. When the circumstances on the 
workstation became more demanding, signallers reduced their passive monitoring 
and engaged in more active monitoring. This provides validation for the method by 
which active and passive monitoring were identified and coded. 
6.5.3.2 Intervention 
The number of observed interventions were found to be significantly different 
between conditions. This is unsurprising as the requirement to set routes manually in 
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the Manual condition would have greatly increased the number of interventions in that 
condition. Even during disruption, the ARS condition was significantly lower than 
Manual as ARS continued to set routes for trains in the unaffected parts of the 
workstation. This demonstrates the value of ARS in disturbed conditions.  
 
Four significant differences were found between LOA for types of intervention. Most 
of these differences are as expected. There was a difference between all groups for 
route setting, since the requirement to set routes increased as the level of automation 
decreased. Auto-routes were not used in the ARS and Manual LOA so there are 
obviously significant differences between the Auto-route LOA and the others. There 
was a significantly greater use of reminders in the ARS LOA, which is interesting as 
they were also required in both other conditions to protect the platform area following 
the introduction of disruption. The significant increase in the use of reminders in the 
ARS condition reflects their use as a control mechanism for ARS, a fact which has 
previously been picked up in both the observations and interviews. However, the 
disruption in this experiment was not anticipated to have greatly increased the use of 
reminders in this context and it is interesting that the effect has appeared. This 
demonstrates how extremely common it is for signallers to use reminders in this way. 
 
It is also interesting to note those interventions for which no significant differences 
were found. The sub-areas were only relevant to the ARS condition as they may be 
used to switch ARS on or off in areas of the workstation. No significant differences 
were found due to the extremely low use of this mechanism by signallers. The 
experiment therefore provides evidence for the non use of this control mechanism, 
perhaps because signallers are unsure of which area is controlled by which sub-area 
and prefer to apply reminders as protection with which they are more comfortable. 
Neither were there any significant differences with regard to changing of screen 
views. The lack of difference between the changing of these views suggests that the 
information requirements of the signallers remained broadly constant in this sense 
regardless of the LOA.  
6.5.3.3 Quiet Time 
Quiet time reduced in both the Manual and ARS conditions following the introduction 
of disruption. However, a reduction was not seen for the Auto-routes condition. This 
seems to indicate that signallers felt they had the same amount of free time in normal 
and disrupted running and provides further evidence of the robustness of this form of 
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automation. It is also noteworthy that quiet time was present for the Manual condition. 
Despite the demands of route setting, participants did spend a small amount of time 
not involved with the system. This is in contrast to passive monitoring during the 
Manual condition which was rarely engaged in and may indicate that participants 
devote monitoring resource during automated conditions, but do not feel it is 
necessary when controlling manually, presumably because they are in control of any 
changes. On this basis, it can be assumed that information is processed during 
passive monitoring. 
6.5.4 Eye Tracking 
There was an initial aim to use the eye tracking equipment to gather data on specific 
elements of the infrastructure participants fixated on during the different conditions. 
This information was expected to be useful in determining signaller monitoring 
strategies and hence help guide future interface design (Ottati et al., 1999), and was 
anticipated to provide some validation for the monitoring strategies suggested in the 
interviews. Unfortunately, the difficulties encountered with the equipment, first noted 
in the pilot, meant that the level of accuracy was not sufficient to support this aim. 
Such difficulties are not uncommon and are well documented in eye tracking 
research (Morimoto & Mimica, 2005). The coding of the data was therefore reduced 
to the broad areas of the screen fixated. Although less specific, the results still 
contain some useful data.   
 
The results illustrate that the majority of the signallers’ time was spent on the first of 
the signalling screens (66% of time compared to 32% on Screen 2). This might be 
explained by the time of the simulation (evening peak) when the majority of trains 
were coming from London and had to be regulated through Stratford. This hypothesis 
could be confirmed by another experiment in the morning peak, in which the division 
of time between the two screens would be reversed. However, an alternate 
explanation may be that Screen 1 is the more complex screen and thus demands 
more of the signallers’ attention. Bow emerged as an important area for monitoring 
purposes. The heat diagrams indicate that this was the main area dwelt upon by 
signallers. The statistics showed that signallers monitored this area more during the 
automated conditions, during which time they were comparatively more free to 
distribute their time as they wished, and also during the disrupted running. Bow 
appears to be an important area for regulation purposes. It is also interesting to note 
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that the results indicate that signallers do change their monitoring strategy according 
to the circumstances on the workstation. 
 
The link diagrams, illustrated by the arrows in the diagrams, illustrate the most 
frequent visual path of the signallers across the workstation. It can be seen that a 
logical path through adjacent sections of track was followed, except between 
screens. There was some movement between screens but it was more common for 
participants to scan within a screen. There was a suggestion that signallers would 
jump between regulating areas on the screens rather than following a logical path, 
but this does not appear to be the case. Although this finding does not contribute 
towards understanding of the effect of automation, it potentially has implications for 
future workstation design. By attempting to ensure that signalling screen diagrams 
have a logical progression designers can aid monitoring.  
6.5.5 Situation Awareness 
The results of the freeze probe measure indicated that much of the data could not be 
recalled by the signallers, and may indicate that these data are not routinely held in 
memory by the signallers. It is interesting that all signallers do not appear to retain 
data on train positions and names, even during manual routing. It was expected that 
signallers would hold this information in memory as the train headcodes contain 
information on priority and pathing which is vital to correct regulation. It may be that 
the constant presence of this information on the signalling screens means that 
signallers do not encode the information in their own memory, but rather they 
remember where to look for it. Research in air traffic control has found a similar result 
in that air traffic controllers have a better knowledge of aircraft location than call sign 
(Durso & Dattell, 2004). The main conclusion from the piloting of this SA measure is 
that further research is necessary to determine what is appropriate to measure with 
regard to SA in a signalling context.  
6.5.6 Discussion of Method 
Introducing disruption which generated a large and sustained increase in workload 
proved difficult. This was a limitation of the experiment and reflects the elimination of 
other variables, primarily communications, which ordinarily would contribute towards 
workload. Communications were omitted from the experiment for a number of valid 
reasons, but it is clear that they have a major impact on workload and any future 
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studies of this nature should give careful consideration as to whether they are 
necessary or not. 
 
The experiment was very ambitious in terms of the number of dependent variables, 
and this meant that data collection was difficult and time consuming. The eye tracking 
was particularly labour intensive and this will be discussed separately below. Some of 
the measures were more productive than others, with Integrated Workload Scale 
(IWS) and the simulator performance scores being the most revealing. While giving 
their IWS scores signallers frequently made comments on why their score had 
changed. Unfortunately this had not been anticipated and no facility had been made 
to record these data. Future experiments using IWS to measure subjective workload 
should incorporate a method to gather this type of data as it would add to the 
analysis. Although the simulator generated performance score was useful, it was only 
possible to obtain a score for the whole simulation and so could not be used to 
examine the effect of disruption. The behaviour observation data were also useful, 
but the SME performance scores were not. This was due to the unstructured nature 
of the data collected which meant that its use during the analysis was extremely 
limited. It is apparent that the SME needs to be in the same environment as the 
signaller to collect this information. It is recommended that future experiments of this 
type have much more structured data collection from SMEs. The data gathered were 
useful during the IWS and behaviour analyses in providing some context as to the 
state of the workstation at different points in each scenario, but the data were not 
sufficient to support an analysis itself. The SA measure did not show any difference 
between the conditions, but this experiment was intended as a pilot for this measure 
and the usefulness of the data was more in refining thoughts on how to measure SA 
in a signalling context.  
6.5.6.1 Eye Tracking 
This research is believed to be the first to use head mounted eye tracking in the 
signalling environment in the UK although Network Rail intends to make further use 
of the equipment in this context to support a number of other projects and goals. 
There are a number of research questions which the equipment could potentially 
support. One of these is the monitoring strategies of signallers and this research 
attempted to begin to examine this question. For example, when re-signalling an area 
and designing workstations to control it there are frequent discussions about how 
best to represent the area. In the past there have been instances of designs put 
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forward which were rejected by SMEs because they cut across a regulating location 
which must be monitored closely to make correct decisions. The eye tracking 
equipment may facilitate easier recognition of these areas and a visualisation for the 
engineers of which areas should remain grouped together.  
 
A limitation of the equipment is that accuracy is lost when participants move about 
during the experiment due to parallax error. The eye tracking cursor may be offset 
from the actual gaze location if the participant moves from the position in which the 
equipment was calibrated. It is still possible to gain some data but not at a high 
degree of accuracy. It was possible to design the data collection and analysis around 
this limitation for this experiment, but future research may require more accurate data 
and these are difficult to obtain. Use of the equipment is also limited by the time taken 
to analyse any data collected. Data analysis took approximately 3 hours for each 
hour of data, and this was with only 12 codes. Finer grained analysis would take far 
longer, and this limits the use of the eye tracking equipment to research projects 
which can dedicate time to the analysis. Such time is not likely to be available for use 
of the equipment in supporting commercial projects such as re-signalling schemes. 
Lighting conditions can also make the equipment difficult to use, and these may be 
difficult to adjust in operational environments such as signalling centres.  
 
Overall the eye tracking equipment is very resource intensive, both in terms of data 
collection and data analysis and interpretation. In order to maximise the potential of 
the equipment it is recommended that it is the sole focus of any such research in 
future.  
6.5.6.2 Use of The Observer XT 
The Observer XT package was used to code the behavioural observation live during 
the experiment and the eye tracking was subsequently coded using the same 
software. Although a powerful tool, it has a number of shortcomings. First, the coding 
scheme cannot be changed once data entry has begun. This means that any 
unexpected behaviours cannot be accounted for in the analysis. Secondly, the 
software can freeze during observations. This is usually only for a short time; 
however, on a couple of occasions during this study the software froze and refused to 
accept any codes. Hence, a couple of minutes of data were lost.  
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Although a useful tool for data collection, provided a complete coding scheme has 
been developed in advance and it does not freeze during data collection, the analysis 
power of The Observer XT is not greater than that of Excel, despite this being a 
selling point. Indeed for some of the data analysis (the lag sequential analysis) the 
raw data were exported from The Observer XT and analysed in Excel as The 
Observer XT could not generate a sufficiently large matrix to display the results. 
6.6 Conclusions 
The key findings of the experiment are summarised in Table 6-4.  
 
 
ARS Auto-routes Manual 




































of Bow area 
Increased monitoring 
of Bow area 
Reduced monitoring of 
Bow area  
Performance Highest and most 
consistent 
performance 
 Lowest performance 
Situation 
Awareness 
No differences found 
Table 6-4 Key Findings of the Level of Automation Experiment 
 
This experiment has shown that ARS does lead to a reduction in workload compared 
to lower levels of automation, but the reduction is not as large during disrupted 
running. In addition, performance was highest and most consistent when working with 
ARS. Auto-routes showed the most stable workload scores throughout, but 
performance was variable between different signallers. There were few differences in 
signallers’ behaviours between the conditions apart from the obvious such as 
increased use of the trackerball during the Manual LOA and increased passive 
monitoring when using ARS. However, the amount of time dedicated to monitoring 
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varied between signallers more for the automated conditions compared to the 
manual. This appears to indicate that individual signallers engage in different 
strategies during the automated conditions.  The eye tracking equipment showed that 
signallers also changed their monitoring strategy under disrupted running for both the 
ARS and Auto-routes LOA compared to the Manual LOA choosing to spend more 
time looking at Bow, where regulating decisions would have to be made.  
 
Overall the findings of the experiment support the use of signalling automation. 
However, the advantages of ARS over Auto-route functionality are not as great as 
might be assumed given the differences in complexity and cost. 
6.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented the final study undertaken for this research, a level of 
automation experiment using a high fidelity signalling simulator. Three levels of 
automation and two levels of disruption were examined and themes including 
workload, monitoring, and SA were further examined. Key findings include the 
reduction of workload through the use of automation and consistency of performance 
with automation. The next chapter will summarise the findings from this and the other 
studies undertaken to evaluate ARS and provide guidance for future automated 
signalling systems under the principles of automation developed in Chapter 2.  
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CHAPTER 7: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
7.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter discusses how the research undertaken supported the objectives of this 
thesis. The findings from the studies are drawn together and related to previous 
research on automation. Specific recommendations for future automation systems 
are given under the principles of automation drawn from the literature. 
7.2 Introduction 
The aim of this research was to study a real world automated system in order to 
understand the impact of automation on the human operators who work alongside it 
and identify how automation can be implemented to best support overall system 
performance. Figure 7-1 illustrates how the research conducted led to an 
understanding of the effect of automation on the signalling task, providing the basis 
for the recommendations given in this chapter.  
 
The domain was rail signalling and the specific system under investigation was 
Automatic Route Setting (ARS) which automatically sets routes for trains using 
timetable information and uses algorithms to resolve conflicts arising between trains. 
A number of research methods were used to this end, including observation of 
signallers working with ARS, video archive analysis, semi-structured interviews, and 
an exploratory level of automation (LOA) experiment. This chapter will discuss the 
findings of the research, and show how it supported the objectives outlined in 
Chapter 1. 
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Figure 7-1: Research Framework 
7.3 Discussion of Research Approach 
Objective 1 
To develop a theoretical framework within which to research and implement human 
oriented automation within rail signalling. 
 
The conceptual framework (Figure 7-2) illustrates the approach taken to the research.  
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Figure 7-2: Conceptual Framework 
 
A review of the literature was undertaken to identify relevant theories, best practice, 
and knowledge. The literature review focussed on the impact of automation design on 
the operator, in terms of workload and trust and on the use of automation, with the 
key themes of monitoring and SA. It introduced the automation of control systems 
and highlighted major research findings on the key themes. These are summarised in 
Table 7-1.  
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Theme Key Finding 
Trust x There is a correlation between trust in and usage of automation.  
x High reliability and competence are fundamental requirements for 
trust in automation.  
x Operator self confidence and the usefulness of the automation also 
influence usage.  
x For complex systems, explicit feedback is required to develop trust. 
x Trust must be well calibrated to ensure optimal use of automation.  
x Accurate mental models are important to ensure correct calibration 
of trust.  




x Level 1 SA is higher during automated operation of information 
acquisition, suggesting that the use of information is more 
important for SA than gathering the information.  
x Level 2 SA is higher during intermediate levels of automation. 
x Level 2 SA may be improved by automation during high workload 
conditions. 
x Performance during automation failures is better with higher SA. 
x Well designed automation has the potential to improve operator 
SA. 
x SA is also affected by high workload conditions. 
 
Workload x Automation can reduce workload during normal operations. 
x Automation of information acquisition and action implementation 
has a greater effect on workload. 
x Monitoring of automation may increase workload. 
x Automation may increase workload during incidents. 
 
Monitoring x The subjective workload associated with monitoring may be high. 
x ‘Passive monitoring’ may reduce awareness as compared with 
‘active control’.  
x Although a reliable laboratory result, no evidence of a vigilance 
decrement has been found in real world systems. 
x Alleged complacency may be due to the calibration levels of trust. 
x Operators develop strategies to monitor automation effectively. 
 
Table 7-1: Summary of Key Findings from the Literature Review 
 
The conceptual framework focussed this research on the use of automation and 
design of automation and both empirical study and archive study were used to gather 
data on the performance and behaviour of operators using automation and the impact 
of the design on the operator. Production of guidance on the appropriate 
implementation, level, and design of new automation systems was the ultimate goal 
of the research and this guidance was generated on the basis of the 12 principles of 
automation developed from the literature and the research carried out.  
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7.4 Discussion of Research Findings 
Objective 2 
To study current use of automation within rail signalling and understand the effect 
automation has on the signalling task, including: 
x How signallers monitor the system; 
x How signallers interact with the system; 
x Signallers’ understanding of how the system works; 
x Overall system performance. 
 
The research undertaken for this thesis built on the themes identified in the literature 
review (i.e. trust, workload, SA, and monitoring) but other themes also emerged 
strongly, such as directability, performance and wider organisational issues. These 
themes will be discussed first in the following sections. The findings within these 
themes will be summarised with regard to the above objective.  
7.4.1 Trust 
Trust was investigated both during the observation study and the interviews with 
signallers. Key dimensions identified from the literature including reliability, 
competence, understanding, predictability, and robustness (Madsen & Gregor, 2000; 
Muir & Moray, 1996; Rempel et al., 1985) were investigated over the course of both 
studies. It is well established that trust in automation is influenced by low or variable 
reliability (Dzindolet et al., 2003; Lee & Moray, 1994). However, ARS is a highly 
reliable safety critical system and this fact allowed other factors influencing trust to 
emerge.  
 
The competence of the system was found to be low, particularly during disruption (i.e. 
it is not robust). Signallers could and did give many examples of incorrect regulating 
decisions made by ARS, particularly with late running trains or complex junctions. 
The system cannot cope with infrastructure restrictions at all and had to be 
constrained when disruption was introduced during the second half of the experiment 
and all routing in the area of the closed platform achieved manually. However, the 
ratings of perceived competence on the trust questionnaire did not differentiate 
between high and low interveners, despite evidence that competence is the greatest 
predictor of the operators’ overall trust (Muir & Moray, 1989). Other factors, including 
Chapter 7: General Discussion 
201 
feedback, reliability, understanding, and predictability, yielded significant differences 
between high and low interveners, providing further evidence for the correlation 
between trust in and usage of the automation (de-Vries et al., 2003). In the literature, 
as discussed in Chapter 2, no research was found which had established empirical 
links between reported understanding, prediction, and faith and automation use. 
Therefore, this may be the first time such an empirical link has been found. These 
links were also found in a real world setting, rather than laboratory, increasing the 
validity of the research. 
 
Feedback from ARS was also found to be very poor, resulting in low understanding 
and low predictability of the automation. As signallers cannot predict what the 
automation will do in all situations they do not feel they can trust it to set routes and 
frequently step in to ensure trains are routed in the correct order. In the observation 
study, the differences found between high and low interveners in terms of feedback, 
understanding and predictability confirm the importance of good mental models in the 
development and calibration of trust (Sheridan & Parasuraman, 2006). The lack of 
such models was emphasised during the interviews when all signallers could give 
recent examples of having been surprised by actions taken by ARS, even those who 
had been working with the system for some time.  
 
The development of accurate mental models is supported by observable and 
understandable automation (Hopkin & Wise, 1996; Lenior et al., 2006; Parasuraman 
& Riley, 1997) and this must be achieved through good feedback in complex 
automation systems. Even when queried, ARS does not provide reliable or easily 
interpretable information. Over the course of the research it became clear that the 
designers of ARS envisioned a near autonomous system with full decision capability 
(i.e. Level 5 on the Rail Automation Model) but the inability of the system to perform 
competently outside of routine running means that the decision making functional 
dimension is considerably lower than was aimed for. The outcome is a system which 
the operator struggles to understand and predict and results in higher levels of 
intervention than may be necessary in order to control ARS adequately. 
7.4.2 Situation Awareness 
Situation awareness has been found to vary with the level of automation in the 
aviation domain, although the direction and degree of this variation depends on the 
type of automation and the level of workload operators are working under (Endsley & 
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Kaber, 1999; Endsley & Kiris, 1995). Situation awareness has not previously been 
examined in detail in a UK signalling context and so the factors which contribute to 
good SA have not yet been identified. This meant that it was not possible to measure 
SA as a part of this research as significant work is first required to identify a valid 
method of measurement. However, a pilot measure for SA was incorporated into the 
LOA experiment. The freeze probe measure required participants to recall train 
position and headcode but signaller recall was poor and no difference was found 
between conditions. It seems likely that because this information is constantly 
displayed to signallers they do not maintain it in their memory, but rather develop 
future oriented SA involving the routes that they need to set and the potential conflicts 
that may arise. Until a validated measure of SA is developed it will not be possible to 
measure how it is affected by automation. 
7.4.3 Workload 
The literature review suggested that workload tends to decrease when automation is 
employed (Endsley & Kaber, 1999) but that a significant mental workload may be 
involved in monitoring (Warm et al., 1996). Observations of signallers and 
discussions with subject matter experts suggest that signalling workload can be 
divided into at least four areas: physical workload associated with setting routes, 
mental workload associated with memory burden of routing and platforming 
requirements for individual trains, physical communications workload, and mental 
workload associated with regulation. 
 
The introduction of ARS was intended to reduce signaller workload and allow them to 
control a larger area (Burrage et al., 1991) and it is likely that ARS does reduce the 
first two of the workload types outlined above. This is because it sets the majority of 
the train routes in areas where it is operational and it holds information on the routing 
and platforming requirements of individual trains. However, ARS has little or no effect 
on communications, and it seems likely that it increases the mental workload 
associated with regulation. The interviews indicated that ARS is not totally competent 
at regulation, particularly under disrupted conditions, and so signallers working with 
ARS consider regulation to be a primary duty. However, ARS introduces an additional 
cognitive burden as signallers consider how it will react in a situation and act 
appropriately to counter this if necessary. Hence there is a potential for a mental 
workload increase. Such a potential has been previously noted by Megaw (2005) but 
no specific reference was found in the literature on control system automation.  
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The findings of the LOA experiment clarified the overall magnitude of workload 
differences between manual and ARS conditions. A significant reduction was seen for 
the ARS condition as compared to the manual, reflecting the removal of the 
requirement for physical route setting. There was not a significant difference between 
ARS and Auto-routes, suggesting that similar workload reductions could be achieved 
with a much simpler form of automation. Unfortunately, it was not possible to directly 
measure the reduction in each of the four types or workload outlined above, or in the 
functional dimensions in which reductions were achieved (Kaber et al., 2006). 
However, the interview data collected suggest that the reduction in workload while 
working ARS is primarily due to the removal of the requirement to physically set 
routes (i.e. action implementation). 
 
Automation may increase workload during incidents (Kantowitz, 1994). The LOA 
experiment found that workload did increase in the ARS condition following the 
introduction of disruption but was still lower than the Manual and Auto-routes 
conditions. This contrasts with the findings from the interviews which suggested that 
ARS does hinder the operator during disruption. During the LOA experiment, the 
disruption introduced half way through each scenario was chosen following numerous 
attempts to try to ensure an increase in workload would be experienced. Despite the 
effort, the workload increases were not as large as desired. Indeed, some 
participants did not show any increase in workload scores at all following the 
disruption. Any incident causing delay or re-routing of trains would normally prompt 
numerous communications with station staff, train staff, control staff, etc. all seeking 
information on the cause and effects of the delay. This multi-tasking appears to be 
the cause of much workload associated with disruption and the interaction between it 
and the control of the automation may be the cause of the workload increase 
reported by interviewed signallers. There may be a difference in this respect between 
different implementations of ARS; some signallers reported that ARS helped during 
incidents by keeping other parts of the workstation moving, and this was the case in 
the experiment, but other locations report that ARS must be switched off during 
disruption. It is therefore not possible to say with certainty that ARS is a ‘clumsy 
automation’ system (Wiener, 1989; Woods, 1996); however, when not well 
implemented it certainly has the potential for clumsiness.  
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7.4.4 Monitoring 
The observation study initially noted that observed monitoring behaviour could be 
divided into two distinct categories, active and passive. Signallers appeared more 
relaxed when engaged in passive monitoring and this was typically for longer periods 
of time and interspersed with periods of quiet time (i.e. distractions). In contrast, 
signallers appeared more engaged with the signalling task while actively monitoring; 
the average time spent actively monitoring was considerably shorter, and tended to 
be interspersed with interventions. It seems likely that this variation of monitoring 
behaviour is a strategy to cope with variation in the demands on a workstation. When 
required, the signaller becomes more involved and actively seeks out information 
whereas when the demands lessen they relax and simply maintain an overview, 
waiting for a situation to arise which requires their attention. The LOA experiment 
provided some validation of this theory; as workload increased in the ARS LOA 
following the introduction of disruption, active monitoring increased and passive 
monitoring decreased.  
 
No such descriptions of monitoring behaviour were found in the literature, but a 
difference has been investigated between ‘active control’ and ‘passive monitoring’ 
(Endsley & Kiris, 1995; Metzger & Parasuraman, 2001). These studies suggest that 
individuals engaged in monitoring passively process information and this may be 
poorer than active processing during control activities. In contrast, this research 
suggests that monitoring of automation is not always a passive activity, and 
interventions were frequently observed immediately following periods of passive 
monitoring. It seems likely that passive monitoring is less demanding than active 
monitoring, or there would be no benefit for signallers to engage in it, but the 
interventions suggest that they are still focussed on the task.  
 
A variety of monitoring strategies were reported during the interviews with signallers. 
These are developed through experience and include maintaining an overview of the 
workstation, monitoring the progress of individual trains which ARS is known to have 
difficulties with, and monitoring route setting to ensure that trains have two green 
signals in front of them wherever possible. These strategies allow signallers to 
recognise situations requiring their attention quickly and to direct their attention where 
it is required.  
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The eye tracking equipment gave some insight into the manner in which gaze is 
transferred across the workstation. The link diagrams presented in Chapter 8 
illustrate that the signallers in the experiment predominantly followed a logical path 
across the workstation, rather than jumping between hot-spots. The eye tracking also 
showed an increase in monitoring of one area of the workstation (Bow) following 
disruption for both the ARS and Auto-routes LOA. This was a key area for regulation 
on the approach to the closed section of track and the presence of automation 
allowed the signallers to dedicate more attention to this area. These findings are 
relevant to interface design, illustrating the importance of presenting track diagrams 
in a logical format and in ensuring that key regulating locations are presented in a 
manner which facilitates monitoring. 
 
The literature review revealed some work which had identified monitoring strategies 
similar to those outlined above (Vicente et al., 2004), but most of the research in the 
area of monitoring was regarding vigilance and complacency (Parasuraman, 1987; 
Parasuraman et al., 1993). Although not investigated as main themes, neither of 
these arose as an issue in signalling. During the interviews, signallers highlighted 
how important they felt it was to monitor the automation, and the observation study 
objectively recorded the high frequency of signaller monitoring behaviour. It is likely 
that this is because of the dynamic nature of the signalling task and the involvement 
of other parties. The demands on the signaller are constantly changing, keeping them 
involved and minimising the chance of missing anything. However, if he/she does 
miss something, it is likely that a train driver will ring to prompt him/her. The lack of a 
vigilance decrement or complacency issue, even in those IECCs where ARS runs 
well, supports the theory that these issues do not arise in real world dynamic systems 
(Moray, 2003; Moray & Haudegond, 1998).  
7.4.5 Performance 
There are a number of issues with ARS which can affect performance including 
poorly input timetable information, incorrect programming of the weighting factors and 
algorithms determining priority in the event of a conflict between trains, and disruption 
in the area of control or surroundings. These all affect the system competence, and 
addressing such issues should increase the overall trust and use of the automation 
(Muir & Moray, 1989). 
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However, the LOA experiment found that system performance was higher and more 
consistent with ARS as compared to manual operation. Because ARS operates in a 
number of different sub-areas, it can be switched off in one area of a workstation in 
the event of disruption in that area. Signallers can then focus their attention on that 
one area while leaving ARS to continue to run the rest of the workstation. This was 
the case in the experiment. However, this is only possible if ARS is well programmed 
and can be trusted to run the rest of the area. During the interviews, some signallers 
regarded this ability as a key strength of ARS while others stated they were not 
happy to work in this manner as ARS unsupervised could go on to cause enormous 
problems in other areas of the workstation. Good planning and programming allow 
signallers to trust ARS to manage parts of the workstation and therefore play a key 
role in the performance of the system overall. 
7.4.6 Directability 
The ability to interact with and direct the automation arose as a key issue during the 
research. There are a number of options for a signaller to intervene in the routing of a 
train. They can turn the ARS sub-area off, they can take a single train out of ARS 
control, or they can apply a reminder device. The latter two options are preferred with 
reminders by far the most common method employed. Turning off ARS sub-areas is 
generally only used when there is significant disruption as this means all trains in that 
part of the workstation must be routed manually. Reminder appliances are quick and 
easy to apply and they prevent ARS setting a route to or from the signal they are 
placed over. This is an easy way to constrain ARS. The reminder can remain in place 
until the signaller is happy for the route to be set and then removed; ARS will then set 
the route if it is available. This method is frequently used to resolve conflicts between 
trains at junctions. The signaller places a reminder in front of one train to ensure that 
the other is routed first. It is a quick and effective method of controlling ARS. 
However, this is not the purpose of reminders. They are primarily intended as a 
safety device to protect staff working on or near the track. Their purpose is both to 
prevent a route being set in that area and to remind the signaller of the presence of 
staff in the area. Use of reminders to control ARS degrades their effectiveness as a 
safety device. The use of reminders in this context indicates the lack of powerful 
methods to direct the automation.  
 
The LOA experiment found that signallers had to manually take over routing in the 
area of disruption. Their attention was then focussed on this part of the workstation, 
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and ARS was allowed to run the remainder. More powerful tools could be employed 
which would allow the signaller to instruct the automation on trains that should be 
routed around the disruption and free up signaller resource to concentrate on the 
overall performance of the train service in their area. This is the ‘control by 
replanning’ suggested by Kauppi et al. (2006). 
7.4.7 Organisational Issues 
Alongside the more technical problems with the ARS system there are some softer 
issues, most particularly the unacknowledged change in the role of the signaller. 
Although ARS adds a new element to the signalling task, and changes it in some 
fundamental ways, the organisational approach is much the same. This is particularly 
reflected in the training of IECC (ARS) signallers which is no different to the training 
of NX panel signallers. Any training on ARS is informal and ad hoc. Information on 
ARS and how it works is passed on from generation to generation in an informal 
manner. The result is signallers who do not know how to work with the system, 
although this should also be considerably more intuitive, and cannot achieve optimal 
levels of operation.  
 
The train planning team are responsible for devising and inputting timetables. As with 
any automated system, to work effectively ARS must have access to a complete and 
accurate timetable (Sheridan, 1996). This is in contrast with non automated signalling 
where the signaller can compensate for any missing or inaccurate timings or route 
codes. Good timetable information is therefore a prerequisite for ARS performance, 
but the planning staff are remotely located and have little knowledge of ARS. The 
result is that they are relatively unaware of the importance of their work to ARS and it 
falls to signallers to compensate.  
 
The introduction of ARS also clouds the responsibility of the signaller for delays. The 
organisation tends to take the view that the signallers are in charge and should take 
responsibility for any delays occurring in their area. However, if ARS sets an 
unexpected route which the signaller could not have anticipated this attitude does not 
seem fair. On the other hand, without the burden of responsibility there is little 
incentive for the signaller to remain involved with a system which can run itself, albeit 
not optimally. There is no standardised view on this issue, but the most common and 
sensible is that the signaller takes responsibility for any delays, unless ARS 
implements a decision which has never been encountered before. Once such a 
Chapter 7: General Discussion 
208 
problem has occurred, the details are passed to the signallers and it is their 
responsibility to ensure that ARS does not make the same mistake again.  
 
It is clear that ARS has suffered from a lack of integration into the railway system as a 
whole. For future automation systems to succeed there must be appropriate support 
and buy-in from all parties who may affect it, or be affected by it. 
7.4.8 Summary 
This research set out to study the current implementation of rail signalling automation 
and understand its effect on the signalling task. Signaller monitoring was investigated 
throughout the research and different levels of monitoring were identified. The 
research also identified different types of monitoring behaviour, but no evidence of a 
vigilance decrement was found. Signaller interaction with the system was found to 
vary between individuals, and this appears to be related to their trust in the 
automation, specifically with the reported level of feedback, understanding, 
predictability and faith. Signaller workload was found to be lower when working with 
ARS, and performance was increased, but a number of issues have also been 
identified. In particular the complexity of, and lack of feedback from, ARS makes the 
system difficult to work with and has knock-on consequences on overall system 
performance. The key findings of the research are summarised in Table 7-2. 
Recommendations were developed from these findings and will be stated in the 
following section. 
 
Chapter 7: General Discussion 
209 
Theme Key Findings 
Trust x ARS was rated highly for reliability. 
x Predictability and competence were rated much lower. 
x Feedback was poor, and signallers did not have complete 
mental models of ARS. 
x Trust is related to the level of intervention a signaller displays. 
x Understanding and prediction were found to influence the 




x Factors suitable for measuring SA in signalling have yet to be 
identified. 
 
Workload x Signallers reported that ARS reduces workload, but less so 
during disrupted conditions. 
x The reduction in workload appears to be in the physical rather 
than mental domain. 
x ARS may increase mental workload. 
x The experiment found that ARS decreased workload, but the 
reduction was less during disrupted conditions. 
 
Monitoring x At least two levels of monitoring are regularly employed by 
signallers, active and passive, and it is likely that these are 
related to perceived workload. 
x Signallers reported a variety of monitoring strategies; 
monitoring the progress of individual trains, monitoring route 
setting, monitoring ‘hot-spots’, maintaining an overview, and 
monitoring CCF. 
x Signallers follow a logical path across the workstation when 
monitoring. 
x No evidence was found of a vigilance decrement or 
complacency. 
 
Competence x ARS cannot be considered to regulate trains. 
Performance x Poorly input information (i.e. planning) affects ARS 
performance. 
x ARS programming also has a strong effect on performance 
and how often the signaller must intervene. 
x ARS does not perform well under disrupted conditions (i.e. it 
is not a robust system). 
x ARS facilitates highest performance and most consistent 
performance across different signallers. 
 
Directability x Use of reminder appliances was the preferred method of 
intervention for most signallers. 




x No standardised training for ARS. 
x Information passed on to new signallers is haphazard. 
x Responsibility for wrong routings or incorrect regulation is a 
grey area when ARS is employed. 
x Planning do not fully understand their importance. 
 
Table 7-2: Summary of Key Findings 
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These findings inform the recommendations and these will be presented under the 
principles of automation in the next section. 
7.5 Recommendations for Future Automated Signalling Systems 
Objective 3 
To develop recommendations for development and implementation of automation in 
future rail signalling systems. 
 
As Network Rail continues to invest in the British rail network further automation is 
likely. This section uses the principles of automation extracted from the literature and 
presented in Table 2-6 to structure recommendations for the design of future 
automated rail signalling systems.  
7.5.1 Reliable 
The mechanical reliability of ARS is very high, as would be expected of an automated 
system employed in a safety critical environment. During the design stages, ARS was 
required to meet high standards regarding its safety integrity level and this ensured a 
highly reliable product.  
 
The reliability of signalling automation systems should continue to be extremely high. 
This means that signallers can rely on the system to continue to operate and in turn 
engenders trust. 
7.5.2 Competent 
The competence of the ARS system is considerably lower than its reliability. 
Signallers who work with ARS have many examples of incorrect decisions made by 
ARS. The low competence of the system is likely to be due its attempts to make 
regulation decisions using complex algorithms but without the accurate real time 
information on the railway which is more readily available to signallers. The hard red 
lines within ARS also leave no room for the context sensitive conclusions at which 
signallers may arrive.  
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Given the low competence of ARS in some complex areas, careful consideration 
should be given as to whether full ARS is necessary or whether a simpler and more 
predictable form of automation, such as running trains strictly to timetable order or on 
a first come first serve basis, is more appropriate. The rail automation model 
highlighted the high levels of decision making automation, which do not appear to be 
supported by high levels of automated analysis. Lowering the level of decision 
making automation may improve operator trust in the automation and help them to 
calibrate their trust correctly. 
 
The rail automation model also highlighted the lack of support for communications in 
automated signalling systems. This is one area where increased automated support 
could provide major benefit. Future signalling systems should aim to reduce the 
communications burden by automatically transmitting pertinent information to relevant 
parties. 
7.5.3 Visible 
The visibility of ARS is relatively good quality, with the same information displayed as 
on non automated signalling system (i.e. NX panels) available to the signallers. The 
introduction of ARS did not therefore result in information hidden from the signaller. 
However, the weighting factors within ARS on which regulating decisions are based 
are not visible and this has an impact on the observability of the system. In a broader 
signalling context, the information relevant to signalling decision making is spread 
across different systems and this lack of integration reduces the overall visibility.  
 
Future automation should integrate information which is currently spread across 
different systems. In particular, delay information should be incorporated on the main 
signalling screens. This could be achieved either through annotation of existing train 
headcodes, or via graphical displays of train movements. However, care must be 
taken not to clutter the display with too much information.  
7.5.4 Observable 
Observability of ARS was found to be very low. The signaller receives no information 
on its intentions and is only aware of decisions after they are made. Although there is 
an ability to query ARS as to its intentions, this requires the signaller to request the 
information for each train in question and there is no guarantee that the response will 
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correspond to the actions finally taken. This is because ARS is constantly re-
evaluating and may come to a different conclusion in a subsequent calculation. This 
ability of ARS to ‘change its mind’ reduces the observability still further. The low 
observability has come across strongly as a weakness with which signallers struggle 
and which must be addressed in future systems.  
 
Observability can be improved through better feedback from the automation. This 
should be both in terms of giving the signaller insight into how the automation works 
and in terms of providing the signaller with explicit, relevant, concrete, and easily 
understood information on its analysis and future intentions. The former will improve 
the signallers’ understanding of how the system works and enable them to work more 
effectively with it. The latter allows the signaller to be confident in the automations 
actions and will remove the current tendency to intervene when it may not be 
required. 
7.5.5 Understandable 
Understanding of ARS was found to be quite poor, probably as a result of the low 
observability. Signallers reported surprise at the decisions of the automation and 
found it difficult to understand the decisions even in retrospect. The low observability 
and understandability of the system make it more difficult for the signaller to work 
cooperatively with the system and result in interventions to control the automation 
which may not be necessary.  
 
Improved feedback will facilitate the development of more accurate mental models 
allowing signallers to understand and predict the automation. More basically, simpler 
automation, such as has been recommended to improve competence, would also be 
more understandable.  
7.5.6 Directable 
There are currently a number of methods signallers may employ to interact with ARS, 
including taking trains out of ARS control or turning ARS off in parts of the 
workstation. Although these provide the signaller with the ability to intervene and take 
control of the railway, they do not allow him/her to direct ARS. Reminders are 
commonly used for this purpose as applying a reminder to a signal prevents ARS 
setting a route from that signal. As discussed previously, reminders are not intended 
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for this purpose being primarily a safety device to ‘remind’ signallers that there is a 
safety reason why they may not operate a signal or set of points, for example 
because there are staff working on the track beyond it.  
 
In the short term, an alternative to reminder devices, perhaps called inhibitors, should 
be provided. These should offer the same functionality as reminders but a different 
form and would be used for regulation purposes, leaving reminder devices solely for 
safety purposes. Longer term, other methods of directing ARS should be introduced, 
such as allowing the signaller to give individual priorities to trains or controlling how 
ARS makes regulating decisions (i.e. changing the mode in which ARS operates 
between conflict resolution), running trains to timetable order, and running trains on a 
first come first serve basis. It should also be possible to ‘lock’ ARS into a particular 
decision to ensure that a train is routed as the signaller wishes. Improving the 
directability of the automation has the potential to improve overall system 
performance.  
7.5.7 Robust 
The operating envelope within which ARS is capable is relatively small; it is not a 
robust system. It is only fully competent during normal running or minor delays. In 
addition, although it does reduce signaller workload during normal circumstances, 
workload is not reduced by the same magnitude during disrupted circumstances. 
There is also the potential for ARS to hinder operations during disruption as it 
continues to route trains as normal. The signaller is then required to inhibit ARS as 
well as dealing with the cause of the disruption, and this may be difficult when large 
amounts of communications are necessary. 
 
To address the issue of robustness, better methods of working during disruption 
should be developed. This is quite a challenge, but one idea is to allow the signaller 
to dictate a train path across the workstations which can be temporarily applied to 
relevant trains, for example to route them around a blockage. Such a system would 
be similar to the existing auto-routes functionality and would mean that once the 
relevant routes are programmed the signaller would be free to concentrate on the 
fault and its ramifications.  
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7.5.8 Accountable 
The system was not designed to be accountable, as evidenced by the low 
observability of the system. However, the work systems in place in Network Rail 
make the signaller responsible for errors made in routing trains, even if the error is 
made by ARS. Although different signal boxes have different practices, the most 
common places the responsibility on the signaller to ensure ARS routes trains 
correctly unless a situation occurs which has not previously been encountered. This 
distinction is driven by the poor observability and understandability of ARS which 
makes it impossible for the signaller to anticipate its every action. It is likely that this 
problem stems from the designers’ original vision of an autonomous system which 
required little or no operator input.  
 
It is recommended that designers and managers regard automated systems as a tool 
to assist the signaller. Accepting this fundamental assumption will facilitate 
development of a system which supports the operator rather than one which attempts 
to act autonomously.  
7.5.9 Error Resistant 
The ARS itself is not error resistant but the wider signalling system is, due to the 
interlocking. The interlocking provides error protection for both the signaller and the 
ARS system. To some extent, this removes the requirement for ARS to provide 
protection against signaller errors. However, the interlocking only protects against 
unsafe actions. Errors resulting in delay or wrong routings may still occur. Some such 
errors are due to the incorrect input of data from the train planners.  
 
Interlocking systems should continue to support the safe operation of signalling 
systems. Where possible, methods should be employed to detect potential errors in 
data input, for example where data codes are missing which prevents ARS from 
routing a train, and highlighted to the planning staff or operator.   
7.5.10 Error Tolerant 
The interlocking provides such a high degree of protection against safety related 
errors that the need for error tolerance is reduced. Although trains may be sent along 
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the wrong route, the interlocking still ensures that there are no safety consequences 
to incorrect routings. However, there is little tolerance to the resulting delay. The 
railway is a very constrained system and a wrong routing will inevitably result in 
delay. It could be argued that ARS does warn the signaller of a manual route set 
contrary to the timetable as the train headcode will turn from blue (i.e. in ARS) to pink 
(i.e. out of ARS). If the signaller has indeed set the route in error, this may allow the 
signaller time to take action to minimise the resulting delay. 
 
The use of interlocking systems should continue to minimise the requirement for error 
tolerance in automated signalling systems. Future systems should also help the 
operator realise the consequences of actions, perhaps by provision of an analysis of 
delays resulting from different options. 
7.5.11 Proactive Control 
Currently, ARS does not make it easy for the signaller to proactively control the 
signalling system although it could be argued that effective management of a 
signalling system including ARS requires the signaller to proactively control. The 
information required for the signallers to control ahead easily is not provided by ARS 
and signallers may be forced into behaving reactively when ARS makes a surprising 
decision. However, signallers can work proactively in the short term by constraining 
ARS and forcing it to work as they wish, by using reminders, turning off sub areas, 
and putting trains in and out of ARS as necessary. 
 
For new automated systems, Kauppi et al. (2006) suggested that the most effective 
method of controlling signalling automation is to change the plan from which it works, 
and this has been successfully implemented in the Netherlands (Lenior et al., 2006). 
One method of achieving this is a train graph (Figure 7-3). Train graphs plot train 
progress on a graph of location against time. This display method presents 
information to the operator clearly and facilitates the development of new plans 
(Kauppi et al., 2005).  
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Figure 7-3: Example of a Train Graph 
 
It is recommended that future automated systems in the UK should utilise train 
graphs as they have the facility to integrate large amounts of information in an easily 
interpretable format. They also allow the signaller to visualise the future state of the 
railway, including conflicts, and the consequences of changes to train running. If used 
in conjunction with improved tools to direct the automation, the signaller can work in a 
proactive manner, generating solutions to conflicts well before they occur.  
7.5.12 Skill Degradation 
There is no evidence that ARS allows signallers’ regulation skills to degrade over 
time. Signallers still monitor the system closely and frequently step in to route trains 
manually. It is likely that the weaknesses of ARS in terms of competence, 
observability and understandability ensure that the signallers maintain skills which 
otherwise might degrade over time. However, there have been reports of signallers 
having a lesser knowledge of the train timetable when working with automation.  
 
Should a more competent automated system be introduced in the future skill 
degradation may become more of an issue. However, a move towards a proactively 
controlled system may help avoid the issue of skill degradation. Any future system 
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should ensure that the skills required to operate it are maintained, either through 
frequent application or structured training.  
7.6 Limitations of the Research 
The potential scope of work to study automation in rail signalling was very wide, and 
it was not possible to examine all aspects of human automation interaction in great 
depth. Therefore the thesis has concentrated upon trust, workload, and monitoring. 
Other potential human factors issues in automation presented study problems. 
Situation awareness posed a particular problem because there is not yet a sufficient 
understanding of what constitutes SA in a signalling context. It proved impossible to 
measure clearly the effect of automation on signaller SA. 
 
A second limitation was the number of participants in the level of automation 
experiment. As the experiment necessarily used expert signallers who had 
experience working on the workstation in the study, the sample size was small. The 
experiment itself was also quite complex and required participants to wear head 
mounted eye tracking equipment, which further reduced the number of willing 
volunteers.  
 
The usefulness of the eye tracking data collected was also limited; difficulties were 
encountered with the use of the equipment in a signal box environment and although 
these were in the main overcome, accurate calibration of the equipment remained an 
issue. This limited the analysis of the data, which was constrained to an analysis of 
the segment of the screen rather than a more detailed analysis of particular elements 
of infrastructure monitored.  
7.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has demonstrated how the research presented and discussed in the 
previous chapters has met the objectives set in Chapter 1. The conceptual framework 
and review of the literature formed a theoretical framework to support the research.  
The use of automation was studied and findings on monitoring, interaction, trust, and 
workload were presented. Finally, the results of these investigations were presented 
in terms of the principles of automation and recommendations for future automation 
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were given. The final chapter summarises the recommendations, describes the 
impact of the research, and suggests areas for future research. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS 
8.1 Chapter Overview 
This final chapter summarises the recommendations generated by the research and 
describes the impact of the research thus far. Future research is also suggested to 
build on this work. This includes further investigation of the importance of mental 
models in understanding and predicting automation, and how this relates to trust and 
usage of the system. 
8.2 Recommendations 
The research undertaken and described in this thesis examined the existing 
implementation of automation in UK rail signalling in order to understand the use and 
design of that automation and generate recommendations for future systems. The 
recommendations generated are based on the 12 principles of automation and are 
summarised in Table 8-1.  
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Principe Recommendation 
Reliable Reliability of automated signalling systems should continue to be 
extremely high. 
Competent Consideration should be given to lower levels of decision making 
automation. 
Communication of information should be better supported through 
automation. 
Visible Decision relevant information should be integrated on one display. 
Observable Clear and explicit feedback should be provided on the 
automation’s analysis and intentions. 
Understandable Improved feedback should facilitate the development of operator 
mental models. 
Simpler automation would have the advantage of being more 
easily understood. 
Directable Inhibitors should be introduced to replace the use of reminders to 
regulate trains. 
New methods of controlling the automation and how it resolves 
conflicts should be introduced. 
Robust Methods of directing the automation during disruption should be 
introduced. 
Accountable Designers, managers, and operators should regard ARS as a tool 
to assist the signaller and ARS should support the signaller in 
controlling the railway. 
Error Resistant Where possible, errors in the timetable data should be highlighted 
by the automation. 
Error Tolerant Interlocking should continue to provide support. 
Analysis of the consequences of actions should be provided. 
Proactive 
Control 




Skills should be maintained, either through frequent use or 
simulator training. 
Table 8-1: Summary of Recommendations 
 
Use of the principles of automation, and the specific recommendations provided 
under each one, in the design of new automated signalling systems should result in a 
more powerful human machine system which works cooperatively to increase 
performance.  
8.3 Impact of the Research 
The work carried out for this thesis has already contributed towards the improvement 
of rail signalling automation in future by influencing a new specification from Network 
Rail which requires automation systems to give greater insight into their actions. In 
addition, the company responsible for developing ARS (DeltaRail) has adopted the 
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two key principles of observability (leading to predictability) and directability and will 
use these to guide future developments. The principles will also be applied as human 
factors requirements for new automated signalling systems introduced to the UK 
network within a major new programme defining the future operating strategy. 
 
The observation framework developed during this research is now used by EPSRC 
Rail Research UK (RRUK) researchers in their research on signaller activities. It has 
also been further developed for use in workload assessments. The same five basic 
behaviours (monitoring, intervention, planning, communications, and quiet time) are 
used but the rigorous collection of data every 5s is not. Data are now collected in 
1min intervals, with subdivisions within that to the nearest approximate 5s. This 
relieves the demand on the observer. The requirement for the observer to remain 
withdrawn from the signallers being observed has also been removed and this allows 
for probing of the reasons behind observed behaviours. Some granularity has 
therefore been lost but has been replaced by the facility to gain some insight into 
signaller strategies. This has proven a useful tool in conducting workload 
assessments, and is set to become a standard part of the Network Rail workload 
toolkit.  
 
The findings from this research also have implications beyond rail signalling; the 
observation study and trust questionnaire found correlations between several 
dimensions of trust, including feedback, reliability, understanding, and predication, 
and the operators’ level of intervention. This is in agreement with existing research in 
terms of feedback and reliability (Dzindolet et al., 2003; Wiegmann et al., 2001), but 
the empirical link between understanding the automation and predicting its future 
actions and trust in the automation may be new. The research indicated that 
automation has been most successful at reducing workload in the area of action 
implementation, as suggested by existing literature (Kaber et al., 2006). A new theory 
of active and passive monitoring has been generated by this research, which 
proposes that operators vary their level of monitoring according to the conditions of 
the area under their control, but crucially they do actively process information, even 
during passive monitoring. This is in contrast to research which suggests that 
processing of information is negatively affected by monitoring behaviour (Metzger & 
Parasuraman, 2001). Finally, no evidence was found to support the existence of a 
vigilance decrement or complacency in a real world automated system (Moray, 
2003).  
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8.4 Future Work 
The interviews with signallers indicated that understanding of the automation is likely 
to be key to its optimal use. The literature in the area has shown a link between 
feedback from the automation and its use (Dzindolet et al., 2003), but this was in 
quite simple systems. Future research evaluating the link between understanding of 
the factors the automation takes into account in decision making and use of 
automation would be very interesting. The research should aim to address the key 
question, “what level of understanding of the underlying algorithms, which may be 
quite complex, is necessary for improved usage?”  
 
With respect to rail signalling systems, a key emerging question in Network Rail is to 
determine what span of control is appropriate for a signaller working with automation. 
This is a complex question and is dependent on a number of factors, including the 
type of automation available, the competence of that automation and its ability to 
operate during disruption, and the acceptable drop in performance during disruption. 
As recommended in this thesis, automation which allows the signaller to plan ahead 
and removes the need for manual route setting is likely to reduce workload, even 
during disruption and so could allow for an increased span of control as compared to 
the current ARS system. Automation which can be trusted to continue operating 
(either due to its predictability or competence) during disruption would also contribute 
towards allowing a larger span of control as the signaller can concentrate on the 
disrupted area allowing the automation to control the remaining area. Finally, if major 
disruption were to become relatively rare (the railway is also working towards 
increased reliability of its assets) then it may be acceptable for a larger drop in 
performance during disruption, perhaps even cancelling large parts of the train 
service. This would reduce the requirement to staff the signalling centres for 
disrupted conditions, and an increase in control area per signaller could be achieved. 
Obviously, to answer these questions there is a great deal of research still required to 
determine more definitely the effect of automation on workload, the effect of different 
interfaces on workload, and to develop methods to measure both of these.  
 
Due to the technical difficulty of manipulating the ‘cleverness’ of ARS it is not possible 
to examine the differences in system performance between working with a simple 
and complex ARS. Much of the research carried out point to the complexity of ARS 
as a factor in signallers’ failure to understand and predict the automation. The results 
of the experiment indicate that there is not a significant difference in workload or 
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performance between ARS and the considerably less complex Auto-routes. Future 
research could investigate this relationship further and examine whether losing some 
of the complexity in the conflict resolution algorithms has a positive impact by 
facilitating the signallers’ control of the system better, or a negative impact because 
of the loss of decision making power. 
8.5 Summary 
This thesis has presented the research performed to investigate the impact of 
automation on rail signalling. Both the use and design of automation systems were 
considered using a variety of methods, and guidance for new automated signalling 
systems was generated from the data collected. This guidance will help direct the 
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APPENDIX A: SITE VISITS 
Site Type ARS present Number of Visits 
Leicester NX Panel No 1
Croft Lever Frame No 1
Liverpool Street IECC Yes 20
Ashford IECC Yes 10
Eastbourne Lever Frame No 1
Knottingley NX Panel No 2
Marylebone IECC Yes 5
Beddingham Level Crossing No 1
Hednesford Lever Frame No 1
York IECC Yes 12
Slough IECC Yes 1
Swindon B IECC Yes 1
Upminster IECC Yes 1
Tyneside IECC Yes 5
Bournemouth VDU No 1
Wembley NX & VDU No 1
Yoker IECC Yes 1
Edinburgh IECC Yes 4
Manchester South VDU No 1
Stoke VDU No 1
Trowse VDU No 1
Wimbledon NX Yes 1
Carlisle NX No 2
Woking NX No 1
Farnham Lever Frame No 1
Three Bridges NX No 1
Moorthorpe Lever Frame No 1
Glasgow NX No 1
Victoria NX No 1
Rugby VDU No 2
Gloucester NX No 1
Paisley NX No 1
Glasgow WSSC VDU No 3
Sandhills IECC Yes 1
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APPENDIX C: RAIL ENVIRONMENT 
Overview 
This appendix describes the environment in which the research was conducted. The 
UK rail industry is briefly described and an introduction to railway operations is given. 
The main focus of this appendix is the description of signalling systems and 
procedures. The three main generations of signalling system are described from the 
early lever frames developed in the 1800s through to the IECC systems developed in 
the 1980s. Finally, details are given on ARS and its method of operation. 
UK Rail Industry 
Development of the Industry 
The rail industry in the UK dates back to the 18th century when horse drawn carts 
were run on wooden rails around coalfields. With the arrival of iron rails and steam 
power in the 1800s railways began to appear around the country. Initially small 
private companies built and operated separate rail lines but slowly these became 
amalgamated, until by the 1920s, there were four main railway companies – Great 
Western Railway; London, Midland and Scottish Railway; London and North Eastern 
Railway; and Southern Railway. To aid the war effort the railways were taken under 
government control during the Second World War and in 1948 they were 
nationalised. Thereafter, the whole of the UK railway system was owned and 
operated by British Rail, a government owned company; which meant that the control 
and development of the whole rail network was centralised. A programme of 
modernisation was embarked upon regenerating tracks and stations and introducing 
electrification. However, as the UK road network developed rail travel became less 
popular and no longer made a profit. In the 1960s the government asked Dr Richard 
Beeching to re-organise the railway resulting in many unpopular line closures made 
on the basis of current profitability of routes. 
 
This decline in the railways continued until the industry was privatised in 1997 and 
divided British Rail into a number of different companies. These included Railtrack, 
which was given ownership of the rail infrastructure and was responsible for 
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maintaining and operating the infrastructure. Although Railtrack was responsible for 
maintenance and renewal of the railway, in practice these tasks were carried out by 
private companies under contract. Railtrack embarked on a programme of investment 
in the railway to upgrade and enhance the network reversing the decline of the 
railway. A number of franchises for train operating companies (TOCs) and freight 
operating companies (FOCs) were also created to run passenger and freight services 
respectively.  
 
Following a number of high profile incidents, both operational and financial, Railtrack 
was placed into administration in 2001 and was subsequently dissolved. Network Rail 
was set up as a replacement in 2002 but rather than being a private company paying 
dividends to shareholders it was set up to operate under the same model as a private 
company but without shareholders; that is, a not-for-dividend company rather than a 
not-for-profit company. This means that any profits made by Network Rail can be 
reinvested in the railway.  
 
Network Rail is the company that currently owns, maintains, and operates the rail 
infrastructure in the UK. Network Rail’s core business is moving trains through the 
infrastructure according to the train paths sold to the TOCs and FOCs. Maintenance 
and renewals activities are required to keep the railway operational, and currently 
there are a number of large scale projects underway to expand the capacity of the 
network. On one site visit, in an area where major work is taking place the local 
manager stated that in 30 years working for the railway he had seen many tracks torn 
up but this was the first time he had seen a brand new railway being laid. Increasingly 
maintenance activities, which were carried out under contract by private companies 
following privatisation of the industry, have been brought back in house by Network 
Rail.  
Railway Operations 
The railway is regulated by the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) who aim to ensure 
that the rail network is managed efficiently and ensure health and safety objectives 
are met. The Railway Safety and Standards Board (RSSB) maintains standards for 
safety across the industry. They are responsible for producing and updating the Rule 
Book which contains the regulations for all activities on the railway. 
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The structure of the industry requires the infrastructure owner (i.e. Network Rail) to 
sell train paths to the TOCs and FOCs, who then sell their services to passengers 
and customers requiring freight services. TOCs and FOCs bid for franchises to run 
trains in certain areas and these are awarded by the government. Compensation for 
any delays to these train paths must be paid by the originator of the delay. Thus if a 
train breaks down the TOC is responsible for any subsequent delay and must pay 
compensation, but if delays are caused by management of the infrastructure Network 
Rail is required to pay compensation. A system of delay attribution has been 
established to determine the cause of delays, and this has influenced the strategies 
used to move trains around the network. Currently the delay is attributed under a 
system known as Public Performance Measure (PPM). This means that any train 
arriving at its destination less than 5 minutes late does not incur a penalty, but if a 
regional train arrives more than 5 minutes late or a long distance train arrives more 
than 10 minutes late compensation will have to be paid by the originator of the delay. 
 
The timetable for railway operation is generated by Network Rail’s planning 
department after train paths have been bought by the TOCs and FOCs. The 
timetable is only changed twice a year so the opportunity to change train timetables is 
limited. In the shorter term, changes to the timetable are facilitated through a short 
term planning system. This can mean that a path for a train can be created in the 
very short term and the signallers will have to implement the routing for this train. 
 
As mentioned, the railway must be maintained and renewed and this requires track 
access for engineering workers. There are a number of methods of gaining access to 
the track including:  
x Red Zone working: track work is carried out on a line open to traffic and track 
workers are responsible for detecting approaching trains and ensuring they 
are clear of the track when they pass; 
x Green Zone working: the area in which work is being carried out is closed to 
traffic and thus track workers are protected; 
x Protections for short term work known as T12s and T2s: the signaller ensures 
that no trains are routed over a particular section of track. Additional methods 
of protection may also be used on track but the signaller remains in control of 
the railway; 
x Possessions (T3): used for longer term work; the signaller ensures that no 
trains are routed into a particular portion of the railway. Another person 
(PICOP) is put in charge of that portion of the railway during the possession 
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and he controls any movement of engineering trains or on track machinery 
during the possession. 
Railway Staff 
Signallers are required to set routes for trains and train drivers drive the trains over 
those routes. There are a number of other personnel who are involved with running 
the railway. Control staff manage larger areas of the railway than signallers and take 
a more strategic view of the entire railway. The TOCs, FOCs and Network Rail all 
have control staff who must coordinate in order to make strategic decisions such as 
train cancellations. They are also responsible for managing faults on the network. 
Electrical Control Room Operators (ECRO) are responsible for controlling electrical 
power supply in those areas of the rail network which are electrified.  Maintenance 
staff require access to the railway to maintain and renew the track and signalling 
equipment. Mobile Operations Managers (MOMs) are usually the first line of 
response to any incidents on the railway including trespass, accidents, minor faults, 
etc. All of these people must coordinate in the everyday running of the railway.  
 
For example, if a piece of equipment fails the signaller or train driver are likely to be 
the first to notice. They must then contact control to report the failure. Control 
organise for an inspection, either by a MOM or maintenance staff depending on the 
type of failure, and start to plan a strategy for the train service until the equipment is 
repaired. Signallers are responsible for implementing this plan. The staff inspecting 
and repairing the equipment must co-ordinate with the signaller, and the ECRO, if the 
failure is in an area of electric traction, to provide protection from trains for them while 
they are on track. Thus, to ensure the railway continues to run, all of these roles must 
work together. 
Information and Communications Systems 
There are a number of publications and systems used on the railway to disseminate 
information. This section gives a brief introduction to the most commonly used in 
signal boxes. 
Publications 
There are a number of publications routinely used in the rail industry. The Rule Book 
contains the regulations for all activities on the railway and has individual modules 
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instructing different groups of rail workers on principles and procedures in their area 
of work. There are two timetables issued, one for passenger services and one for 
freight services. Individual signal boxes have Box Special Instructions detailing any 
areas in which their local operation operations differ from the regulations in the Rule 
Book. The Sectional Appendix gives details on the infrastructure in a specific area. 
The Weekly Operating Notice (WON) gives information on engineering arrangements 
and operating restrictions on a weekly basis. 
Simplifier 
The simplifier is a paper based version of the timetable used by signallers showing 
the trains booked on each workstation. It shows the time and route of each train 
booked to travel over the infrastructure controlled by that workstation. Figure C- 1 
shows a simplifier.  
 
 
Figure C- 1: Simplifier 
TOPS 
Total Operations Processing System (TOPS) is a system which uses track circuit 
occupations to determine the location and progress of each train on the rail network. 
TRUST 
Train Running System on TOPS (TRUST) is a frequently used computer based tool 
which gives information on actual train running as compared to the timetable. It is a 
text based tool and allows the user to look up individual trains to see their current 
running. This gives signallers information on when trains can be expected to arrive on 
their workstation. Figure C- 2 shows a TRUST screen showing the running times for a 
train. 
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Figure C- 2: Trust Screen 
CCF 
Control Centre of the Future (CCF) is a map based computerised tool showing train 
running information (Figure C- 3). Large areas can be viewed on CCF and each train 
in that area is colour coded according to its status (i.e. right time or current delay). 
Although developed for use by controllers, this system allows signallers to get an 
overview of how trains surrounding their area of control are running. As with TRUST 
individual trains can be queried for more detailed text based information on running 
and delay times.  
 
 
Figure C- 3: CCF Screen 
Train Register Book 
A train register book (TRB) is present in most signal boxes. In older manual boxes 
this is used to register each train passing through the area as well as any incidents or 
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occurrences in that area. In more technologically advanced signal boxes the passing 
of trains is registered automatically, and the TRB is used only to record incidents and 
occurrences.  
Communications Systems 
Although communication with drivers is achieved through the signalling system by 
changing signal aspects to tell drivers they can proceed, some verbal 
communications are also required at times, particularly in the event of failure 
situations. These are primarily achieved through Signal Post Telephones (SPT) which 
are telephones located at each signal. Telephones may also be located at points. 
Calls from these telephones and from other operational staff working alongside a 
signaller are made and received from the signallers’ telephone concentrator (Figure 
C- 4). Train drivers in some areas also have a radio system, Cab Secure Radio 
(CSR), in their cabs from which they can call the signaller in emergencies (Figure C- 
5). CSR also contains the facility to send preset text messages between the driver 




Figure C- 4: Telephone Concentrator 
 
Figure C- 5: CSR 
Signalling 
Moving trains through the infrastructure is achieved through signalling systems. 
There are a number of types of signalling systems, but the primary goal of each is to 
maintain separation between trains. In the early days of the railway signalling 
systems were not necessary as trains had limited routes and ran much more slowly. 
As the weight and speed of trains increased the time taken to slow to a stop also 
increased. Eventually this reached the point where a train could not necessarily stop 
in time upon sighting an obstruction in front. This meant that if a train was to break 
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down a following train was likely to collide with it. A system to instruct train drivers on 
the safety of proceeding was necessary and signalling was developed for this 
purpose. 
 
At its essence, signalling divides the railway up into sections and only one train is 
allowed into a section at a time. This is known as ‘Block System’. Each of these 
sections has some form of signal to pass information on to the driver about the 
availability of the section in front and the system is controlled by a signaller. 
 
As changes in signalling were generally driven by developing technologies the 
enabling technologies for each generation of signalling system are first outlined 
before definitions of the signalling principles behind each system and a description of 
the operation of a typical signal box are given. 
Early Signalling 
Initially each section of the railway had a responsible citizen, usually a policeman, at 
its entrance. The policemen gave hand or flag signals to trains to proceed into the 
section and simply timed how long it had been since the last train before letting the 
next train in. This was known as ‘Time Interval Block’. The flaw in this system was 
that the policemen had no way of knowing whether a train had broken down in the 
section and so collisions could still occur. Safer methods of signalling were developed 
as technology facilitated it and Time Interval Block is no longer used as a signalling 
principle. However, this initial use of policemen as signallers means that signallers 
today are still frequently referred to as ‘Bobby’.  
Lever Frames 
Lever Frames are the oldest form of signalling system still in use on the railway 
today. Figure C- 6 shows a typical lever frame box. Each lever is connected to 
entities controlled by the signaller such as a signal or set of points and the signaller 
has a map of his control area displayed over the levers. 
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Figure C- 6: Lever Frame 
Technologies 
Semaphore Signals 
Out on the track semaphore signals were originally used to communicate with the 
train drivers. A horizontal signal indicates that the driver must stop but a signal sitting 
at 45 degrees from horizontal indicates permission to proceed into the next section 
(Figure C- 7). The position of the signal is known as the aspect. Setting a signal to 
show a proceed aspect is called ‘clearing the signal’ or ‘pulling the signal off’. 
 
 
Figure C- 7: Semaphore Signals 
 
Figure C- 8: Distant Semaphore Signals 
 
As trains can take some distance to stop ‘distant signals’ were used to indicate the 
position of the signal being approached to allow the train driver time to stop (Figure 
C- 8).  
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Points 
As the railway became more complex, trains also required points to be set to allow 
them to take different routes. The position of the points is said to be normal for the 
route straight ahead (Figure C- 9) and reverse for the secondary route (Figure C- 10). 
 
 
Figure C- 9: Points in Normal Position 
 
Figure C- 10: Points Set to Reverse 
 
The signaller became responsible for setting the points in the correct positions for 
each train. In lever frame boxes this was achieved by the signaller pulling a lever 
physically connected to the points to ‘swing’ them. In more modern boxes the moving 
of points has been mechanised. 
Reminders 
Reminder appliances are used as a reminder to a signaller that a particular route or 
set of points should not be operated. They take different forms in different types of 
signal boxes but the purpose is always the same. On lever frames, reminders take 
the form of a metal collar which fits over the lever and prevents the signaller from 
pulling it. While a reminder device is applied the signaller is not able to pull the lever 
to clear that signal or change the position of the points. An example of when they 
would be used is if the signaller is protecting some track workers. A reminder would 
be placed on any signals which if showing proceed could allow a train to travel over 
the protected portion of track.  
Block Bell 
The major facilitating technology for lever frame boxes was the electric telegraph. 
This allowed the signaller at the start of a section to communicate with a signaller at 
the end to check whether trains had passed through the section successfully. A 
typical block bell is shown in Figure C- 11. Signallers use coded messages similar to 
Morse code to communicate train movements and infrastructure state with each 
other. 
 




Figure C- 11: Block Bell 
 
Figure C- 12: Block Instrument 
Block Instrument 
A typical block instrument is shown in Figure C- 12. Block instruments show status of 
a section of railway. It typically has 3 settings: 
x Normal – no trains in the control area; 
x Train on Line – a train or other obstruction is present in the section; 
x Train Accepted – the line is clear for a train to proceed. 
The signalling system will not allow the signaller to set a route until the relevant block 
instrument is set to ‘Train Accepted’. When a train is present on a piece of line the 
block instrument must be set to ‘Train on Line’ 
Interlocking 
The term interlocking refers to the systems developed to ensure that conflicting 
routes are not set. This is achieved by connecting the signalling equipment together 
in such a way that the levers can only be operated in a certain order. The interlocking 
used in lever frame boxes is mechanical in nature. It works by metal bars attached to 
the levers in the signal box. When a lever is pulled the metal bar is positioned so that 
it blocks other levers which, if pulled or released, would endanger that route. The 
interlocking is designed using logic tables to describe the releases and locks 
associated with each lever. 
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Absolute Block 
Lever frame boxes work under a principle known as Absolute Block (AB). This 
principle states that only one train may be in one section of railway on one line at one 




Figure C- 13: Absolute Block Signalling 
 
Signallers receive information regarding approaching trains in the form of a request 
via the block bell from the preceding signaller. The diagram in Figure C- 13 can be 
used to describe a very simplified version of absolute block during normal operations. 
In this example, Signaller A would contact Signaller B to request a route for the train. 
If the line is clear Signaller B turns his block instrument to “Train Accepted” and this 
releases the interlocking for Signaller A to set and clear the route through section 1. 
Once the train has passed the signal at the entrance to section 1 Signaller A must set 
his block instrument to “Train on Line”. Signaller B then contacts Signaller C via the 
block bell to request the further route. Once Signaller C has set his block instrument 
to “Train Accepted” Signaller B can set and clear the route through section 2. Once 
the train has passed the entrance signal to Section 2 signaller B contacts signaller A 
to let him know that the train has left Section 1. Signaller A then turns his block 
instrument to “Normal”. 
Entry-Exit Panels 
The lever frame form of signalling dominated until the 1950s when Entry-Exit (NX) 
panels were developed (Figure C- 14). NX panels were a major leap from lever 
frames. They fundamentally changed the interface signallers use to control trains and 
enabled much larger areas of the railway to be controlled by each signaller. The 
development of NX panels was made possible by the use of track circuits for train 
detection. 
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Figure C- 14: NX Panel 
Technologies 
Colour Light Signals 
Colour light signals operate on the similar principles to traffic lights. A red means 
stop, yellow indicates that the next signal will be red and the driver should be 
prepared to stop at it (serving the same function of a distant signal under AB 
principles), and a green signal means proceed. These are used in two aspect (red 
and green) signalling and three aspect signalling. High density railways use four 
aspect signalling which includes a double yellow aspect, indicating that the next 
signal will be at yellow (Figure C- 15).  This facilitates shorter block sections allowing 
trains to travel closer together. 
 
 
Figure C- 15: Four Aspect Signalling 
Route Indicators 
Route indicators are normally in the form of five white lights over signals and are 
used to inform drivers which route has been set for them. For simple junctions with 
only two routes forward the signal would be as shown in Figure C- 16. If the route set 
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is straight on the five white lights above the signal would not light up, but if they are lit 
up it indicates to the driver that the route to the right is set. 
 
 
Figure C- 16: Simple Junction Indicator 
 
Signals can have up to seven route indicators above a signal to indicate route set to 
drivers at complex junctions. If there are more than seven possible routes from a 
signal then each route is given a number and theatre lights are used to indicate which 
route is set (Figure C- 17). 
 
 
Figure C- 17: Theatre Lights 
Track Circuits 
Track circuits are used to detect the presence of a train on a particular section. These 
operate by running a small current through the rails operating a relay. When a train is 
present the electricity runs through the wheels of the trains and the track circuit relay 
is interrupted. Once the train leaves the section the track circuit relay operates again. 
When connected to a display system this development meant that signallers no 
longer had to physically see a train to know its position and thus the number of trains 
a signaller could keep track of was increased. In this sense, track circuits were 
fundamental in facilitating the development of new signalling control systems. Track 
circuits fail safe in the majority of circumstances as any interruption to the power 
supply would result in the track circuit showing occupied. 
Appendix C: Rail Environment 
250 
Train Describer 
Train describers (TD) are identifiers for individual trains on the rail network. They take 
the form of a 4 digit alpha-numeric code. The first digit indicates the class of train, the 
second character is a letter indicating the route of the train, and the final two digits 
are simply used to distinguish that train from others following the same route on the 
same day. Thus, 2J18 would be a Class 2 train perhaps travelling between Glasgow 
and Edinburgh and would be the 18th train to follow such a route that day. These TDs 
are displayed to the signaller on the panel (Figure C- 18) and pass automatically 
between signal boxes. 
 
 
Figure C- 18: Train Identifiers Displayed on a Panel 
Reminders 
Reminders on NX Panels are similar to those of lever frames; they take the form of a 
small plastic collar which fits over the buttons on the panel preventing signallers from 
pressing that button. 
Interlocking 
NX Panels use Route Relay Interlocking (RRI) instead of mechanical interlocking. 
The principles of logic and the purpose are the same but the data are held in 
electrical circuitry rather than mechanical bars.  
TORR 
Train Operated Route Release (TORR) uses track circuit occupation to determine 
when a train has left a particular section. It then automatically releases the route that 
was set over that section, freeing the route to be set for another train. TORR can be 
regarded as an early form of automation freeing the signaller from the menial task of 
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clearing routes after trains. Along with track circuits TORR was a major facilitating 
technology for future highly automated systems, such as ARS. 
Track Circuit Block 
Under AB the number of trains running over a line was limited by the number of 
signal boxes on that line as only one train could be in a section at a time and sections 
typically stretch between signal boxes. As demand increased it was desirable to have 
trains running closer together. 
 
To achieve this ‘Track Circuit Block’ (TCB) was developed. TCB uses track circuits to 
determine the location of a train. The track circuit block system permits a signal to 
show a proceed aspect when: 
x All track circuits, up to and including the overlap of the next stop signal, 
are clear, and 
x All necessary points within the route are detected in the correct position 
for a train to pass safely 
 
This means that a route for a train can only be set if the track circuits show that route 
to be clear and the points are proved to be in the correct position. Overlaps are a 
safety margin so that if a train goes slightly beyond a stop signal the route is 
guaranteed to be clear. As the information on train position is gathered by track 
circuits rather than signallers TCB allows one signaller to keep track of more trains. 
Another important facilitating technology was the mechanisation of points and the 
introduction of colour light signals. This meant that signallers did not have to be 
located close to these entities to operate them. TCB tends to be associated with 
colour light signalling although there is no reason why mechanised semaphore 
signals cannot be used. Track circuit block is also the method of signalling used in 
IECC signal boxes. 
 
On NX panels the area of control is represented on the panel and instead of manually 
controlling each signal section and set of points using levers the signaller sets routes 
using buttons on the panel (Figure C- 19). The signal aspects and points appropriate 
to that route are changed automatically. Train detection is provided by track circuits 
and train positions are indicated by red lights on the panel. The development of this 
technology allowed one signaller to control a much greater geographical area. 
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Figure C- 19: NX Panel Buttons 
 
The signaller can see the TD of any approaching trains displayed in an approach 
berth on the panel. This prompts them to set a route for the train using the buttons on 
the panel. 
 
Track circuits and train describers eliminated the need for signallers to physically 
communicate the movement of trains and so the block bell and instrument could be 
done away with (except if the TD does not automatically transfer to the next signal 
box). Signallers have an emergency alarm button on the panel which sends an alarm 
to adjacent signallers warning them of an emergency situation. Other 
communications when necessary are achieved by telephone. 
VDU Signalling 
In the 1980s the concept of NX panels was moved onto VDU screens and ARS was 
introduced in IECC boxes. IECC refers to the whole system used in those signal 
boxes, including the display systems and interlockings. ARS is only one part of the 
IECC system. There are other types of signal box which use VDU technology but only 
IECCs currently have ARS. 
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Figure C- 20: IECC Signal Box 
 
Figure C- 20 shows an IECC signaller working. Instead of a panel showing the control 
area, signallers working with VDU screens have their entire control area displayed on 
up to two overview screens, typically leaving 2 screens to call up detailed pieces of 
those overviews. Signallers use a trackerball and keyboard to interface with the 
signalling screens. Most basic commands can be done with either the trackerball or 
the keyboard, although some less common commands require the keyboard alone or 
a combination of the trackerball and keyboard. 
 
 
Figure C- 21: IECC Screen View 
Appendix C: Rail Environment 
254 
Figure C- 21 shows a typical overview screen. The indications are as follows:  
x Orange blocks are station platforms. 
x Grey lines are tracks. 
x White lines indicate a route has been set over that portion of line. 
x Signals are indicated by a round dot showing red, yellow or green depending 
on the aspect of the signal at the time. If the aspect is double yellow two 
yellow dots are shown. 
x Blue dots represent ARS sub-areas. 
x Blue or pink squares over signal heads (round dots) indicate a reminder has 
been applied to that signal. 
The soft buttons along the bottom of the screen include some controls such as 
reminder appliances and also allow the signaller to choose a different screen view. 
 
The method of signalling is identical to NX panels; again using TCB and the 
interlocking is very similar although it tends to be either Solid State Interlocking (SSI) 
or Computer Based Interlocking (CBI) both of which are software based interlockings. 
RRIs can still be used, but are less common. 
Other Signalling Systems 
The signalling systems described above are the most commonly used. There are 
other principles of signalling (e.g. Electric Token Block and Tokenless Block) and 
types of signalling system (e.g. One Common Switch (OCS) and Miniature Lever 
Frame) as well as hybrid systems combining two or more types of signalling 
principles or systems on the railway but they have not been covered here as their 
implementation is relatively limited. 
Signalling Task 
Aside from physical operation of the signalling equipment, the signalling task requires 
the signaller to route trains according to the timetable. This is a straightforward goal 
to achieve while the railway is running smoothly but if disruption occurs it can become 
considerably more complicated. There are many causes of disruption to the railway, 
including train failures, trespassers and vandals, track circuit failures, or simply late 
running trains. Disruption is an impediment to routing trains on time. In this case, 
signallers are called upon to ‘regulate’ the service.  
Appendix C: Rail Environment 
255 
Regulation 
Although regulation of trains is frequently referred to within the rail environment there 
is no standard definition of what regulation entails. Discussions with Subject Matter 
Experts resulted in the following definition for regulation: 
 
“The planning and implementation of train paths over the available 
infrastructure in order to optimise the train service, mitigate the effects of 
disruption, and support recovery from disruption.” 
 
Signallers take a variety of factors into account when making regulating decisions. 
These include:  
x The class of train - Each train in the timetable has a train class associated 
with it. For example, passenger trains are classes 1 and 2, with 1 being 
express passenger trains and 2 being ordinary class, freight trains are classes 
3, 4, and 6, and empty coaching stock is class 5. In the past the lower the 
number of the class of train the higher priority that train had, so express 
passenger trains had priority over freight trains for example. Since 
privatisation and the introduction of PPM the class priority system has 
become obsolete but many signallers still use it as a rule of thumb to 
determine which train to route first; 
x Next possible passing location – how soon can one train pass another; 
x Train stopping patterns – if one train stops at all stations and another is an 
express it may be best to put the express train first, even if this means 
stopping the first train until the express can pass through the junction; 
x Train speed – different trains have different running speeds and this will affect 
the signallers’ decision; 
x Delay already accumulated by trains – it may be preferable to stop an already 
delayed train and cause it further delay than to delay a train which would 
otherwise be on time; 
x Route (or platform) availability – if a portion of the forward route or platform is 
not available for a train it may not be advisable to route it forward as this may 
block other trains from proceeding; 
x Experience – signallers learn from previous occasions and may base routing 
decisions on avoiding situations which have caused problems in the past; 
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x Delay attribution and PPM – signallers are required to signal trains to reduce 
PPM, but with the way delay is attributed signallers may be inclined to signal 
trains to reduce the likelihood that a delay will be attributed to them regardless 
of whether this is in the best interest of the whole network. 
 
As regulation involves the ordering of trains regulating decisions can only be 
implemented at regulating points (i.e. junctions or crossovers). Junctions are where 
two or more routes converge or diverge (depending on the direction of travel). 
Crossovers allow trains to cross between parallel lines. Plain line is a section of track 
with no crossovers. There are no regulating decisions to be made on these sections 
of track. These three types of track infrastructure are illustrated in Figure C- 22. 
 
 
Figure C- 22: Junctions, Crossovers, and Plain Line 
 
The signaller’s objective is to minimise delay to trains over his/her patch of railway, 
although signallers should also take into account the potential effects of their 
decisions on other signallers in each train’s route. Of course there is a limit to how far 
down the line these effects can be taken into account. There have been attempts in 
the past to develop an advanced automation system which would maximise the 
routing over trains over the entire rail network, but this proved extremely complex and 
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decisions for trains in London on the basis of optimising them in Scotland must also 
be considered. As the railway is a dynamic system with numerous interfaces to the 
rest of the world there is no guarantee that the system will not look totally different by 
the time the train reaches Scotland. Nevertheless, experience may tell signallers that 
certain situations create problems further down the line and a good signaller may 
attempt to avoid these.  
Railway Failures 
Signallers must routinely deal with failures of parts of the rail system or disruption 
caused to the railway. The fact that the railway has so many interfaces to the rest of 
the world makes it difficult to insulate against failures.  
Typical failures or disruption are outlined below: 
TC Failure 
Track circuits (TC) are not highly reliable and fail relatively often. As they are fail safe 
a track circuit failure means that a track section shows up occupied and the 
interlocking will therefore prevent any attempts to set a route through the affected 
area. Until the fault is rectified signallers must use verbal procedures to give drivers 
permission to pass through the affected section. Drivers may only travel at very slow 
speeds in this case and together with the additional time taken for the verbal 
communications this means a TC failure greatly reduces the number of trains that 
can travel over the affected area. 
Line blockage 
Lines may become blocked for a number of reasons, for example, train failures, 
points failures, accidents or incidents, trespassers, emergency engineering work. Any 
line blockage means that approaching trains may become stuck or may need to be 
re-routed around the blockage.  
SPAD 
Signals passed at danger (SPAD) are one of the most serious incidents on the 
railway. These occur when a train fails to stop at a red signal. This may be merely 
because the train has slightly overrun and occupied the track circuit in advance of a 
signal, or because the train driver has not realised that the signal is at red. If a train 
passes a red signal all trains in the area must be stopped.  
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Weather 
Weather can cause problems for the railway with fog reducing visibility of signals so 
trains may have to travel at slower speeds, leaves on the track in autumn can prevent 
track circuits from proving, and ice reduces the traction on the rails.  
Permissive Working 
Permissive working allows more than one train to be in a signal section at one time. It 
may only be used in specific circumstances, such as for joining movements at 
platforms. Ground position lights (GPL) give the train driver permission to proceed 
into the section (Figure C- 23 & Figure C- 24), but they must do so at a very slow 
speed that will allow them to stop upon seeing an obstruction. 
 
 




Figure C- 24: Ground Position Light Showing Proceed Aspect 
ARS 
Automatic Route Setting (ARS) has been in place since the late 1980s, and was first 
introduced in Liverpool Street Integrated Electronic Control Centre (IECC). DeltaRail 
who now develop ARS state that: 
  
“ARS optimally routes trains using timetable data, current train positions and 
an internal representation of the rail network. It can handle severely disrupted 
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service patterns and assist the signaller in the event of train or infrastructure 
failures.” 
 
ARS has access to the central timetable services database (TSDB) and each day 
downloads the timetable for all the trains in the area it controls. It then uses codes 
from the timetable to determine the route and timings for each train. As each train 
enters the control area ARS automatically sets the route ahead of the train. ARS also 
incorporates algorithms to compare trains on the workstation to decide which to route 
first. Less advanced forms of route setting automation could either route strictly 
according to the timetable or operate on a first come first serve basis, but ARS 
attempts to regulate. 
How ARS works 
The information contained in this section has been gathered from visits to signal 
boxes, relevant Network Rail standards, guidance materials issued by the 
manufacturers of ARS, and discussions with signalling SMEs and senior signalling 
engineers. Even then it was not possible to obtain a clear picture of how ARS works 
and so a preliminary model was developed to guide discussions. The knowledge 
available within Network Rail was not sufficient to validate the model and so it proved 
necessary to meet with the engineers who originally designed the system. The 
validated model is shown and explained in this section. 
 
Figure C- 25 shows the internal processes of ARS at a high level. When a train 
enters the control area ARS recognises the track circuit occupation, reads the TD of 
the approaching train and uses data from the TSDB to generate a list of the routes, or 
path segments, required by that train. It then compares this list to those generated for 
other trains in the control area and identifies which trains potentially conflict. There 
are three ways a train may conflict; they may travel over the same section of track in 
the same direction, travel over the same section of track in opposite directions, or 
travel over lines which cross. Trains with no potential conflicts are discarded, that is 
they are not again considered with respect to the routing of the new train. The new 
train can then enter into the cyclical processing of ARS.  
 
Every 10 seconds ARS considers whether each of the trains in the control area 
requires a route to be set (ARS attempts to ensure that there are 2 green signals in 
front of every train where possible). If no routes are required the ARS will consider 
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again in 10 seconds. If a route is required for a train ARS compares the train 
requiring a route with each of the trains identified earlier as potentially conflicting with 
it. At this stage it uses a set of parameters such as train class and priorities, current 
train delay, and predictive forward movements from the timetable to determine the 
weighted delay for putting each train first in this situation. If the calculations show that 
the train requiring the route has the least weighted delay in all the pairwise 
comparisons then ARS will check if the route required is available. If the route is 
available it will then request the route for that train. If the weighted delay is lower for 
another train then ARS will not request the route. The whole process is repeated 
every 10 seconds. ARS uses a complex set of parameters in these algorithms and 
these vary for each location on each workstation. This means that a bespoke ARS 
system must be designed for each workstation. 
 
 
Figure C- 25: ARS Processes 
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The signaller has no insight into this process. The signalling screens only display 
when routes are set by ARS and although there is an ability to query ARS through the 
general purpose (GP) screen this information is not always informative to the 
signaller, particularly if they do not fully understand the processes ARS uses to make 
its decisions. It is impossible for ARS to give information on what it is planning to do 
as it does not make any decisions until it has to.  
 
Not all trains are in ARS; this is most likely to be because there is no timetable or an 
incomplete timetable for them in the database. Trains which are not in ARS are 
shown in pink and must either be routed manually or put into a Special Timing 
Pattern (STP). STPs are pre-programmed routes over the workstation which can be 
applied to individual trains. If an STP is applied to a train the train is coloured brown 
and ARS will route the train according to the route instructions in the STP. Trains in 
an STP are given priority over all other traffic, which may not be practical as freight 
trains are the most common to require STPs and these are less likely to be the 
priority on the workstation. Signallers may also choose to take trains out of ARS. This 
allows signallers to maintain control over that train as it must be routed manually, 
although it can be put back in to ARS if the signaller wishes. 
 
Reminder appliances exist for ARS as they do for signallers. If a reminder appliance 
is placed over a signal by the signaller ARS will not be able to call a route to or from 
that signal. The reminder also serves its traditional function of reminding the signaller 
not to call that route. Although intended as a safety device, reminders are frequently 
used by IECC signallers to control ARS as it is a direct and easy way to inhibit route 
calling. 
Use of ARS 
ARS was intended to be “as efficient as a good signalman” (Burrage et al., 1991) and 
with respect to routing trains according to the timetable this can be said to be the 
case. However, ARS is often referred to as “deaf and dumb” as it does not receive all 
the information the signaller does, particularly from voice communications, and the 
feedback from the system is relatively poor. In practice this means that ARS cannot 
cope effectively with failure situations and restriction of infrastructure and this falls 
upon the signaller.  
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Each workstation is divided into a number of “sub-areas” for the purposes of ARS 
control. Each of these sub-areas may be disabled by the signaller allowing him to 
control all trains in that area manually. Where localised problems exist, the signaller 
may disable the relevant sub-area and ARS may be able to provide benefit by 
keeping other areas of the workstation running while the signaller focuses on the 
failure.  
 
The principles behind ARS allow the signaller to remain in charge. He can manually 
set routes for trains, restrict ARS working in an area (disable the sub-area), and take 
individual trains out of ARS control. As mentioned above, ARS also incorporates a 
function which allows the signaller to query ARS routing decisions and timetables for 
trains. The reply to these queries and information on alarms appears on the general 
purpose (GP) screen usually located to the far left of the signalling screens (Figure C- 
26). Typical responses to queries in ARS may be: 
 
 “Sufficient route in advance; R1053C is last route found” 
 
“Train is currently routed off planned path: R7777 is last route found” 
 
 “Train is not ARS controlled” 
 
 
Figure C- 26: General Purpose Screen 
 
Information on trains approaching the area of control is also displayed on the GP 
screen. The engineers designing ARS anticipated that signaller vigilance would fall 
when ARS was introduced and they introduced alarm systems to counter this effect 
(Burrage et al., 1991). Thus ARS produces alarms for a large number of events 
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including unexpected occupation of a track circuit, train entering workstation, non-
ARS trains, and lengthy occupation of a track circuit. In addition a large number of 
alarms are presented which are not directly relevant to the signaller but are more 
directed towards technicians, such as system response timing alarms. Apart from the 
more recently introduced SPAD alarms the audible tone for all alarms on the 
workstation is identical. This means that in practice signallers are bombarded with 
alarms and apart from periodically cancelling them they pay relatively little attention to 
them.  
 
Any change to the algorithms or base data that ARS uses in its decisions requires a 
major data change. In 1997 when British Rail was broken up the research wing which 
had been responsible for the development, implementation and maintenance of ARS 
was also privatised and was bought by AEA Technologies. It has since been sold 
again and is now called DeltaRail. Therefore after privatisation Railtrack, and 
subsequently Network Rail, were required to pay for support for ARS which had 
formerly been free. 
Summary 
This appendix has given details on the signalling systems and technologies 
predominant in the UK railway. This information is essential in understanding the role 
automation currently occupies in the signalling environment.  
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APPENDIX D: VALIDATION OF PRINCIPLES OF 
AUTOMATION 
A paired comparisons exercise was undertaken with 22 human factors professionals 
to validate the principles. Ten of the participants work in Network Rail Ergonomics 
team and the remaining 12 work in the Human Factors Research Group at 
Nottingham University. A PowerPoint presentation was prepared in which each 
principle was presented with each of the other principles. Participants were given an 
instruction sheet and a briefing sheet giving an explanation of each principle. They 
were then asked to work their way through the PowerPoint presentation. Each slide 
stated “An automated system should be…” and two principles were shown. 
Participants were required to choose one principle over the other to complete the 
sentence. A researcher noted their answers.  
 
The responses were entered into a spreadsheet and analysed using the paired 
comparisons technique. A comparison matrix was generated detailing the number of 
times each principle was chosen over each of the other principles. From this, the 
probability for each principle was calculated and hence z-scores. The average z-
score was calculated for each principle and they were plotted along a line, as shown 
in Figure D- 1. 
 
 
Figure D- 1: Scaling of Principles of Automation 
 
The results suggest reliability is the most desirable principle and competence, 
observability and understandability also all score towards the top of the scale. The 
only principle which stands out at the negative end of the scale is skill degradation, 
suggesting perhaps it warrants removal. However, as the reliability and competence 
of an automated system increase the operator’s requirement to intervene reduces 
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and skill degradation becomes more likely and potentially more important as a 
principle. For this reason this principle was kept. 
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APPENDIX E: TRUST QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Below is a list of statements for evaluating trust between people and automation. 
Please circle the number which best describes your feeling or impression for each 
statement. 
 
Note: 1=Strongly Disagree, 5=Strongly Agree 
 
1. ARS is always available for use (Reliability) 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
2. ARS is capable of performing under a variety of different circumstances 
(Robustness) 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
3. It is easy to understand what ARS does (Understandability) 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
4. ARS is capable of signalling trains as competently as a signaller 
(Competence) 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
5. ARS gives explicit information on its intended actions (Explication of intention) 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
6. I can count on ARS to do its job (Dependability) 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
7. I have a personal preference for using ARS (Personal Attachment) 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
8. I can predict what ARS will do from moment to moment (Predictability) 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
9. If ARS makes a routing decision which I am uncertain about I have confidence 
that ARS is correct (Faith) 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
10. I understand how ARS works (Understandability) 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
11. ARS performs well under normal running conditions (Competence) 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
12. ARS is very unpredictable, I never know what it is going to do (Predictability) 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
13. I can rely on ARS to function as it is supposed to (Reliability) 
1 2 3 4 5 
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14. Even if I have no reason to expect that ARS will be able to deal with a 
situation, I still feel certain that it will (Faith) 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
15. I understand why ARS makes the decisions it does (Understandability) 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
16. ARS performs well under disturbed conditions (Competence) 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
17. ARS is very consistent (Predictability) 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
18. ARS will always make the same routing decision under the same 
circumstances (Reliability) 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
19. I trust ARS 
1 2 3 4 5 
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APPENDIX F: ODEC SCORES 
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APPENDIX G: OBSERVATION STUDY CONSENT FORM 
 
This study is designed to observe signallers interacting with the signalling system to 
determine individual differences in strategies.  
 
Participation in this study is voluntary and there will be no consequences if you 
choose not to participate. Any information obtained from the research will be 
anonymous and will not be used for any purposes other than this study. The data 
obtained will be used to help design automation in the future. 
 
The method used in this study will be real time data collection by a researcher sitting 
near the signaller. Written records will be made of certain behaviours, such as using 
the trackerball or looking at the simplifier. No recording devices will be used. The 





1. I confirm that I have read and understand the above information and have had 
the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at 
any time. 
 




           




   
Researcher     Date   Signature 
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APPENDIX H: OBSERVATION STUDY SAMPLE DATA 
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APPENDIX I: CONDITIONS DURING OBSERVATIONS 
 
Appendix I: Conditions During Observations 
272 
Appendix J: Smoothness of Observation Data 
273 
APPENDIX J: SMOOTHNESS OF OBSERVATION DATA
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Figure J- 6: Smoothness of Data for Obs 6 
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Figure J- 12: Smoothness of Data for Obs 12 
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Figure J- 18: Smoothness of Data for Obs 18 
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x How is ARS running today? 
 
x How long have you been working here/with ARS? 
x Where did you work before?  
o NX 
o Lever Frame 
 
x What do you think about ARS? 
o Do you like it? 
o Would you prefer to work without it? 
 
x Do you trust ARS? 
o Without the interlocking? 
o Compared to another signaller? 
 
x What do you think are the main problems with ARS? 
o When does it get into difficulties? (Engineering works, late running 
trains) 
 
x What can ARS not do on this workstation? 
 
x Can ARS cope with all situations? 
o Which ones does it have trouble with? 
o Why? 
o What are the problems? 
 
x How could ARS work better in disturbed conditions? 
o What would you like it to do? 
 
x Do you ever wish you didn’t have ARS? 
o Does it ever get in the way? 
 
x How is the programming on here? 





x Can ARS regulate? 




x Who is responsible for running the trains? 
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x Can you explain how ARS works? 
 
x Do you understand how ARS resolves conflicts? 
o The factors it takes into account 
o How do you think it resolves conflicts? 
 
x Do you think ARS is consistent in its decisions? 





x Can you predict ARS? 
o Does it ever surprise you? 
 














x How do you monitor ARS? 
o What screens do you use? 
 
o What are you looking for? 
x Hot-spots 
x Individual trains 
x Length of route 
  
o Do you know how many trains are in your control area right now? 
 
o How long do you feel comfortable looking away for? 
 
o What do you check when you leave the workstation? 
x What information do they need? 
x Where do they get the information from? 
 
o Do you find monitoring difficult? 
x Hard to concentrate? 
x Hard to pay attention? 
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x Boring? 
x Lose focus? 
x How do they get round this? 
 
o What sort of things catch your eye when you’re monitoring? 
 
o If you were to glance at the screen, could you see pretty quickly if 
something was wrong? 
x Needed intervention 





x How often do you interrogate ARS? 
o Why 
o For what information 





x How is your job different with ARS? 
 
x How has ARS changed the workload? 
o Higher/lower 
o Changed the tasks 
o ARS failure/worked workstation without ARS 
 
x Is the job easier with or without ARS? 
 






x Apart from control, does anyone else affect the way you use ARS? 
 
o Does delay attribution affect the decisions you make? 
o If ARS does something stupid, does that delay go down to you? 
 
 
o What impact does planning have on ARS? 
 
 





x Anything else you want to say about ARS? 
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APPENDIX L: SIGNALLER INTERVIEWS CONSENT FORM  
 
 
The purpose of these interviews is to understand how signallers are using ARS and 
what problems there are with it. The interviews are informal but will be recorded by 
the interviewer.  Each interview should take about 1 hour. 
 
Participation in this study is voluntary and there will be no consequences if you 
choose not to participate. Any information obtained from the research will be 
anonymous and will not be used for any purposes other than this study. The recorded 
data will not be made available to anyone else.  
 







1. I confirm that I have read and understand the above information and have had 
the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at 
any time. 
 
3.    I agree to take part in the above study, and to be recorded.     
   
 
 
           




   
Researcher             Date       Signature 
 
 
Appendix M: Signaller Interviews Sample Data 
281 
APPENDIX M: SIGNALLER INTERVIEWS SAMPLE DATA  
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         1 Not Demanding Work is not demanding at all  
         2 Minimal Effort Minimal effort required to keep on top of situation 
         3 Some Spare Time Active with some spare time to 
complete less essential jobs 
         4 Moderate Effort Work demanding but manageable 
with moderate effort 
         5 Moderate Pressure Moderate pressure, work is 
manageable 
         6 Very Busy Very busy but still able to do job 
         7 Extreme Effort 
Extreme effort and concentration 
necessary to ensure everything gets 
done 
         8 Struggling to Keep Up 
Very high level of effort and demand, 
struggling to keep up with 
everything 
         9 Work too Demanding 
Work too demanding - complex or 
multiple problems to deal with and 
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APPENDIX O: IVIEW HED SPECIFICATION 
 
Technology Non-invasive, video-based eye tracking 
Monocular, pupil-CR, dark pupil tracking 
Performance Sampling rate eye movements: 50Hz (default), 200 Hz (optional) 
Tracking Resolution: <0.1° (typ.) 
Gaze position accuracy: <0.5° - 1° (typ.) 
System Operating System: Windows XP 
Workstation: Subnotebook or laptop 
Headset Lightweight bicycle helmet 
Interface weight: 79g 




Digital scene video recording in broadcast quality (720 x 576, 
MPEG-4) 
Socket based API interface via Ethernet (UDP) 
Compatible with SMI BeGaze™ Analysis Software 
Compatible with 3rd party video analysis packages (e.g. The 
Observer™ from Noldus) 
Norm 
Compliance 
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         1 Comfortable Easily achieving all demands  
         2 Coping Achieving all demands but some 
opportunities missed 
         3 Pressurised All demands not met or frequent 
opportunities missed  
  
 
Appendix Q: Situation Awareness Questionnaire 
285 
APPENDIX Q: SITUATION AWARENESS QUESTIONNAIRE 
Situat ion Aw areness Study –  Part  1  
 
Mark on the t rack layout  diagram s (overleaf)  
 
1. The posit ion at  the end of the sim ulat ion of as m any t rains as you 
can recall.  Where possible, write the headcodes – if you can only 
rem em ber part  of the headcode, m ark any gaps with a dash e.g. 
“4F2- “  
2. Where possible, m ark the routes these t rains will follow. Mark 
different  routes for different  t rains using the coloured pens 
provided. 
 
You can see an exam ple, below 
 
 
Put  your answers down in any order you want .  
 
Try to answer the quest ions as quickly as possible – don’t  worry about  






For adm in 
 
Part icipant  num ber:  
 
Date:       Tim e:  
 
Condit ion:  
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Situat ion Aw areness Study –  Part  2  
 
Read the quest ions and below and m ark your answer on the scale 





Qu. 1 . Can you rate the sim ulat ion for  com plexity?  
Was the sim ulat ion sim ple and st raight forward ( low)  or highly changeable 





Qu. 2 . Can you rate the sim ulat ion for  at tent ional dem and?  
Did you have capacity to think about  other things, or did your m ind 
wander, ( low)  or did the sim ulat ion require a high degree of concent rat ion 






Qu. 3 . Can you rate  the sim ulat ion for  understanding?  
Did you feel that  what  was happening was unfam iliar or that  your 
understanding was incom plete ( low)  or did you feel you had com plete and 
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Start simulator  
Plug in, and turn on switch for laptop  
Explain study and sign consent form 
Note that the right hand buttons tend to stick 
Familiarise with IWS 
 
Note participant number, scenario and order  
Put on eye-tracking helmet  
Make sure to use correct mirror  
Check connections  
Start up laptop and open HED and Observer  
Calibrate eye-tracking  
Focus camera  
Press record in Experiment Centre  
Start Experiment  












Stop recording in Observer and save (also a backup)  
Stop recording eye-tracking and save  
Administer SA test  
Save scenario on simulator  
Get data from simulator  
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APPENDIX S: EXPERIMENT CONSENT FORM  
 
 
The purpose of these experiments is to understand the impact of automation (ARS 
and auto-routes) on the signalling task and the signaller. The data obtained will be 
used to help guide the development of future signalling automation systems. 
 
You will be asked to complete three scenarios on the Stratford workstation, using 
different levels of automation in each, using ARS, using auto-routes but not ARS, and 
fully manual signalling. Each scenario is 40 minutes long. You will be provided with a 
simplifier for each scenario and are asked to signal the trains as you normally would.  
 
Several types of data will be collected during each scenario: 
1. Eye-tracking data – you will be asked to wear a bicycle helmet which has eye-
tracking equipment attached to it. This collects information on where you are 
looking throughout the experiment. It is not harmful in any way and should not 
be distracting to you either. 
2. Workload scores – you will be provided with a scale at the start of the 
experiment and you will be asked to rate your workload on this scale at 2 
minute intervals throughout. 
3. Performance scores – minutes lost by signaller, minutes gained by signaller, 
overall percentage score, routes cancelled by signaller. All these data are 
provided by the simulator. 
4. Activity – your activity will be recorded throughout the experiment. It will be 
recorded as one of five categories – monitoring the signalling screens, using 
the keyboard or trackerball, looking at the simplifier, communicating with 
drivers or other signallers, and not involved in the signalling task.  
5. Situation awareness – following each 40 minutes scenario you will be asked 
to fill out a short questionnaire assessing your situation awareness. 
 
In addition, with your consent, the experiment will be video-taped. These data will be 
used only to review the experiment. The recorded data will not be made available to 
anyone else. 
 
Participation in this study is voluntary and there will be no consequences if you 
choose not to participate. Any information obtained from the research will be 
anonymous and will not be used for any purposes other than this study.  
 
Thank you for your time and co-operation with this effort. 
 




1. I confirm that I have read and understand the above information and have had 
the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at 
any time. 
 
3.    I agree to take part in the above study, and to be recorded.     
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APPENDIX T: DATA SETS  
 
The following data sets are included on the accompanying CD: 
 
Chapter 4: Structured Observations of Signallers Data Sets 
x Observation Data 
x Observation Data from Second Observer 
x Trust Questionnaire Data 
 
Chapter 5: Signaller Interviews Data Sets 
x Interview 3 transcript 
Only one transcript is included as a sample due to concerns with maintaining the 
anonymity of participants.  
 
Chapter 6: Level of Automation Experiment Data Sets 
x Observed Behaviours 
x Observed Interventions 
x IWS Scores 
x Performance Scores 
x Eye-tracking Data 
 
Appendix C: Validation of Principles of Automation 
x Paired Comparisons Data 
 
 
